CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, a corporation; Religious Technology
Center, a corporation; and Scientology Missions International, a corporation,
The ELMIRA MISSION OF the CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY, a corporation, a/k/a Church of
Scientology, Mission of Elmira, a/k/a Dianetics Center, a/k/a Scientology
Elmira, a/k/a Center for Creative Learning; Harry Palmer, an individual; and
Avra Honey-Smith, an individual, Defendants.
United States District Court,
W.D. New York.
Aug. 1, 1985.
International religious organization, which had brought trademark infringement
suit against local religious organization, moved for preliminary injunction to
restrain local organization from further infringement during pendency of suit.
The District Court, Telesca, J., held that international organization failed to
show irreparable injury necessary for issuance of preliminary injunction.
 COPYRIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
When plaintiff seeks preliminary injunction for violations of trademark or
copyright law, allegations of irreparable injury need not be very detailed.
 TRADE REGULATION
When plaintiff seeks preliminary injunction for violations of trademark or
copyright law, allegations of irreparable injury need not be very detailed.
 TRADE REGULATION
Plaintiff who demonstrates likelihood of success in trademark infringement
action will almost inevitably be entitled to presumption of possible
irreparable injury adequate to sustain granting of preliminary injunction, but
that inference must always remain open to rebuttal. Lanham Trade-
Mark Act, s 32(1), 15 U.S.C.A. s 1114(1).
District court could take judicial notice of distances separating three cities
in New York based on data compiled and released by local "Auto Club."
Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 201, 28 U.S.C.A.
 TRADE REGULATION
Trademark violation does not pose any threat of irreparable injury, for
purposes of determining whether to issue preliminary injunction, merely because
consumers are confused into believing that they are dealing with authorized or
licensed distributor. Lanham Trade-Mark Act, s 32(1), 15 U.S.C.A. s
 TRADE REGULATION
International religious organization failed to establish "irreparable injury"
necessary for issuance of injunction against local organization that was
allegedly using international organization's trade name and marks without
authorization, where local and international organization were not in direct
economic competition, and where there was no showing that courses and services
offered by local organization were inferior to or differed from those offered
by authorized missions and churches. Lanham Trade-Mark Act, s 32(1), 15
U.S.C.A. s 1114(1).
*501 Harris, Beach, Wilcox, Rubin & Levey, Rochester, N.Y. (Kevin J.
Arquit, Rochester, N.Y., of counsel), for plaintiffs.
Weidman & Jordan, Rochester, N.Y. (Mark S. Nunn, Rochester, N.Y., of counsel),
TELESCA, District Judge.
For over a decade, defendant Harry Palmer has been the operator and President
of the Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology. The Elmira Mission
operated for many years with the blessings of the highest church officials
until 1984, when the Elmira Chapter ceased paying its regular tithes to the
mother church in California, Scientology Missions International. Within a few
months, Mr. Palmer was notified by the Religious Technology Center (which
purports to be the owner and protector of the trademarks associated with the
religion of Scientology) that he had violated the obligations of his license
agreement. After the parties failed in attempts at private dispute resolution,
including arbitration, the Church of Scientology International brought the
matter to this Court.
According to the complaint, the Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology is
presently using the "Scientology" tradename and marks without the authorization
of the church organization, and is therefore infringing plaintiffs' rights
under the Federal Trademark Act of 1946. [FN1] Consequently, plaintiffs now
move this Court for a preliminary injunction to restrain defendants from
further infringement during the pendency of this lawsuit. For the reasons set
forth below, that request must be denied.
FN1. Plaintiffs also assert additional claims arising under New York State
law, but have expressly based their application for a preliminary
injunction solely on their claims for relief under Federal Trademark law.
"Perhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is a demonstration that if it is not granted the
applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits
can be rendered." Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d
Cir.1985) (quoting 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,
Section 2948, at 431 (1973)). Plaintiffs have made no serious attempt to
explain with evidentiary detail how that requirement might be satisfied under
the particular facts of this case. Rather, plaintiffs have placed their
primary reliance on the argument that the elements of "irreparable harm" are
established in a trademark action simply by a showing of *502 the likelihood
of plaintiff's success on the merits. Plaintiffs apparently take the position
that they must be entitled to a preliminary injunction if they succeed in
demonstrating a likelihood of success on their trademark claim, since such a
showing would entail, as a matter of law, a conclusive and irrebuttable
presumption of possible irreparable injury. Although the defendants have never
contested that position, I draw a contrary conclusion from my reading of the
applicable case law.
 When a plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction for violations of
trademark or copyright law, it is now well settled in this Circuit that
"allegations of irreparable injury need not be very detailed", because normally
such injury can be presumed from infringement. Wainwright Securities, Inc.
v. Wall Street Transcript Corporation, 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d
Cir.1977) (copyright), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014, 98 S.Ct. 730, 54 L.Ed.2d
759 (1978). Due to the unique role played by a trademark in commerce, and the
difficulties in measuring the value of the goodwill that it represents, there
is a virtually insurmountable presumption that irreparable harm is at least
possible (if not likely) where infringement is not enjoined. Consequently,
when a plaintiff establishes a likelihood of success in a trademark
infringement action, by demonstrating that defendant's use of a mark is likely
to cause confusion or mistake, the courts in this Circuit will almost routinely
find the possibility of irreparable harm and grant preliminary injunctive
In P. Daussa Corp. v. Sutton Cosmetics (P.R.) Inc., 462 F.2d 134, 136 (2d
Cir.1972), the Court of Appeals announced that, "in trademark cases, confusing
similarity between marks is sufficient injury to warrant the issuance of a
preliminary injunction". Reasoning that "an injunction will issue" when an
infringing mark is likely to cause confusion, the Second Circuit held that the
District Court Judge below had abused her discretion in denying a preliminary
injunction on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show the necessary
"irreparable injury". Id. Accord, Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1052 (2d Cir.1983) ("A preliminary
injunction will issue where an advertisement creates a reasonable likelihood of
confusion by consumers regarding the origin or sponsorship of the product"),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823, 105 S.Ct. 100, 83 L.Ed.2d 45 (1984); Coca-
Cola Company v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d
Cir.1982) (Holding that statistical tests provided "sufficient evidence of a
risk of irreparable harm because they demonstrate that a significant number of
consumers would be likely to be misled"); Matter of Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
606 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1979) ("In a trademark infringement case such as this, a
substantial likelihood of confusion constitutes, in and of itself, irreparable
injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 65(b)(1)");
American Home Products Corporation v. Johnson Chemical Company, Inc., 589
F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir.1978).
In reliance on these and similar pronouncements, many District Courts in this
Circuit have held that the requisite showing of possible irreparable injury
follows as a matter of course where there is a likelihood of consumer
confusion. Tavaro S.A. v. Jolson, 591 F.Supp. 846, 853-54 (S.D.N.Y.1984);
Camp Beverly Hills, Inc. v. Camp Central Park, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 783, 785
(S.D.N.Y.1982); Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe International Corp., 509
F.Supp. 1036, 1044-45 (S.D.N.Y.1981); Lacoste Alligator S.A. v. F.
Saltstein, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. 985 (S.D.N.Y.1981).
In a pair of recent trademark decisions, however, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals has now made it clear that it will demand a slightly more
discriminating analysis of the requirements for a preliminary injunction.
See Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273 (2d Cir.1985) and Bell &
Howell: Mamiya Company v. Masel Supply Company Corp., 719 F.2d 42 (2d
Cir.1983). In both cases, the District Courts below had found that the
plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of demonstrating a likelihood of
confusion. Consequently, in *503 keeping with what had become the customary
practice within this Circuit, both District Courts granted preliminary
injunctions against continued infringement without any extended discussion or
explicit findings with respect to irreparable harm. In both cases, however,
the Court of Appeals vacated the preliminary injunction as an abuse of
discretion, on the grounds that the District Court had failed to adequately
consider whether there was a sufficient factual foundation for any presumption
of possible irreparable harm. Without deciding whether the plaintiffs were
likely to prevail on the question of trademark infringement, the Second Circuit
decided in both cases that the type of "confusion" found by the District Court
did not support an inference of possible irreparable injury. [FN2]
FN2. Although the Second Circuit's decisions in Bell & Howell and
Citibank represent a fairly clear departure from prior case law in this
Circuit, the issue apparently remains somewhat unsettled. In its most
recent pronouncement on this subject, in a decision reached subsequent to
oral argument in the instant case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that, "[i]n a trademark case, irreparable injury will be found"
where the plaintiff demonstrates a likelihood of success on the issue of
potential consumer confusion. Joseph Scott Company v. Scott Swimming
Pools, Inc., 764 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.1985). Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals upheld the District Court's finding of possible irreparable harm
(and the issuance of a preliminary injunction) simply on the grounds that
confusion seemed likely, without any further discussion as to how that
confusion might lead to irreparable injury. Id., at 67.
This aspect of the Scott decision is not easily reconciled with the
other recent decisions by the Second Circuit on this same question,
although it is consistent with the substantial body of prior case law. The
resolution of this tension requires--and surely deserves--further
clarification from the Court of Appeals for this Circuit.
Accordingly, although the inference of possible irreparable harm is nearly
inexorable when a likelihood of confusion is established, that presumption may
be rebutted. Citibank, supra, 756 F.2d at 276; Dow Jones and Company,
Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 546 F.Supp. 113, 117
(S.D.N.Y.1982) (copyright). As Chief Judge Henry J. Friendly observed, in
defining the standard for preliminary injunctive relief against trademark
infringement: "Where there is, then, such high probability of confusion,
injury irreparable in the sense that it may not be fully compensable in damages
almost inevitably follows." Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera
Company, 451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir.1971) (emphasis added). This conclusion
is compelled by the fundamental principles of equity jurisprudence, since a
rigid and irrebuttable presumption of irreparable harm would violate the well-
established maxim that "equitable relief must, by its very nature, be tailored
to the facts of a particular dispute". Joseph Scott Company v. Scott
Swimming Pools, Inc., 764 F.2d 62, 63 (2d Cir.1985). The Second Circuit has
repeatedly observed that suits demanding injunctive relief against trademark
infringement require a "comprehensive analysis of all the relevant facts and
circumstances", Vitarroz v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 968 (2d Cir.1981),
since "each trademark infringement case presents its own unique set of
facts". Thompsom Medical Co., Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 214 (2d
 For the foregoing reasons, I hold that a plaintiff who demonstrates a
likelihood of success in a trademark infringement action will "almost
inevitably" be entitled to a presumption of possible irreparable injury
adequate to sustain the granting of a preliminary injunction, but that
inference must always remain open to rebuttal. Consequently, before granting a
preliminary injunction against trademark infringement, a Federal Judge must
first be satisfied that the reasoning traditionally underlying the ordinary
presumption of "irreparable harm" is consistent with the unique facts and
circumstances of the particular case. This duty exists even where, as here,
the party opposing the injunction has made no serious attempt to explain why
that ordinary presumption might be inapplicable. [FN3] Accordingly, I now turn
to *504 the question of whether there is any realistic possibility that the
infringing activities alleged in this case, if not enjoined during the pendency
of this lawsuit, might cause harm which is "irreparable" in the sense that it
cannot be fully compensated by legal remedies.
FN3. In their opposition to this motion, defendants have placed primary
reliance on their arguments as to plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the
With respect to the possibility of irreparable harm, defendants' primary
contention has been simply that plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden
of proof, even though defendants have never disputed plaintiffs' position
that such a possibility can normally be inferred from the likelihood of
success on the merits. Beyond that, defendants' only argument as to
irreparable injury has been their assertion, without the citation of any
legal authority, that the Church of Scientology is too large to be injured
economically, and too notorious to suffer any further damage to the
commercial value of its good will and reputation.
Fortunately for the defendants, my disposition of the issues raised in this
opinion renders it unnecessary for me to rule on any of those arguments.
