OPERATION CLAMBAKE: SCIENTOLOGY COURT FILES

Part of a public library containing court papers related to lawsuits involving Scientology in some way. Collected to help lawyers and critics of Scientology in future lawsuits from or against this cult. Please report back if this has been of help, or send new contributions to the collection. Thanks. Andreas Heldal-Lund (heldal@online.no)




       CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE ORG., INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                       v.
   CITY OF CLEARWATER, Milton A. Galbraith, Jr., City Attorney of the City of
      Clearwater, Cynthia E. Goudeau, City Clerk of the City of Clearwater,
                              Defendants-Appellees.
                                  No. 91-3988.
                         United States Court of Appeals,
                                Eleventh Circuit.
                                 Sept. 30, 1993.
  Church brought action challenging city's charitable solicitation ordinance.
 The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, No. 84-
 719-CIV-T-17, Elizabeth A. Kovachevich, J., granted summary judgment in favor
 of city, 756 F.Supp. 1498, and church appealed.  The Court of Appeals,
 Dubina, Circuit Judge, held that:  (1) ordinance requiring disclosure of use of
 funds resulted in excessive entanglement with religion in violation of First
 Amendment establishment clause;  (2) genuine issue of fact was presented as to
 whether the ordinance was enacted for impermissible motive of driving church
 from the city;  (3) city could not present justification defense, as Lemon
 provides prophylactic wall of separation between church and state;  but (4)
 certain requirements for registering the identity of the person making
 solicitation were permissible;  and (5) requirement that refund policy be
 disclosed in full contemporaneously with the offer of a refund was
 constitutionally permissible.
  Affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

 [1] COURTS
 Fifth Circuit decisions rendered by Unit A of that Court after September 30,
 1981, are not binding on the Eleventh Circuit, but they are persuasive
 authority.

 [2] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Charitable organization within definition of solicitation ordinance had
 standing to challenge the ordinance on First Amendment grounds.  U.S.C.A.
 Const. Art. 3, s 1 et seq.;  Amend. 1.

 [3] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Religious groups and their members that are singled out for discriminatory
 government treatment by official harassment or symbolic conduct analogous to
 defamation have standing to seek redress in federal courts.  U.S.C.A. Const.
 Art. 3, s 1 et seq.;  Amend. 1.

 [4] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Church would not be required to prove that it was bona fide religion entitled
 to First Amendment protection in order to obtain standing to challenge
 charitable solicitation ordinance.  U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, s 1 et seq.;
 Amend. 1.

 [5] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
 Zone of interest requirement is a prudential standing doctrine which is not
 mandated directly by Article III.  U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, s 1 et seq.

 [6] CIVIL RIGHTS
 Zone of interest analysis which determines standing under federal civil rights
 statute is limited to ascertaining whether substantive constitutional or
 statutory provision confers rights intended by the legislature to be
 enforceable under the remedial statute;  test requires only that relationship
 between plaintiff's alleged interest and purposes implicit in the substantive
 provision be more than marginal.  42 U.S.C.A. s 1983.

 [7] CIVIL RIGHTS
 First Amendment creates enforceable rights under federal civil rights statute,
 and any citizen's interest in preventing violation of those rights is more than
 marginally related to constitutional provision which protects the public at
 large as well as the individual plaintiff from government invasion of
 religious, political, and intellectual activity.  42 U.S.C.A. s 1983.

 [7] CIVIL RIGHTS
 First Amendment creates enforceable rights under federal civil rights statute,
 and any citizen's interest in preventing violation of those rights is more than
 marginally related to constitutional provision which protects the public at
 large as well as the individual plaintiff from government invasion of
 religious, political, and intellectual activity.  42 U.S.C.A. s 1983.

 [8] FEDERAL COURTS
 District court's order granting summary judgment is reviewed under the de novo
 standard.  Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

 [9] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 When challenged under the establishment clause, statute must have secular
 legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
 advances nor inhibits religion, and the statute must not foster an excessive
 government entanglement with religion;  only if all three of the criteria are
 satisfied may the law be upheld.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [10] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Under Lemon analysis of statute challenged under the establishment clause,
 review of government purpose is deferential and religious purpose alone is not
 enough to invalidate the act;  religious purpose must predominate, and statute
 is invalid only if it does not have a clearly secular purpose.  U.S.C.A.
 Const.Amend. 1.

 [11] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 If legislature's stated purpose is not actually furthered by enactment, that
 purpose is disregarded as being insincere or sham for purposes of Lemon
 analysis under the establishment clause;  even if proffered purpose is not a
 sham, court must evaluate effect of statute's provisions and consider
 historical context of the statute and the specific sequence of events leading
 to its passage.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [12] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Statute in which impermissible religious purpose predominates is invalid even
 if legislative body was motivated in part by legitimate secular objectives;
 even if ordinance in fact furthers secular purpose, actual purpose may in
 certain cases be found by asking whether government intends to convey a message
 of endorsement or disapproval of religion.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [13] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 City's purpose in enacting ordinance was not irrelevant to claim of
 establishment clause violation.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [14] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Predominantly or preeminently sectarian purpose will invalidate otherwise
 permissible law under the establishment clause.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [15] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 When plaintiff shows by direct evidence that sectarian or religious purpose was
 substantial or motivating factor behind enactment of statute, burden shifts to
 defendant to show by preponderance of the evidence that action challenged under
 the establishment clause would have been undertaken even in the absence of the
 improper considerations.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [16] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
 Materials, including newspaper articles, which may not have been admissible at
 trial were appropriately submitted by the nonmoving in opposition to motion for
 summary judgment.  Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

 [17] COURTS
 Decisions of the Fifth Circuit rendered before October 1, 1981, are binding on
 panels of the Eleventh Circuit, but they must be disregarded if necessary to
 give effect to decision of United States Supreme Court.

 [17] COURTS
 Decisions of the Fifth Circuit rendered before October 1, 1981, are binding on
 panels of the Eleventh Circuit, but they must be disregarded if necessary to
 give effect to decision of United States Supreme Court.

 [18] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
 Evidence, including newspaper articles, showed widespread political movement
 intent on driving church from city and raised genuine issue of fact as to
 whether enactment of charitable contribution ordinance was motivated by
 sectarian goal of driving the church from the city, thus precluding summary
 judgment on establishment clause claim of church.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [19] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Objective of employing tax laws to discriminate against church is a purpose
 that is patently offensive to the First Amendment.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [20] CHARITIES
 Charitable solicitation ordinance which made executive and judicial authorities
 the ultimate arbiters of appropriate level of disclosure to church members in
 all matters of ecclesiastical fiscal administration and also conferred
 responsibility for apprising themselves and the public concerning such matters
 resulted in excessive entanglement and violated the establishment clause.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [20] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Charitable solicitation ordinance which made executive and judicial authorities
 the ultimate arbiters of appropriate level of disclosure to church members in
 all matters of ecclesiastical fiscal administration and also conferred
 responsibility for apprising themselves and the public concerning such matters
 resulted in excessive entanglement and violated the establishment clause.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [21] ASSOCIATIONS
 While democratic participation by individual members in affairs of society is
 cornerstone of public life, government may not mandate such arrangements in
 private organizations.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [22] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 State may not require churches to forego protected religious and speech
 activity, like public solicitation, in order to avoid becoming entangled with
 civil authorities;  unconstitutional entanglement may not be excused on the
 ground that it is imposed only as condition of avoiding otherwise permissible
 regulation or as prerequisite to receiving valuable privilege.  U.S.C.A.
 Const.Amend. 1.

