OPERATION CLAMBAKE: SCIENTOLOGY COURT FILES

Part of a public library containing court papers related to lawsuits involving Scientology in some way. Collected to help lawyers and critics of Scientology in future lawsuits from or against this cult. Please report back if this has been of help, or send new contributions to the collection. Thanks. Andreas Heldal-Lund (heldal@online.no)




                 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner
                                       v.
                            INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE.
                                   No. 86-472.
                       Supreme Court of the United States
                              Argued Oct. 5, 1987.
                             Decided Nov. 10, 1987.
  Action was brought under the Freedom of Information Act to compel disclosure
 of certain information by the IRS.  The United States District Court for the
 District of Columbia, 569 F.Supp. 1165, denied relief.  The United States
 Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 792 F.Supp. 146 and 792
 F.2d 153, vacated and remanded.  The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
 held that mere redaction by identifying data will not, by virtue of the Haskell
 amendment, take material out of the definition of return information, which is
 required to be kept confidential.
  Affirmed.

 [1] INTERNAL REVENUE
 Mere redaction of data identifying the taxpayer will not, by virtue of the
 Haskell amendment allowing disclosure of data in a form which cannot be
 directly associated with a particular taxpayer, take the material out of the
 definition of "return information" which may not be disclosed by the Internal
 Revenue Service.  26 U.S.C.A. s 6103(b)(2).

 [2] RECORDS
 If confidentiality provision of the Internal Revenue Code forbids the
 disclosure of material, it may not be produced in response to a request under
 the Freedom of Information Act.  26 U.S.C.A. s 6103;  5 U.S.C.A. s
 552(b)(3).

 [3] INTERNAL REVENUE
 Nonidentifying data in income tax return does not cease to be "return
 information" at all for purposes of confidentiality provision.  26
 U.S.C.A. s 6103.
 See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and
 definitions.

 [4] INTERNAL REVENUE
 One of the major purposes of 1976 revision of Internal Revenue Code
 confidentiality provision was to tighten restrictions on the use of return
 information by entities other than the Internal Revenue Service.  26
 U.S.C.A. s 6103.
                                 Syllabus [FN*]

      FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has
     been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
     reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26
     S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

  *9 Section 6103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that tax
 returns and "return information" shall be confidential and shall not be
 disclosed except as authorized.  "Return information" is defined in
 s 6103(b)(2) to include a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount
 of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets,
 liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies,
 overassessments, tax payments, or any other data with respect to a return or to
 the determination of the existence or amount of liability.  However,
 s 6103(b)(2) also contains the proviso, known as the Haskell Amendment,
 that "return information" does not include data "in a form" which cannot be
 associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular
 taxpayer.  Upon the Internal Revenue Service's slow response to petitioner's
 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the production of numerous
 records containing information relating to it, petitioner filed suit in Federal
 District Court to compel release of the materials.  The court held that the IRS
 had correctly limited its search for and disclosure of the requested materials,
 and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Haskell Amendment's "in a
 form" phrase contemplates agency reformulation of return information into a
 statistical study or some other composite product and not merely the deletion
 of the taxpayer's name and other identifying data.
  Held:  The Haskell Amendment does not exempt from s 6103(b)(2)'s definition
 of confidential "return information" material in IRS files which can be
 redacted to delete those parts which would identify a particular taxpayer.  If
 the mere removal of identifying details sufficed to put the information "in a
 form" envisioned by the Amendment, the remainder of the protected categories of
 information included in s 6103(b)(2) would often be irrelevant, and the "in
 a form" phrase would itself be extremely awkward, confusing, and unnecessary.
 Petitioner's contrary construction of the Amendment is likewise belied by other
 provisions of s 6103 which set forth various exceptions to the general rule
 of confidentiality and recognize that "return information" remains such even
 when it does not identify a particular taxpayer.  Moreover, the legislative
 history also refutes petitioner's construction, since allowing the disclosure
 of *10 otherwise confidential return information merely by the redaction of
 identifying details would undercut s 6103's primary purpose of limiting
 access to tax filings.  In fact, the Amendment was simply intended to permit
 continuation of the IRS's practice of releasing statistical studies and
 compilations that do not identify particular taxpayers.  Thus, since deletion
 of identifying data would not make otherwise protected return information
 discloseable, there is no merit to petitioner's contention that respondent has
 an FOIA duty to undertake such redaction.  Pp. 273-276.
  253 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 792 F.2d 153, affirmed.
  REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
 Members joined, except BRENNAN and SCALIA, JJ., who took no part in the
 consideration or decision of the case.
  **272 Michael Lee Hertzberg argued the causefor petitioner.  With him on the
 briefs were Eric M. Lieberman and Ellen J.  Winner.
  Deputy Solicitor General Lauber argued the cause for respondent.  With him on
 the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mann,
 and Alan I. Horowitz.*
  * David C. Vladeck and Alan B. Morrison filed a brief for Professor John L.
 Neufeld et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
  John A. Powell, Stephen K. Strong, and David F. Stobaugh filed a brief for the
 American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae.

  Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
  [1] Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code 26 U.S.C. s 6103, lays
 down a general rule that "returns" and "return information" as defined therein
 shall be confidential.  "Return information" is elaborately defined in
 s 6103(b)(2);  immediately after that definition appears the following
 proviso, known as the Haskell Amendment:
   "[B]ut such term does not include data in a form which cannot be associated
 with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer."
  Petitioner Church of Scientology of California, seeking disclosure under the
 Freedom of Information Act, contends that *11 the Haskell Amendment excepts
 from the definition of "return information" all material in the files of the
 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which can be redacted to delete those parts
 which would identify a particular taxpayer.  Respondent IRS in opposition
 argues that the mere redaction of identifying data will not, by virtue of the
 Haskell Amendment, take the material out of the definition of "return
 information."  We agree with the IRS.
  Petitioner filed a request with respondent under the Freedom of Information
 Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. s 552, for the production of numerous documents.  Among
 the materials sought by petitioner were "[c]opies of all information relating
 to or containing the names of, Scientology, Church of Scientology, any specific
 Scientology church or entity identified by containing the words Scientology,
 Hubbard and/or Dianetics in their names, L. Ron Hubbard or Mary Sue Hubbard in
 the form of written record, correspondence, document, memorandum, form,
 computor [sic] tape, computor [sic] program **273 or microfilm, which is
 contained in" an extensive list of respondent's case files and data systems.
 FOIA Request Dated May 16, 1980, App. 20a-27a.  Petitioner also requested
 similar information from the offices and personal areas of a number of
 respondent's officials.
  [2] Dissatisfied by the slow response to its request, petitioner filed suit
 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to compel
 release of the materials.  In the District Court the parties agreed--as they
 continue to agree here--that s 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code is the sort
 of statute referred to by the FOIA in 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(3) relating to
 matters that are "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ...";  thus,
 if s 6103 forbids the disclosure of material, it may not be produced in
 response to a request under the FOIA.  Respondent argued that many of the
 records were protected as "returns" or "return information" under s 6103.
 Section 6103(a) provides that "[r]eturns and return information shall be
 confidential" and shall not be *12 disclosed "except as authorized by this
 title."  A "return" is defined in s 6103(b)(1) as "any tax or information
 return, declaration of estimated tax, or claim for refund" including supporting
 schedules, attachments, and lists.  Section 6103(b)(2) then supplies a more
 extensive definition of "return information," which includes:
   "[A] taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income,
 payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net
 worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, over-assessments, or tax
 payments, whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be examined or
 subject to other investigation or processing, or any other data, received by,
 recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with
 respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the existence, or
 possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person under
 this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other
 imposition, or offense...."
  After providing this detailed explanation of confidential "return
 information," s 6103(b)(2), as previously noted, continues:  "but such term
 does not include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise
 identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer."  This last clause--
 the Haskell Amendment--was proposed as a floor amendment by Senator Haskell of
 Colorado and was adopted by a voice vote during the debate on the 1976
 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code.
  The District Court, after an in camera review of representative documents,
 held that respondent had correctly limited its search for and disclosure of
 materials requested by petitioner.  569 F.Supp. 1165 (D.D.C.1983).
 Petitioner appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
 District of Columbia Circuit.  Following briefing and argument before a three-
 judge panel, the Court of Appeals  *13 sua sponte undertook en banc review of
 the meaning of the Haskell Amendment and the modification it works upon
 s 6103(b)(2).  The Court of Appeals concluded that, by using the words "in a
 form," Congress contemplated "not merely the deletion of an identifying name or
 symbol on a document that contains return information, but agency reformulation
 of the return information into a statistical study or some other composite
 product...."  253 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 92, 792 F.2d 153, 160 (1986) (emphasis in
 original).  Thus, the court held, before respondent may produce documents
 otherwise protected, the Haskell Amendment requires that some modification have
 occurred in the form of the data contained in the documents.  "[M]ere deletion
 of the taxpayer's name or other identifying data is not enough, since that
 would render the reformulation requirement entirely duplicative of the
 nonidentification requirement." [FN1]  Id., at 95, 792 F.2d, at 163.