To prevail on their claim for federal trademark infringement, plaintiffs will
be required to prove that the defendants' business activities are "likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive". 15 U.S.C. Section
1114(1). In trademark cases where the plaintiff appears likely to prevail on
the merits, the courts of this Circuit will normally presume that such
"confusion", if not enjoined, will be likely to cause irreparable economic
injury. Generally speaking, that possibility of irreparable harm may be
created in two different ways: by the defendant's exploitation of protected
trademarks for its own advantage, or by the defendant's corruption or dilution
of the value of the goodwill and reputation associated with that trademark.
Both of those possibilities must now be considered individually in the context
of this particular factual situation.
The most common economic injury of trademark infringement occurs when the
infringer exploits the value of its competitor's trademark in an effort "to
divert business by misinforming the consumer". Sutton Cosmetics v. Lander
Company, 455 F.2d 285, 288 (2d Cir.1972). The result for the trademark owner
may be a direct loss of sales, since many consumers are deceived or confused
into associating the infringer's product or service with the trademark.
Although the injured trademark owner would be entitled to recover the profits
on the infringing items, the lost profits may not be fully compensable in
monetary damages, since it is "notoriously difficult" to prove the loss of
sales due to infringement. Omega Importing Corp., supra, 451 F.2d at 1195.
Consequently, the ordinary presumption of irreparable harm is valid where a
competitor's activities are likely to "mislead consumers and, as a consequence,
cause them to shift their purchases from plaintiff's product to defendant's".
Coca-Cola Company, supra, 690 F.2d at 317. Accord, Wainwright
Securities, supra, 558 F.2d at 94 (copyright).
 In the present case, there appears to be no likelihood that defendants'
allegedly infringing activities would directly divert any business from the
plaintiffs, since there is no evidence that the parties are in direct economic
competition. The plaintiffs have never denied or contradicted the sworn
deposition testimony of defendant Harry Palmer that the Elmira Mission of the
Church of Scientology is the only Scientology mission in that city, and that
"[t]here is no other Scientology organization in Elmira to compete with".
(Palmer deposition at 38.) Mr. Palmer also testified, and plaintiffs' counsel
conceded at oral argument, that the Elmira Mission is the only Church of
Scientology within a radius of almost 150 miles of that town. [FN4]
FN4. Mr. Palmer testified that the Elmira Mission is the only Scientology
Center between Buffalo and New York City. According to data compiled and
released by the Auto Club of Elmira, that city is a drive of 144 miles from
Buffalo, and 240 miles from New York City. These facts are a proper matter
for judicial notice. Federal Rules of Evidence 201.
All of the evidence presented to this Court indicates that the impact of the
Elmira *505 Mission's activities is entirely confined to an area where the
plaintiffs have had no competing business interests at all. These factors
suggest that any diversion of plaintiffs' sales by defendants' competition will
be minimal at best, easily calculated, and readily compensated by monetary
damages. I therefore must conclude that there is no realistic possibility that
the Elmira Mission might irreparably injure the Church of Scientology by
directly reducing the demand for plaintiffs' services.
This conclusion is compelled by the decision of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in Sutton Cosmetics, supra, 455 F.2d at 286, in which the court
upheld a preliminary injunction against apparent trademark infringement,
"[w]ith the single modification of limiting the geographical scope of the
injunction to the areas in which [the plaintiff] has sold". The court reasoned
A preliminary injunction under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act will issue
only on a showing of a clear likelihood of success on the merits and
irreparable injury, and [plaintiff] cannot be irreparably injured by
[defendant's] sales in markets in which [plaintiff] does not itself sell.
Accordingly, we hold that the order must be modified to encompass only [those
geographical] areas in which the district court finds that [plaintiff] was
making sales at the time of the suit.
Id., at 288-289 (footnote and citation omitted). [FN5] Applying that
standard to the instant case, the Church of Scientology's request for a
preliminary injunction must be denied altogether.
FN5. It is noteworthy that, in this respect, the Sutton decision is
also inconsistent with the plaintiffs' argument (see Part I of this
decision) that a showing of plaintiffs' likelihood of success in a
trademark action necessarily entails the possibility of irreparable harm
and the propriety of preliminary injunctive relief.