 [23] CHARITIES
 Procedures for citizen complaint to city attorney concerning charitable
 solicitation by and provision of city ordinance for investigation by subpoena
 increased substantial risk of government participation in intramural church
 conflict and decision making, in violation of establishment clause, as did
 provisions requiring prospective and retrospective disclosure of church
 finances, activities, and organization as a condition of soliciting funds.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [23] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Procedures for citizen complaint to city attorney concerning charitable
 solicitation by and provision of city ordinance for investigation by subpoena
 increased substantial risk of government participation in intramural church
 conflict and decision making, in violation of establishment clause, as did
 provisions requiring prospective and retrospective disclosure of church
 finances, activities, and organization as a condition of soliciting funds.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [24] CHARITIES
 Charitable solicitation ordinance requiring organization to make limited public
 disclosure of the nature and identity of the organization, its tax-exempt
 status, other cities in which it was registered, and criminal histories of its
 officers and solicitors did not result in excessive entanglement and did not
 violate establishment clause, as those disclosures required no continuing
 monitoring by private or public entities, imposed only minimal burden
 on organization, and did not significantly interfere in ordering of church
 affairs voluntarily accepted by members.

 [24] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Charitable solicitation ordinance requiring organization to make limited public
 disclosure of the nature and identity of the organization, its tax-exempt
 status, other cities in which it was registered, and criminal histories of its
 officers and solicitors did not result in excessive entanglement and did not
 violate establishment clause, as those disclosures required no continuing
 monitoring by private or public entities, imposed only minimal burden
 on organization, and did not significantly interfere in ordering of church
 affairs voluntarily accepted by members.

 [25] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Unlike limitations placed upon government power to protect the individual's
 freedoms of expression and conscience under other clauses of the First
 Amendment, limitations under the establishment clause imposed by Lemon
 provide prophylactic wall of separation between church and state;  regulations
 affecting freedom of speech are subject to strict scrutiny under a compelling
 interest standard, with regulations fostering excessive entanglement between
 government and church are not.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [26] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 City cannot assert compelling interest to justify charitable solicitation
 ordinance against establishment clause challenge where the ordinance was
 facially neutral among religions and applied to wholly secular charities as
 well as churches.

 [27] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Establishment clause is implicated when government entangles itself on a
 continuing basis in nondoctrinal affairs of church function.  U.S.C.A.
 Const.Amend. 1.

 [28] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Although government conduct may be impermissible under both free exercise and
 establishment clauses, challenged conduct that satisfies the former may offend
 the latter.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [29] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Neutral and generally applicable criminal laws may be applied to an individual
 without compelling justification even if they conflict with his religious
 beliefs.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [30] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Solicitation by secular charities, as well as fundraising by political advocacy
 groups, no less than solicitation by religious organizations, is protected as
 aspects of First Amendment speech and associational freedoms.  U.S.C.A.
 Const.Amend. 1.

 [30] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Solicitation by secular charities, as well as fundraising by political advocacy
 groups, no less than solicitation by religious organizations, is protected as
 aspects of First Amendment speech and associational freedoms.  U.S.C.A.
 Const.Amend. 1.

 [31] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Exacting First Amendment scrutiny would be applied to free exercise challenge
 to city's charitable solicitation ordinance.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [32] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 State has compelling interest in protecting church members from affirmative,
 material misrepresentations designed to part them from their money, and penal
 laws are available to punish that conduct;  interests are not diminished by the
 fact that victims may be voluntarily members of religious association.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [33] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 When no affirmative misrepresentations are made concerning uses for which funds
 will be employed, either explicitly or by clear implication, state has no
 compelling interest in requiring members of church or the public to be made
 aware of those matters when a solicitation is made;  if church members are
 willing to contribute money without being told how it will be used, city or
 state has no interest in forcing church to make that information available.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [34] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Associational interests protected by the religion clauses stand on equal
 footing with protected political rights.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [35] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 State may not compel specific disclosures by church in connection with
 fundraising merely because, in the state's view, some potential contributors to
 some causes might tend to think that those facts evidence unfairness or some
 other objectionable quality in the use to which the funds will be put.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [36] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 City could not defend charitable solicitation ordinance by contending that
 tenets of church were fantastic or false or by arguing, as a consequence, that
 the church's collection of funds under the cloak of religion was fraudulent;
 First Amendment precludes civil authorities from evaluating truth or falsity of
 religious beliefs.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [37] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Fact that church's doctrine of "exchange" might appear to nonadherents as a
 crass rationalization to justify enrichment of a few select leaders at the
 expense of neophytes was no basis for imposing burdensome and entangling
 regulations for the "benefit" of the church members who voluntarily chose to
 adhere to that doctrine, and such an official perception of theological
 unsoundness could not justify regulation respecting church disclosure of the
 use of solicited funds to nonmembers.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [37] RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES
 Fact that church's doctrine of "exchange" might appear to nonadherents as a
 crass rationalization to justify enrichment of a few select leaders at the
 expense of neophytes was no basis for imposing burdensome and entangling
 regulations for the "benefit" of the church members who voluntarily chose to
 adhere to that doctrine, and such an official perception of theological
 unsoundness could not justify regulation respecting church disclosure of the
 use of solicited funds to nonmembers.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [38] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 To extent that it was determined that a single church's beliefs were insincere,
 imposition by city ordinance of record keeping and disclosure requirements on
 all churches and charities engaged in public and private solicitation would
 burden a great deal of protected expression without serving any legitimate
 purpose.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [39] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Whatever evidence might appropriately be considered at hearing to determine
 that religious beliefs asserted by certain persons were not sincere and thus
 not protected, those espousing the beliefs would not be required to show the
 sincerity with which their deceased prophets espoused religious revelations per
 se.