      FN1. The decision of the District of Columbia Circuit was thus in
     substantial agreement with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in King v. IRS,
     688 F.2d 488 (1982), and the Eleventh Circuit's determination in Currie
     v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523 (1983).  The Seventh Circuit concluded in King
     that s 6103 "protects from disclosure all nonamalgamated items listed in
     subsection (b)(2)(A), and that the Haskell Amendment provides only for the
     disclosure of statistical tabulations which are not associated with or do
     not identify particular taxpayers."  688 F.2d, at 493.  Similarly, in
     Currie the Eleventh Circuit held that the Haskell Amendment does not
     obligate the IRS, in a suit under the FOIA, to delete identifying material
     from documents and release what would otherwise be return information.
     704 F.2d, at 531-532.
     The Ninth Circuit, however, reached a different result in Long v. IRS,
     596 F.2d 362 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 1851, 64
     L.Ed.2d 271 (1980).  In Long, the court found that the Haskell Amendment
     removes from the category of protected return information any documents
     that do not identify a particular taxpayer once names, addresses, and
     similar details are deleted.  See 596 F.2d, at 367-369.

  **274 We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 1063, 107 S.Ct. 947, 93 L.Ed.2d
 996 (1987), to consider the scope of the Haskell Amendment and its relation to
 the *14 confidentiality provisions of ss 6103(a) and (b). [FN2]
 Petitioner believes that the Haskell Amendment makes significantly greater
 inroads on the definition of "return information" than did the Court of
 Appeals.  It makes two interrelated contentions:  first, that the Haskell
 Amendment removes from the classification of "return information" all data
 which do not identify a particular taxpayer, and, second, that 5 U.S.C. s
 552(b)--requiring that "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion" of a record be
 provided to a requester after deletion of the portions which are exempt--
 compels respondent to redact "return information" in its files where possible
 so as to bring that material within the terms of the Haskell Amendment.  We
 reject both of these arguments.

      FN2. The original panel applied the en banc decision to the search and
     disclosure undertaken by respondent.  See 253 U.S.App.D.C. 78, 792 F.2d
     146 (1986).  Although many of the requested documents were protected as
     "return information," the panel found that the District Court had erred in
     accepting respondent's blanket assertion that all information responsive to
     petitioner's request in files unrelated to petitioner's California branch
     was exempt from disclosure.  The panel remanded the case to District Court
     with instructions that respondent conduct a new search for information
     about the third parties identified by petitioner and justify any
     withholding of the information under the FOIA or s 6103.  See id., at
     84-85, 792 F.2d, at 152-153.