Even where the parties to a trademark action are not direct economic
competitors, irreparable injury is often found where the infringer's activities
threaten to injure the economic value of the goodwill and reputation associated
with the trademark. If consumers are confused into "mistak[ing] defendants'
inferior goods for those of plaintiffs", the resulting loss of goodwill may not
be easily translated into money damages. LaCoste Alligator, supra, 216
U.S.P.Q. at 989. Consequently, "if an infringer's product is of poor quality,
or simply not worth the price, a more lasting but not readily measurable injury
may be inflicted on the plaintiff's reputation in the market". Omega
Importing Corp., supra, 451 F.2d at 1195. Finally, infringers may also
undermine the value of a trademark by diluting its distinctiveness, and the
resulting confusion "may cause purchasers to refrain from buying either product
and to turn to those of other competitors". Id. Once again, however, the
unusual and undisputed circumstances of this case apparently rule out any
possibility that the Elmira Mission might irreparably injure the Church of
Scientology in any of these ways.
First of all, there is no possibility that the Elmira Mission might confuse or
deceive anyone into a "mistaken" impression that the Church of Scientology
International has authorized individual churches and missions to deliver
Scientology services and materials on a local basis. On the contrary,
plaintiffs concede that they have licensed 33 churches and over 80 missions of
Scientology in the United States alone, and each uses the term "Church of
Scientology" as a part of its name. (Affidavit of Warren McShane para. 5).
Furthermore, plaintiffs have never even alleged, much less offered any
evidence, that the courses and services offered by the Elmira Mission are in
any way inferior to, or even different from, those being provided by authorized
missions and churches. [FN6] Indeed, all of the available evidence
*506 points to a contrary conclusion. Plaintiffs concede that the Elmira
Mission was an authorized mission of the Church of Scientology "for many years
and until at least 1982", [FN7] at which time the Elmira Mission was granted by
Scientology Missions International a written license to use the assorted
trademarks owned by the Church. [FN8] Plaintiffs further concede that the
Elmira Mission was authorized and licensed to use the trademarks and service
marks of the religion, including the name "Scientology", "until relatively
recently". [FN9] Yet, despite these admissions, the plaintiffs have never
denied or drawn into serious question the testimony of Harry Palmer that the
Elmira Mission has been providing the same Scientology training and courses for
more than a decade. [FN10] Plaintiffs have offered neither allegations nor
evidence to dispute Palmer's testimony that the Elmira Mission is still
offering the same services it provided during the decade when it operated with
the blessings and authorization of top Church officials. Indeed, when asked by
this Court whether the defendants are presently teaching Scientology in
accordance with the established tenets of the religion, plaintiffs' counsel
replied, "We do not know what they are teaching." (Tr. oral arg. 11).
FN6. I must therefore conclude, as the Court of Appeals did in Bell &
Howell, supra, 719 F.2d at 46, that "there would appear to be ... no
significant likelihood of damage to [the plaintiff's] reputation" since
thus far there has been no evidence that the courses and instruction
offered by the Elmira Mission are inferior to those sold by the Church of
FN7. Plaintiffs' Memorandum dated May 2, 1985, at 4.
FN8. Affidavit of Warren McShane, para. 11.
FN9. Plaintiffs' notice of motion and motion for preliminary injunction,
dated May 2, 1985, para. 7.
FN10. Palmer deposition, at 25. In fact, far from questioning Palmer's
assertion that he has been offering the same courses for 12 years,
plaintiffs have indicated a willingness to adopt that statement as an
admission against defendants' interest on the issue of infringement. See
the affidavit of Kevin J. Arquit, sworn to May 29, 1985, at p. 4.
In fact, however, plaintiffs have a rather accurate idea of what the
defendants are teaching at the Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology.
Along with this motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs filed on the
same day the affidavit of Celeste DeFiore, a student at Elmira College who
visited the Elmira Mission on a number of occasions beginning in late 1984,
months after the defendants had allegedly repudiated their license agreement.