 [40] CHARITIES
 Requirements that organization seeking to undertake charitable solicitation in
 city disclose name of person registering and desiring to solicit funds and
 whether the person is an actual person, partnership, corporation, or
 association, provide reference to determinations of tax exempt status under
 federal and state law, and provide the names of other cities within the state
 in which the person has collected funds for charitable purposes within the last
 five years are narrowly tailored to prevent fraud by religious and charitable
 organizations and do not impermissibly impose discriminatory regulation of
 speech on the basis of the speaker's identity as a religion or charity.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [40] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Requirements that organization seeking to undertake charitable solicitation in
 city disclose name of person registering and desiring to solicit funds and
 whether the person is an actual person, partnership, corporation, or
 association, provide reference to determinations of tax exempt status under
 federal and state law, and provide the names of other cities within the state
 in which the person has collected funds for charitable purposes within the last
 five years are narrowly tailored to prevent fraud by religious and charitable
 organizations and do not impermissibly impose discriminatory regulation of
 speech on the basis of the speaker's identity as a religion or charity.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [41] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Even if there was evidence that church's finances and operations were
 implicitly or explicitly misrepresented to members and contributors, that would
 not justify far reaching regulation of charitable solicitations by city in view
 of the potent but significantly less intrusive regulatory alternatives
 available to authorities for dealing with fraud.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [41] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Even if there was evidence that church's finances and operations were
 implicitly or explicitly misrepresented to members and contributors, that would
 not justify far reaching regulation of charitable solicitations by city in view
 of the potent but significantly less intrusive regulatory alternatives
 available to authorities for dealing with fraud.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [42] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 System of licensing speech or religious activity may be upheld against First
 Amendment challenge only if criteria for denying license are narrowly tailored
 to serve compelling governmental interests.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [43] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 System of prior restraint must guarantee prompt and final judicial review of
 executive determination to deny license, so that erroneous abridgment of
 freedom of speech may be corrected as quickly as reasonably possible in the
 adversarial setting of a courtroom;  in most instances, scheme must place upon
 government burden of initiating the proceeding and demonstrating the propriety
 of the restraint.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [44] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Whether speech is prohibited before the exercise of judicial review or after,
 effect of such a ban is to impose a prior restraint.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
 1.

 [45] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Vague law regulating speech is not rendered more precise by virtue of court
 having passed upon its application to particular facts, as such process merely
 shifts exercise of impermissibly broad discretion from executive officials to
 judges, a shift that has no significance in First Amendment jurisprudence.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [46] CHARITIES
 Requirements of charitable solicitation ordinance requiring disclosure of the
 identity of the party making the solicitation, the cities within which the
 party has solicited funds in the state within the past five years, and a
 reference to tax-exempt status determinations under federal state law were not
 void for vagueness.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [46] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Requirements of charitable solicitation ordinance requiring disclosure of the
 identity of the party making the solicitation, the cities within which the
 party has solicited funds in the state within the past five years, and a
 reference to tax-exempt status determinations under federal state law were not
 void for vagueness.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [47] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Under free exercise clause, court applies strict scrutiny to legislation that
 imposes substantial burden on observation of religious belief or practice.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [48] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Solicitation of funds by religious organization is protected religious
 expressive activity under the First Amendment.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [48] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Solicitation of funds by religious organization is protected religious
 expressive activity under the First Amendment.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [49] CHARITIES
 Provision of city charitable solicitation ordinance requiring full disclosure
 of refund policy was constitutionally permissible method of preventing
 affirmative fraudulent conduct, as was requirement that statement be
 contemporaneous with the offer of a refund and that it be in writing.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [49] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Provision of city charitable solicitation ordinance requiring full disclosure
 of refund policy was constitutionally permissible method of preventing
 affirmative fraudulent conduct, as was requirement that statement be
 contemporaneous with the offer of a refund and that it be in writing.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [50] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 City could not require church to adopt policy for refunding money which it has
 solicited nor dictate the terms of any policy voluntarily adopted, and could
 not require that money be refunded within 60 days of request whenever any
 refund policy was adopted.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [50] RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES
 City could not require church to adopt policy for refunding money which it has
 solicited nor dictate the terms of any policy voluntarily adopted, and could
 not require that money be refunded within 60 days of request whenever any
 refund policy was adopted.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
  *1519 Paul B. Johnson, Johnson & Johnson, Tampa, FL, Eric M. Lieberman,
 Edward Copeland, Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C., New
 York City, for plaintiff-appellant.
  Alan S. Zimmett, Sargent, Repka & Covert, M.A. Galbraith, Jr., City Atty.,
 Clearwater, FL, Lawrence R. Velvel, Nasha, NH, for defendants-appellees.
  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of
 Florida.

  Before ANDERSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge.

  DUBINA, Circuit Judge:
  This appeal involves a challenge to an ordinance regulating the
 solicitation of funds by charitable organizations in the City of Clearwater,
 Florida ("Clearwater").  Plaintiff Church of Scientology Flag Service
 Organization, Inc. ("Scientology") claims that the ordinance deprives it of
 rights and liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
 Constitution of the United States in violation of 42 U.S.C. s 1983.
 Scientology appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment to the
 defendants (collectively "the City") [FN1] and denying summary judgment to
 Scientology.  Church of Scientology Flag Servs. Org. v. City of Clearwater,
 756 F.Supp. 1498 (M.D.Fla.1991).  We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in
 part and remand.

      FN1. Defendants are the City of Clearwater, its city attorney Milton A.
     Galbraith, Jr., as successor to Thomas Bustin, and city clerk Cynthia
     Goudeau, as successor to Lucille Williams.

                                    I. BACKGROUND
  Scientology, a worldwide organization, maintains one of the largest centers of
 its activities in Clearwater.  The history, organization, doctrine and
 practices of Scientology have been thoroughly recounted in numerous judicial
 decisions.  See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 684-86, 109
 S.Ct. 2136, 2141, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989);  Church of Scientology v.
 Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310, 1313-14 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988);  Founding Church of
 Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied,
 396 U.S. 963, 90 S.Ct. 434, 24 L.Ed.2d 427 (1969), and on *1520 remand,
 United States v. Article or Device Hubbard Electrometer, 333 F.Supp. 357
 (D.D.C.1971);  Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or.App. 203, 644
 P.2d 577, 580-81, pet'n denied, 293 Or. 456, 650 P.2d 928 (1982), and cert.
 denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 103 S.Ct. 1196, 75 L.Ed.2d 439 (1983).
  We need not reiterate this background because the district court found that no
 genuine factual issues existed to dispute Scientology's claim of being a bona
 fide religion.  See 756 F.Supp. at 1502-04.  The district court granted
 partial summary judgment to Scientology on that issue.  Id. at 1532;
 accord Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at 1160;  Christofferson,
 644 P.2d at 600-01.  As the City has neither appealed from that order nor
 argued that Scientology is not entitled to protection under the religion
 clauses of the First Amendment, we must assume that the district court was
 correct.  In addition, without deciding the question ourselves, we note that
 research has not uncovered any holdings that Scientology is not a religion for
 First Amendment purposes.  But cf. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner,
 823 F.2d at 1316-18 (upholding Tax Court determination that Church of
 Scientology was not entitled to religious tax exemption under 26 U.S.C. s
 501(c)(3) for certain years because its revenues inured to the benefit of
 individuals and non-religious entities).
                             II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
  In 1983 the City enacted Ordinance No. 3091-83 (the "1983 Ordinance").
 The 1983 Ordinance imposed substantial recordkeeping and disclosure
 requirements for all charities and religious organizations soliciting funds in
 Clearwater.  Scientology filed an action in the district court seeking an
 injunction against its enforcement.  That action was consolidated with a
 similar case brought by Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
 Inc. ("Americans United").  Before the district court could rule on the law's
 validity, however, the City enacted Ordinance No. 3479-84 (the "1984
 Ordinance"), repealing and modifying the 1983 Ordinance in part.  Clearwater,
 Fla., Code Ordinances, tit. VIII, s 100 (1984) (hereinafter "Code s ---").
 Both plaintiffs filed new lawsuits to challenge the revised ordinance and its
 1983 predecessor.
  In the second Scientology suit, the district court ruled the 1983 Ordinance
 unconstitutional on its face and permanently enjoined the City from enforcing
 it.  The court further ruled the 1984 version facially valid, without reaching
 the question of its validity as applied to Scientology and Americans United.
 The City appealed the former ruling and Scientology and Americans United were
 permitted to file interlocutory cross-appeals of the latter.  We vacated the
 former as moot, reasoning that challenges to the repealed 1983 Ordinance posed
 no live controversy suitable for judicial resolution.  Church of Scientology
 Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 777 F.2d 598, 604-06 (11th Cir.1985),
 cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116, 106 S.Ct. 1973, 90 L.Ed.2d 656
 (1986) (hereinafter Scientology-Clearwater I ), overruled, Northeastern
 Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508
 U.S. 656, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 2301, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993).  We dismissed the
 interlocutory cross-appeals as improvidently granted, finding nothing in the
 record to support (or controvert) a conclusion that the plaintiffs possessed a
 sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation to confer standing.
 Scientology-Clearwater I, 777 F.2d at 607.  But see Pennell v. City of
 San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7-8, 108 S.Ct. 849, 855, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (holding
 that allegations of complaint should be accepted as true and construed in favor
 of standing when there is no factual record).  We also affirmed the district
 court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief.  777 F.2d at 608.
  Scientology continued to prosecute its second action challenging the 1984
 Ordinance.  Scientology also petitioned for leave to amend the complaint in its
 first pending action to challenge the new 1984 law.  The district court
 apparently did not rule on that petition but rather proceeded to address the
 merits in the second Scientology case.  Upon granting summary judgment to the
 City in that second case, from which this appeal followed, the district court
 dismissed with prejudice the earlier action for want of prosecution.  The court
 also denied Scientology's *1521 request for attorney fees in the first
 action.  In Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization v. City of
 Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir.1993) (hereinafter Scientology-Clearwater
 II ), this panel vacated the district court's denial of attorney fees in the
 first filed action. [FN2]