  We are told by the IRS that, as a practical matter, "return information" might
 include the report of an audit examination, internal IRS correspondence
 concerning a taxpayer's claim, or a notice of deficiency issued by the IRS
 proposing an increase in the taxpayer's assessment.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 24-25.
 Petitioner asserts that the segregation requirement of the FOIA, s 552(b),
 directs respondent to remove the identifiers from such documents as these and
 that, once the materials are purged of such identifiers, they must be disclosed
 because they no longer constitute return information described in
 s 6103(b)(2).
  We find no support for petitioner's arguments in either the language of
 s 6103 or in its legislative history.  In addition to *15 the returns
 themselves, which are protected from disclosure by s 6103(b)(1),
 s 6103(b)(2) contains an elaborate description of the sorts of information
 related to returns that respondent is compelled to keep confidential.  If the
 mere removal of identifying details from return information sufficed to put the
 information "in a form" envisioned by the Haskell Amendment, the remainder of
 the categories included in s 6103(b)(2) would often be irrelevant.  The
 entire section could have been prefaced by the simple instruction to respondent
 that the elimination of identifiers would shift related tax data outside the
 realm of protected return information.  Respondent would then first determine
 whether the information could be redacted so as not to identify a taxpayer;
 only if it could not would the extensive list of materials that constitute
 "return information" become pertinent.  And if petitioner correctly interprets
 the intent of the Haskell Amendment, Congress' drafting was awkward in the
 extreme.  The Amendment exempts "data **275 in a form " (emphasis added) that
 cannot be associated with or otherwise identify a particular taxpayer.  A much
 more natural phrasing would omit the confusing and unnecessary words "in a
 form" and refer simply to data.
  [3] Other provisions of s 6103 likewise belie petitioner's construction
 of the Haskell Amendment.  Subsections (c) through (o ) of s 6103 set forth
 various exceptions to the general rule that returns and return information are
 confidential and not to be disclosed.  These subsections provide that in some
 circumstances, and with special safeguards, returns and return information can
 be made available to congressional committees, the President, state tax
 officials, and other federal agencies.  The subsections also recognize that
 "return information" remains such even when it does not identify a particular
 taxpayer.  Subsections 6103(f)(1), (2), and (4), for example, allow the release
 of returns and return information to congressional committees, but distinguish
 between return information that identifies a taxpayer and return information
 that does not.  Subsection (f) is thus inconsistent with petitioner's *16
 theory that nonidentifying data cease to be return information at all.
  [4] The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.L. 94-455, 90
 Stat. 1520, of which the amendments to s 6103 are a part, also indicates
 that Congress did not intend the statute to allow the disclosure of otherwise
 confidential return information merely by the redaction of identifying
 details.  One of the major purposes in revising s 6103 was to tighten the
 restrictions on the use of return information by entities other than
 respondent.  See S.Rep. No. 94-938, p. 318 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
 1976, pp. 2897, 3747 ("[R]eturns and return information should generally be
 treated as confidential and not subject to disclosure except in those limited
 situations delineated in the newly amended section 6103").  Petitioner's
 suggestion that the Haskell Amendment was intended to modify the restrictions
 of s 6103 by making all nonidentifying return information eligible for
 disclosure would mean that the Amendment was designed to undercut the
 legislation's primary purpose of limiting access to tax filings.
  The circumstances under which the Haskell Amendment was adopted make us
 reluctant to credit it with this expansive purpose.  During debate on the
 Senate floor, Senator Haskell proposed that s 6103(b)(2) be amended to make
 clear that return information "does not include data in a form which cannot be
 associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular
 taxpayer."  He then added this explanation of his proposal:
   "[T]he purpose of this amendment is to insure that statistical studies and
 other compilations of data now prepared by the Internal Revenue Service and
 disclosed by it to outside parties will continue to be subject to disclosure to
 the extent allowed under present law.  Thus the Internal Revenue Service can
 continue to release for research purposes statistical studies and compilations
 of data, such as the tax model, which do not identify individual taxpayers.
   *17 "The definition of 'return information' was intended to neither
 enhance nor diminish access now obtainable under the Freedom of Information Act
 to statistical studies and compilations of data by the Internal Revenue
 Service.  Thus, the addition by the Internal Revenue Service of easily
 deletable identifying information to the type of statistical study or
 compilation of data which, under its current practice, has [sic] been subject
 to disclosure, will not prevent disclosure of such study or compilation under
 the newly amended s 6103.  In such an instance, the identifying information
 would be deleted and disclosure of the statistical study or compilation of data
 be made."  122 Cong.Rec. 24012 (1976).
  After these remarks, the floor manager of the legislation, Senator Long, added
 that he would "be happy to take this amendment to **276 conference.  It might
 not be entirely necessary, but it might serve a good purpose."  The Haskell
 Amendment was then passed by voice vote in the Senate and became part of the
 conference bill.
  We find it difficult to believe that Congress in this manner adopted an
 amendment which would work such an alteration to the basic thrust of the draft
 bill amending s 6103.  The Senate's purpose in revising s 6103 was, as we
 have noted, to impose greater restrictions on the disclosure of tax data;  a
 change in the proposed draft permitting disclosure of all return information
 after deletion of material identifying a particular taxpayer would have, it
 seems to us, at a minimum engendered some debate in the Senate and resulted in
 a rollcall vote.  More importantly, Senator Haskell's remarks clearly indicate
 that he did not mean to revise s 6103(b)(2) in this fashion.  He refers only
 to statistical studies and compilations, and gives no intimation that his
 amendment would require respondent to remove identifying details from material
 as it exists in its files in order to comply with its requirement.  All in all,
 we think this is a case where common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur
 Conan Doyle's "dog that *18 didn't bark," that an amendment having the
 effect petitioner ascribes to it would have been differently described by its
 sponsor, and not nearly as readily accepted by the floor manager of the bill.
  We thus hold that, as with a return itself, removal of identification from
 return information would not deprive it of protection under s 6103(b).
 Since such deletion would not make otherwise protected return information
 discloseable, respondent has no duty under the FOIA to undertake such
 redaction.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
  Affirmed.

  Justices BRENNAN and SCALIA took no part in the consideration or decision of
 this case.

End of file...