Her affidavit contains a detailed narration of what she was shown, sold, and
taught at the Mission, and includes a number of exhibits of pamphlets and
brochures that she was sold or given by the defendants. Those pamphlets
purport to quote heavily from, and appear to promote the sale of, books and
materials marketed by the Church of Scientology. In light of the considerable
detail provided to the plaintiffs by this affidavit about the "Scientology"
courses and services offered at the Elmira Mission, it is extremely significant
that plaintiffs have never alleged that those courses or programs deviate in
any way from the true teachings of the Church, or from the courses taught by
the Elmira Mission during the 10 year period when it enjoyed the favor of the
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that there is no realistic possibility
that any consumer might be "confused" or "deceived" into believing that the
form and the substance of the courses offered by the Elmira Mission have met
the approval of the Church of Scientology. All of the available evidence shows
that such an impression would not be mistaken, since the defendants' practices,
until very recently, enjoyed the authorization of the Church for many years.
The only respect in which the Elmira Mission is now allegedly in breach of its
license agreement, and the only reason offered by the plaintiffs for their
sudden refusal to continue sponsoring that Mission, is the fact that the
defendants have not paid their tithes to the plaintiffs since July, 1984.
[FN11] (Affidavit of Gerald *507 Laws, para. 3.) Consequently, if the
Elmira Mission is allowed to continue its allegedly infringing use of the
"Scientology" name and trademarks during the pendency of this lawsuit, some
consumers might be "deceived" or "confused" at most into believing that the
Mission has paid up all of its debts to the Church headquarters in California.
That sort of "confusion" may well be actionable as a trademark violation, but
it obviously poses absolutely no danger of irreparable harm to the goodwill and
reputation enjoyed by the plaintiffs' trademarks.
FN11. Of course, that aspect of this case (like the fact, discussed in
part II.A. of this decision, that the parties are not directly competing
in the same areas) will not necessarily preclude the plaintiffs from
ultimately prevailing on the merits of their federal trademark claims.
Nevertheless, for the reasons stated in this opinion, those factors rule
out any serious possibility that plaintiffs might be irreparably harmed by
the denial of a preliminary injunction at this point.
 In this respect, the present case is quite similar to the factual
pattern involved in Bell & Howell: Mamiya Company v. Masel Supply Company,
548 F.Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y.1982), reversed, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.1983). The
District Court in that case found a "substantial likelihood" that the public
might be led to confuse an unauthorized importer of Japanese cameras with the
American company which actually owned the legitimate and exclusive rights to
distribute those cameras in this country. Id., 548 F.Supp. at 1079.
Without reaching the merits or questioning that finding by the District Court,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that irreparable injury had not
been demonstrated, since the plaintiff had not shown that the sale of the
camera by an allegedly unauthorized distributor was "likely to cause any
consumer to be misled about the product he or she purchases". Id., 719 F.2d
at 46 (emphasis added). In so doing, the Court of Appeals implicitly
concluded (as I hold in this case) that a trademark violation does not pose any
threat of irreparable injury merely because consumers are "confused" into
believing that they are dealing with an authorized or licensed distributor.
 In summary, although the facts alleged by the plaintiffs in this case
may well satisfy the legal elements for a case of trademark infringement, the
economic character of this case bears little resemblance to that of the
traditional trademark infringement situation. From the perspective of
potential economic consequences, the Elmira Mission's alleged "infringement" is
actually much closer to the case of a bookstore which orders and retails
authentic "Scientology" books without paying the publisher for the books.
Nothing could be further from irreparable injury.
For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that the version of the facts
alleged by plaintiffs in this case, even if true, fails to create any
possibility that plaintiffs might be irreparably injured if the Elmira Mission
is not enjoined from its allegedly infringing use of the "Scientology"
trademarks during the pendency of this lawsuit. For that reason, and for the
reasons outlined in this Court's oral decision at the argument of this motion
on June 5, 1985, the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief must
be denied. It is therefore unnecessary for me at this time to reach the merits
of plaintiffs' trademark claims, or to decide any of the arguments advanced by
the defendants in opposition to this motion.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.