      FN2. We reasoned that the filing of the lawsuit had caused the City to
     amend the 1983 Ordinance in a manner that significantly affected the legal
     relationship between the parties.  Therefore, Scientology was a "prevailing
     party" under 42 U.S.C. s 1988 and presumptively entitled to an award of
     attorney fees.

  Having found that Scientology had standing to sue in the second action,
 the district court further found the 1984 Ordinance constitutional, both on its
 face and as applied to Scientology, and therefore granted the City's motion for
 summary judgment and denied Scientology's cross-motion for summary judgment.
 Scientology then perfected this appeal.
                               III. THE ORDINANCES
  The 1984 Ordinance, like its 1983 predecessor, is designed to regulate the
 solicitation of contributions within Clearwater by "charitable organizations,"
 a term that includes religious groups.  Code s 100.01(1).  The regulated
 "solicitation of funds" is defined to mean:
   any request, within the City of Clearwater, for the donation of money,
 property, or anything of value ...;  or the selling or offering for sale of any
 property, real or personal ..., whether of value or not, including but not
 limited to, goods, books, pamphlets, tickets, publications or subscriptions to
 publications, upon the representation, express or implied, that the proceeds of
 such sale will be used for a charitable purpose.
  Code s 100.01(2) (emphasis added).  "Expressly excluded from the meaning of
 'solicit funds' ... is any offer of membership in any charitable
 organization."  Id.  As Scientology points out, virtually any sale of
 religious literature carries the implied representation that the proceeds will
 be used to further the seller's purposes or, at least, to "benefit" the
 organization.  (Appellant's Br. at 34-35).  In essence, therefore, all speech
 that is not delivered gratis will subject a charitable organization to
 regulation.  An organization is exempt, however, if it is all-volunteer and/or
 small in scale.  Code s 100.02(1).  A similar exemption applies to all-
 volunteer scholarship organizations.  Code s 100.02(2).
  [1] The 1984 Ordinance is a licensing statute that requires charitable
 organizations to disclose certain information about themselves, their officers
 and the methods and purposes of the solicitation.  A non-exempt organization
 that solicits without obtaining an annual registration certificate from the
 city clerk commits a criminal offense.  Code s 100.05(1)(i).  To obtain that
 certificate, an organization must file a registration form with the clerk.  The
 form is a public document, Code s 100.03(7), submitted under oath, which must
 disclose among other things:
   (a) The name of the person registering and desiring to solicit funds for
 charitable purposes.
   (b) Whether the person registering is a natural person, partnership,
 corporation, or association and, ...
   (c) A reference to all determinations of tax-exempt status under the Internal
 Revenue Code of the United States and law of any state, and the laws of any
 county or municipality.
   (d) A brief description of the charitable purpose for which the funds are to
 be solicited, and a brief explanation of the intended use of the funds toward
 that purpose.
   (e) The names, mailing address[es] and telephone number[s] of all individuals
 authorized to disburse the proceeds of the solicitation.
   (f) The names, mailing address[es] and telephone number[s] of all
 individuals who will be in direct charge or control of the solicitation of
 funds.
   (g) The time period within which the solicitation of funds is to be made....
   (h) A brief description of the methods and means by which the solicitation of
 funds is to be accomplished.
   *1522 (i) An estimated schedule of salaries, wages, fees, commissions,
 expenses and costs to be expended and paid in connection with the solicitation
 of funds and in connection with their disbursement, and an estimated percentage
 of the total projected collections which the costs of the solicitation will
 comprise.
   (j) The names of any other cities in Florida in which the person registering
 has collected funds for charitable purposes within the past five (5) years....
   ....
   (m) The names of any officer ... or any current agent or employee engaging in
 the solicitation of funds who has been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor
 involving moral turpitude within the past seven (7) years, the nature of the
 offense, the State in which the conviction occurred, and the year of such
 conviction.
   (n) A brief explanation of the reasons, if the person registering is unable
 to provide any of the foregoing information, why such information is not
 available.
  Code s 100.03(1) (emphasis added).  This information is virtually identical to
 the disclosure required under the ordinance upheld against facial attack on
 free exercise and associational privacy grounds in International Society for
 Krishna Consciousness v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 541, 559-61 (5th Cir. Unit A
 1982) (hereinafter ISKCON-Houston ), although, as discussed below, there are
 significant differences between the Clearwater and Houston laws. [FN3]

      FN3. Fifth Circuit decisions rendered by Unit A of that court after
     September 30, 1981, are not binding upon this court, but they are
     persuasive authority.  Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34
     (11th Cir.1982).

  Unlike the Houston submission, the Clearwater form must be filed even if the
 organization intends to solicit only from its own members, although the form
 may omit certain information "regarding the solicitation of funds from
 members," provided it so states.  Code s 100.02(3).  Thus, as we read the
 Clearwater ordinance, an organization soliciting only from its members may omit
 the information required by subsections (d) through (i) of Code s 100.03(1).
 Nevertheless, even when no public solicitation is planned, subsections
 100.03(1)(a), (b), (c), (j) and (n) of the code require an organization
 publicly to disclose significant information, namely the nature and identity of
 the organization, its tax-exempt status, the detailed criminal histories of its
 officers and solicitors, the names of other Florida cities in which it has
 registered and an explanation why any of the foregoing information is
 unavailable.
  The City's law also requires organizations omitting information from the
 registration form to prepare a sworn "private statement at least annually that
 contains all of the information" that otherwise would be required in the
 registration form.  Code s 100.02(3)(b).  The organization must maintain the
 records used to complete the private statement for at least three years "and,
 together with the private statement, make[ ] them reasonably available for
 inspection by every member of the charitable organization."  Code
 s 100.02(3)(c).  Wilful failure to prepare a truthful private statement,
 maintain the records or make the statement and records available to members is
 a criminal offense.  Code s 100.05(1)(k).  The same supporting documentation
 must be maintained when the organization files a public registration form,
 Code s 100.04, and failure to do so is also an offense, Code s 100.05(1)(j).
  At the end of each annual registration period the organization must file
 a retrospective reporting statement giving "the full amount of money and
 property collected" in Clearwater and "a complete list of any and all expenses
 incurred in procuring those funds ... broken down into salaries, wages, fees,
 commissions, advertising and all other expenses."  Code s 100.03(8).  The
 organization must reveal "the bank, if any, where the proceeds of those
 solicitations of funds were placed" and the "actual or proposed utilization in
 approximate amounts of the said proceeds," id., and maintain supporting
 documentation for three years, Code s 100.04.  Information about solicitations
 from members may be omitted on the same terms as the omission of similar
 information from the registration form, namely, upon condition *1523 that
 the organization prepare a "private statement" subject to disclosure along with
 supporting documentation upon request by a member, failure to prepare or
 disclose the materials being a criminal offense.  Code s 100.02(3).  Wilful
 failure to file truthful registration forms and retrospective annual statements
 is also an offense.  Code s 100.05(1)(b).  These provisions for
 retrospective disclosure differ from the Houston ordinance by (1) requiring
 detailed disclosure of the expenses incurred in the solicitation, (2) requiring
 disclosure of the bank account in which funds are located, (3) requiring
 disclosure of every proposed or actual use of the funds, (4) requiring the
 maintenance of supporting documentation for three years, (5) applying
 themselves to membership solicitations, and (6) imposing criminal penalties.
  The Clearwater ordinance defines a number of other criminal offenses,
 including:
   (a) wilful[ly] us[ing] any solicited funds or soliciting or retaining funds
 to support or execute any conduct that is criminal or illegal under the laws of
 the [city, county, state, or federal government];
                              .    .    .    .    .
   (c) us[ing] any scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain money or property by
 means of any false statement or representation;
   (d) wilfully concealing the identity of an organization on whose behalf
 solicitations are being made;
   (e) knowingly misrepresenting that the proceeds of any solicitation of funds,
 under current law, would entitle the donor to a Federal or State income tax
 deduction;
   (f) promising any person that the proceeds of a solicitation of funds will be
 refunded upon request, and thereafter wilfully failing within 60 days to make a
 refund that has been requested in writing;
   (g) promising any person that refunds of the proceeds of the solicitation of
 funds will be made upon request without providing such person, at the time such
 representation is made, with a written statement of the terms and conditions
 upon which refunds are made;  provided, however, that any statement made in
 good faith at the time is not prohibited by this section;....
  Code s 100.05(1).  All offenses under the law are punishable by a fine of
 up to $1,000 and/or imprisonment for up to six months.  Code s 100.05(2).
 No such criminal provisions were included in the Houston ordinance.
  The city clerk has power to review the registration form to determine
 whether it meets the ordinance's requirements and may deny registration if she
 determines that it does not.  The clerk testified that she and her staff would
 exercise their personal judgment, under the direction of the city attorney, to
 decide whether a given response was adequate.  For example, she and the city
 attorney would determine whether the stated purpose of the solicitation was in
 fact a charitable one.  [R5-110-Tab 2-Exh. A-46-49.]  In addition, although the
 statute provides no guidance on the subject, the city attorney testified that a
 general statement along the lines of "We are a benevolent society and we will
 use [the funds] as our governing board decides is within our purposes" would
 not provide adequate information to satisfy the requirements of Code
 s 100.03(1)(d).  He was unable to say, however, whether a statement like "We
 are a church and we will use [the funds] for general church purposes" would be
 sufficiently specific.  [R5-110-Tab 2-Exh. B-49.]
  Whatever level of detail would meet the city officials' standards concerning
 disclosure of charitable purpose, we may presume that they require a more
 specific explanation of how the funds will be used to further the purposes
 stated.  In these respects the Clearwater ordinance confers broader executive
 discretion than the Houston law, which the Fifth Circuit interpreted as
 conferring only the ministerial authority to determine "two objective facts:
 (1) whether information is provided, and (2) whether an explanation for failure
 to supply the information is provided," ISKCON-Houston, 689 F.2d at 547.
 The City of Houston had adopted an interpretation of the law giving the
 administering official no discretion to evaluate the adequacy of information
 provided by registrants.  For example, any question about the required
 *1524 detail of disclosure concerning the purposes of solicitation would
 have been resolved in the registrant's favor.  Id. at 555.
  If the city clerk denies registration, the organization may still continue to
 solicit in Clearwater.  The clerk must initiate a declaratory judgment action
 in state circuit court to "review" her decision.  Code s 100.03(3).
 Presumably the court may set aside the denial if it finds the clerk acted
 improperly, but neither the ordinance nor the Florida declaratory judgment act
 provides express criteria by which the decision should be judged.  The
 ordinance also permits the court to dispense with the requirement of furnishing
 information whose disclosure it finds to constitute a "special or unique
 hardship to the charitable organization."  Code s 100.03(4).  Again, no
 further express guidance is offered.
  Upon receiving ten "bona fide complaints," sworn in writing and suggesting
 that an offense has occurred, the city attorney may investigate. [FN4]  The
 attorney may subpoena witnesses and documents, including "private statements"
 and the documentation supporting them.  Upon investigation, and having found
 probable cause to believe that an offense has occurred, the attorney "shall"
 institute a prosecution.  Code s 100.06.  We note that these provisions entitle
 the city attorney to obtain the so-called "private" statements (and all of the
 supporting records), and presumably treat them as public documents, in the
 course of an investigation or prosecution to determine whether an organization
 was entitled to omit the specified information from its public registration
 form.

      FN4. Although the relevant provision of the 1984 Ordinance substituted the
     phrase "shall investigate ... only after receiving ten bona fide
     complaints" for the apparently equivalent language in the 1983 Ordinance
     providing that the city attorney "may investigate ... upon receiving ten
     bona fide complaints," the City adopted the position in Scientology-
     Clearwater II that this change removes all discretion from the city
     attorney.  Nevertheless, it appears that the prosecutor retains
     unreviewable discretion to determine whether a complaint is "bona fide."

  The ordinance has an express severability clause.  1984 Ordinance s 10.
                                   IV. ISSUES
  We confront several complex issues in this appeal.  First, Scientology argues
 that there are sufficient facts in dispute to preclude summary judgment on its
 claim that the 1984 Ordinance (like its 1983 predecessor) was enacted for the
 impermissible purpose of discriminating against it in favor of more popular
 religious organizations.  Second, Scientology contends that, as a matter of
 law, the disclosure requirements applicable to solicitations of members and the
 public constitute an impermissible government "entanglement" in matters of
 ecclesiastical authority and governance in violation of the Establishment
 Clause.  Although Scientology contends that such excessive entanglements may
 not be justified by resort to the balancing of compelling governmental
 interests that is applicable in other areas of constitutional law, it further
 contends that this disclosure of information concerning member solicitation is
 not narrowly tailored to serve such an interest.  Third, Scientology argues
 that the ordinance is vague and confers overly broad discretion upon the city
 clerk to deny a registration certificate, thereby imposing an impermissible
 prior restraint upon its exercise of religion.  Finally, Scientology argues
 that the requirements of providing a refund policy in writing and making
 refunds within sixty days also represent impermissible invasions of church
 governance and religious practice. [FN5]

      FN5. While Scientology argues on appeal that the entire 1984 Ordinance is
     unconstitutional, its brief challenges certain provisions only.  See
     generally Code ss 100.01(2), 100.01(3), 100.02(3)(c),
     100.03(1), 100.03(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (j) and (n), 100.03(2),
     100.03(3), 100.03(4), 100.03(7), 100.03(8), 100.04,
     100.05(1)(b), (f) and (g), 100.05(2), 100.06, 100.06(1), and
     100.06(2).  It is these provisions that we confront.  All other
     provisions of the 1984 Ordinance not specifically addressed or encompassed
     by this opinion remain valid should the district court on remand determine
     that (1) the 1984 Ordinance was enacted without a discriminatory purpose
     and (2) the remaining provisions are severable.

  After considering the question of standing, we address these issues in turn.
                                   V. STANDING
  [2] Scientology is a charitable organization as defined under the 1984
 Ordinance and *1525 is subject to direct regulation thereunder.  As already
 detailed, the regulation is substantial and, accordingly, represents a
 sufficiently direct injury to Scientology to confer standing.  The injury is
 caused by the City's ordinance (in other words, the injury is fairly traceable
 to the challenged conduct) and would be redressed by invalidation of the
 regulatory scheme.  Therefore, Scientology meets the "case" or "controversy"
 requirements for standing imposed by Article III of the Constitution.  See
 California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 44-45, 68-69, 76, 94 S.Ct.
 1494, 1509, 1521, 1524-25, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974).  Moreover, it is well settled
 that "a party may challenge a licensing statute regardless of whether he or she
 was denied a permit, or whether one has ever been sought."  Fernandes v.
 Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 625 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458
 U.S. 1124, 103 S.Ct. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 1395 (1982);  see also, e.g.,
 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151, 89 S.Ct. 935, 938,
 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969).
  [3] Scientology's interest in avoiding challenged regulation is greater than
 the minimum interest in the outcome of a lawsuit required for standing.  Just
 as the Establishment Clause "does not depend upon any showing of direct
 governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which
 establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
 nonobserving individuals or not," Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430, 82
 S.Ct. 1261, 1267, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962), so also does the clause prohibit the
 casting of official disfavor upon a particular sect even though its members are
 not directly regulated.  Religious groups and their members that are singled
 out for discriminatory government treatment by official harassment or symbolic
 conduct analogous to defamation have standing to seek redress in federal
 courts.  Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1279-80 (5th
 Cir.1981);  see also, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755, 104 S.Ct.
 3315, 3326, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (noting that stigmatic injury associated with
 invidious official conduct is cognizable for standing purposes if the plaintiff
 is directly affected).
  [4] The question of standing is distinct from the broader issues
 concerning the merits of Scientology's case.  Therefore, we would not require
 Scientology to prove that it is a bona fide religion entitled to First
 Amendment protection in order to obtain standing, any more than we would
 require a contract claimant to demonstrate that it is a party to a valid
 agreement before invoking jurisdiction in an ordinary private law dispute.
 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254 n. 30, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1689 n. 30,
 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982) (finding standing to challenge regulation, but noting
 "[n]othing in our opinion suggests that appellants could not ... put the Church
 to the proof of its bona fides as a religious organization").  Moreover, in our
 view the facts considered by the district court, 756 F.Supp. at 1509-11,
 provide much more than "a sufficiently strong demonstration that [Scientology]
 is a religion to overcome any prudential standing obstacles to consideration
 of [its] Establishment Clause claim" and its free exercise claim, Valente,
 456 U.S. at 244 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. at 1683 n. 16, assuming for present purposes
 that such a prudential obstacle exists.
  Nevertheless, we do not accept the district court's application of the "zone
 of interests" requirement for standing to raise a First Amendment challenge
 under s 1983, see 756 F.Supp. at 1509-12.  The requirement that "the
 interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must be] arguably within
 the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
 constitutional guarantee in question," Association of Data Processing Serv.
 Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184
 (1970) (emphasis added) (hereinafter ADAPSO ), was first developed as a
 limitation on judicial review of agency action under the Administrative
 Procedure Act ("APA").  The APA provides that a plaintiff must be adversely
 affected by challenged action "within the meaning of a relevant statute."  5
 U.S.C. s 702.  The Supreme Court has used a similar standard to determine
 whether particular federal statutes create actionable "rights" under s 1983,
 which creates a federal cause of action for "the deprivation of any rights,
 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and *1526 laws."
 [FN6]  The Court has undertaken the same zone of interests inquiry to determine
 whether a particular constitutional provision creates rights intended by
 Congress to be enforceable under s 1983. [FN7]

      FN6. Compare Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118
     L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (holding s 1983 remedy unavailable for violation of
     vaguely defined statutory "right") with Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n,
     496 U.S. 498, 508-10, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 2516-17, 110 L.Ed.2d 455
     (1990) (finding definite and enforceable "right") and Wright v. Roanoke
     Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 766, 774-75, 93
     L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (finding specific enforceable "right" defined by
     administrative regulations that clarified statutory language).

      FN7. Compare Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 449, 111 S.Ct. 865, 872,
     112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991) (Commerce Clause creates rights enforceable under
     s 1983) and Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 321
     n. 3, 97 S.Ct. 599, 603 n. 3, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977) (victims of
     discriminatory taxation are within "zone of interests" protected by
     Commerce Clause) with Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,
     493 U.S. 103, 110 S.Ct. 444, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989) (Supremacy Clause by
     itself was intended to provide no enforceable "rights" under s 1983)
     and Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905,
     60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979) (same).

  [5][6] The zone of interest requirement is a prudential standing doctrine,
 not mandated directly by Article III.  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751, 104
 S.Ct. at 3324;  Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
 Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 752, 760, 70
 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982).  Whatever the nature of the inquiry in the absence of
 congressional legislation, the Court's precedents show that the zone of
 interests analysis under s 1983 is limited to ascertaining whether the
 substantive constitutional or statutory provision confers rights intended by
 the legislature to be enforceable under the remedial statute.  See also
 Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, ----, 112
 S.Ct. 1311, 1328, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (zone of
 interests test is an "element of statutory standing").  The test does not
 require the plaintiff to show an identifiable "legal interest" that may entitle
 him to relief.  ADAPSO, 397 U.S. at 153-56, 90 S.Ct. at 830-31;  see also
 Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400, 107 S.Ct. 750,
 757, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987);  Valente, 456 U.S. at 254 n. 30, 102 S.Ct. at
 1689 n. 30.  The test requires only that the relationship between the
 plaintiff's alleged interest and the purposes implicit in the substantive
 provision be more than "marginal[ ]."  Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. at
 399, 107 S.Ct. at 757.
  [7] Therefore the district court erred when it investigated the merits
 of Scientology's claim by evaluating whether it is in fact a religion.
 Moreover, it is clear that the First Amendment creates enforceable "rights"
 under s 1983.  Any citizen's interest in preventing violations of those
 rights is more than marginally related to the constitutional provision, which
 protects the public at large as well as the individual plaintiff from
 government invasion of religious, political and intellectual activity, although
 requirements other than the zone of interests test may preclude a finding of
 standing.  Cf. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 478-87, 102 S.Ct. at 762-67
 (holding citizens' generalized interest in preventing establishment of religion
 by federal government insufficient to confer standing without allegations that
 tax funds were improperly collected or expended by Congress).  See generally
 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343
 (1975).  Thus, the complaint on its face alleges interests within the zone
 arguably protected by the constitutional provision.  Since we have already held
 that all other requirements are satisfied, Scientology has standing.
                        VI. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
  [8] A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if no genuine dispute
 remains as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
 a matter of law.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).  As with all questions of law, we
 review the district court's order granting summary judgment under the de novo
 standard of review.  See Woodruff v. United States Dep't of Labor, 954 F.2d
 634, 636 (11th Cir.1992) (per curiam).
   *1527 The moving party bears the initial burden to show the district
 court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of
 material fact that should be decided at trial.  Only when that burden has been
 met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is
 indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.
  Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991).  With
 these principles in mind, we address the contentions of the parties.
                           VII. DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE
  [9] Under the Establishment Clause jurisprudence which has followed Lemon
 v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), courts
 undertake a three-part analysis of challenged legislation.  "First, the statute
 must have a secular legislative purpose;  second, its principal or primary
 effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, ...;  finally,
 the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
 religion.' "  403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at 2111 (citations omitted).
 Only if all three criteria are satisfied may the law be upheld.  As the
 district court correctly recognized, "the three-part Lemon test remains the
 basic standard of judicial review in Establishment Clause cases."  756
 F.Supp. at 1513;  see, e.g., Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 695-96 & n. 11, 109
 S.Ct. at 2146-47 & n. 11.
  A. Standard of Judicial Review
  [10] Judicial review of governmental purpose is deferential.  "A
 religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of a state
 legislature.  The religious purpose must predominate."  Edwards v.
 Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 2586, 96 L.Ed.2d 510
 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  Thus, a statute is
 invalid only if it "does not have a clearly secular purpose."  Wallace v.
 Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2489-90, 86 L.Ed.2d 29
 (1985) (emphasis added);  see, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Commissioner,
 823 F.2d at 1321.  Nevertheless, the City cannot overcome the first Lemon
 prong merely by articulating a legitimate purpose.  "[N]o legislative
 recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us" to an enactment's "pre-
 eminent purpose."  Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41, 101 S.Ct. 192, 194, 66
 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (per curiam).
  [11] Inquiry into legislative purpose begins with interpreting the law
 itself.  "The plain meaning of the statute's words, enlightened by their
 context and the contemporaneous legislative history [or explained by the
 interpretation of a responsible administrative agency], can control the
 determination of legislative purpose."  Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 594, 107
 S.Ct. at 2583 (citations omitted).  If the legislature's stated purpose is not
 actually furthered by the enactment then that purpose is disregarded as being
 insincere or a sham.  Id., 482 U.S. at 586-87, 107 S.Ct. at 2579.  Even if
 the proffered purpose is not a sham, the court must evaluate the effect of the
 statute's provisions and "consider[ ] the historical context of the statute ...
 and the specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage ...," id., 482
 U.S. at 595, 107 S.Ct. at 2583 (citations omitted);  see, e.g., Jaffree, 472
 U.S. at 59-60, 105 S.Ct. at 2491;  Valente, 456 U.S. at 253-55, 102 S.Ct. at
 1688-89;  see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
 Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (noting that
 Fourteenth Amendment challenge invokes inquiry into "historical background"
 and "specific sequence of events" preceding enactment);  Hunter v.
 Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 1920, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985);
 cf. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573,
 606, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3107, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (applying the effects
 criterion of Lemon by evaluating the "particular contexts" in which the
 government acts).
  [12] A statute in which an impermissible purpose predominates is invalid
 even if the legislative body was motivated in part by legitimate secular
 objectives.  Thus, for example, even if the ordinance in fact furthers a
 secular purpose, the "actual purpose" may in certain cases be found by asking
 "whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or
 disapproval of religion," Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104
 *1528 S.Ct. 1355, 1368, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
 See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56, 105 S.Ct. at 2489-90. [FN8]  If the "pre-
 eminent purpose" is illicit then the law is void.  Stone, 449 U.S. at 41,
 101 S.Ct. at 194.

      FN8. This newly articulated principle that creation of the appearance of
     official disapproval for a sect may constitute a violation of the
     Establishment Clause appears to have overruled in part Church of
     Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. Mar.1981), in which the
     court held that defamatory public condemnation by former Clearwater mayor
     Gabriel Cazares did not violate Scientology's civil rights and could not,
     consistent with the mayor's freedom of expression, be condemned under state
     law.  See also Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 585, 107 S.Ct. at 2578;  cf.
     Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2655-57, 120 L.Ed.2d
     467 (1992).

  Although the Court stated in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 108
 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988), that a statute is void only if "motivated
 wholly by an impermissible purpose," 487 U.S. at 602, 108 S.Ct. at 2570
 (emphasis added), we do not believe that this statement was intended to
 overrule the "predominate" standard of Aguillard, the "clearly secular"
 standard of Jaffree or the "pre-eminent" standard of Stone.  First, the
 statement in Kendrick was dictum.  "[T]he [statute] was motivated primarily,
 if not entirely, by a legitimate secular purpose."  Kendrick, 487 U.S. at
 602, 108 S.Ct. at 2571 (emphases added).  Second, we do not believe the Court
 would have overruled the principle of deferential yet searching analysis
 applied to questions of legislative purpose so recently (in Aguillard and
 Jaffree ) and so broadly (for example, in Underwood and Metropolitan
 Housing ) without explicitly acknowledging its intention to do so.  Instead,
 the Court simply cited Donnelly and Stone with apparent approval.  See
 Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 602, 108 S.Ct. at 2570.  Third, the Court's statement
 in Stone that "Kentucky's statute requiring the posting of the Ten
 Commandments in public schoolrooms had no secular legislative purpose, and is
 therefore unconstitutional," 449 U.S. at 41, 101 S.Ct. at 193 (emphasis
 added), does not represent a holding that any secular purpose is sufficient to
 validate an enactment.  Cf. Stone, 449 U.S. at 43-47, 101 S.Ct. at 195-96
 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that teaching children about the secular
 significance of the Ten Commandments is a sufficient legislative purpose).
 Finally, adopting the standard suggested by the Kendrick dictum would make
 Lemon 's purpose criterion a virtual dead letter, for "[r]arely can it be
 said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate
 made a decision motivated solely by a single concern ...," Metropolitan
 Housing, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 563.
  [13] Inexplicably, the City continues to argue that its purpose in enacting
 the ordinances is irrelevant to Scientology's allegation of an Establishment
 Clause violation.  (Appellees' Br. at 48).  As discussed above, the Supreme
 Court has unmistakably rejected this contention, most recently in Hernandez,
 in which the Court invoked the test of whether the challenged law "was born of
 animus to religion in general or Scientology in particular."  490 U.S. at
 696, 109 S.Ct. at 2147.  The cases relied upon by the City, Palmer v.
 Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26, 91 S.Ct. 1940, 1944-45, 29 L.Ed.2d 438
 (1971) (upholding against equal protection challenge city decision to close
 swimming pools rather than operate them on racially integrated basis), and
 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1682-84, 20
 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (upholding against free speech challenge federal statute
 prohibiting burning of draft card), are obviously distinguishable, as neither
 involved a claim arising under the Establishment Clause.  Contrary to the
 dictum of Palmer that judicial invalidation of a law on the basis of
 improper legislative purpose might be "futil[e]" because the statute "would
 presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body
 repassed it for different reasons," 403 U.S. at 225, 91 S.Ct. at 1945, the
 requirement that a court entertaining an Establishment Clause challenge must
 consider "the specific sequence of events leading to [re-]passage of the
 statute," Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 595, 107 S.Ct. at 2583, embodies a
 sensitivity to the political realities of the legislative process that is amply
 refined to *1529 discern such a crude attempt to circumvent federal judicial
 determination. [FN9]

      FN9. In any event, we are not inclined to accord too much weight to
     Palmer.  Four Justices dissented and Justice Blackmun's concurrence
     makes clear that he joined the majority only because facts developed in the
     record and conceded at oral argument rebutted the allegation of
     discriminatory motive.  403 U.S. at 228-30, 91 S.Ct. at 1946-47
     (Blackmun, J., concurring).  See generally Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d
     614, 617 n. 7 (11th Cir.1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85
     L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).

  Furthermore, Palmer 's holding simply has not withstood the test of
 time, even in the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection context.  See, e.g.,
 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870
 (1979) (sex discrimination);  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct.
 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (race discrimination);  see also City of Mobile
 v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (race
 discrimination under Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).  "Once racial
 discrimination is shown to have been a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor
 behind enactment of the law, the burden shifts to the law's defenders to
 demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without this factor."
 Underwood, 471 U.S. at 228, 105 S.Ct. at 1920.  The Court's 1968 decision
 in O'Brien, holding in the free speech context "that this Court will not
 strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged
 illicit motive," 391 U.S. at 383, 88 S.Ct. at 1682, may also effectively
 have been overruled in relevant part.  In Pickering v. Board of Education,
 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), Perry v.
 Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), and
 Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
 283-84, 97 S.Ct. 568, 574, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), the Court held that improper
 retaliatory purpose would invalidate action directed against a government
 employee's protected speech.  In Metropolitan Housing, 429 U.S. at 270 n.
 21, 97 S.Ct. at 566 n. 21, and Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at
 576, both decided on the same day, the Court applied identical standards of
 proof to a zoning action allegedly motivated by racial considerations and an
 employment action allegedly motivated by a purpose to chill free speech, the
 same standard that it would later apply in Underwood to determine racially
 discriminatory legislative purpose.  See also Lee v. Russell County Bd. of
 Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773-74 (11th Cir.1982) (applying identical Mt. Healthy
 standards to free speech and equal protection challenges to government
 employment action).  These decisions, which treat the evaluation of
 governmental purpose in challenges under the First Amendment as identical to
 the inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, suggest that action by any
 branch of government may be invalid if the challenger shows the action was
 partly motivated by purposes offensive to the Free Speech Clause and the
 defender cannot prove that illicit motivation was not in fact the cause of the
 action.  See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
 460 U.S. 575, 579-80, 585, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 1364-65, 1372, 75 L.Ed.2d 295
 (1983). [FN10]

      FN10. A sharply divided Court recently relied on O'Brien for guidance
     in evaluating regulation of non-verbal expressive conduct, such as burning
     draft cards or dancing nude, that also has significant components lacking
     expressive content.  See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 111
     S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991).  Only Justice Souter alluded to
     O'Brien's holding concerning legislative purpose, although he would have
     recognized that illicit purpose is dispositive in the Establishment Clause
     context.  Id., 501 U.S. at ---- & n. 1, 111 S.Ct. at 2469 & n. 1
     (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).

  [14] If Hernandez, Aguillard, Jaffree, Stone and Lemon
 were not enough to show that the City's contention is meritless, our holding
 in American Civil Liberties Union v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, 698
 F.2d 1098, 1110-11 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam), that improper religious motive
 invalidates official action challenged under the Establishment Clause, would
 suffice.  We readily conclude that a predominantly or pre-eminently sectarian
 purpose will invalidate an otherwise permissible law under the Establishment
 Clause.  We therefore turn to consider the allocation of proof in applying the
 purpose criterion of Lemon, and conclude that the frequently invoked Mt.
 Healthy standard is the most appropriate.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
 490 U.S. 228, 252-54, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1792-93, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 *1530
 (1989) (plurality opinion) (applying Mt. Healthy to private intentional sex
 discrimination case under Title VII);  id., 490 U.S. at 258-60, 109 S.Ct. at
 1795 (White, J., concurring) (same);  NLRB v. Transportation Management
 Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2475, 76 L.Ed.2d 667
 (1983) (applying Mt. Healthy to discriminatory anti-union discharge case);
 Thompkins v. Morris Brown College, 752 F.2d 558, 563-64 (11th
 Cir.1985) (anticipating Hopkins );  Hayes v. Shelby Mem. Hosp., 726 F.2d
 1543, 1548 (11th Cir.1984) (applying Mt. Healthy to Pregnancy Discrimination
 Act).
  [15] To be sure, the competing interests implicated in an Establishment
 Clause case may differ from those in free speech cases, as well as those
 involved in discrimination cases under the equal protection aspect of the
 Fourteenth Amendment, the disparate treatment aspect of Title VII, the
 Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the National Labor Relations Act.
 Nevertheless, the Establishment Clause requirement that a statute must have a
 "clearly secular" purpose, over which any sectarian motivation does not
 "predominate," is consistent with the allocation of proof adopted by the Court
 in Hopkins, Underwood, Transportation Management, Metropolitan
 Housing and Mt. Healthy and by our court in Hayes.  Just as the plurality
 in Hopkins and Justice White were "not inclined to say that the public
 policy against firing employees because they spoke out on issues of public
 concern [in violation of the First Amendment] or because they affiliated with a
 union is less important than the policy against discharging employees on the
 basis of their gender," 490 U.S. at 254, 109 S.Ct. at 1793, we are not
 inclined to conclude that the constitutional prohibition of laws tending to
 establish one or more official religions is less important than any of those
 policies just addressed.  "Each of these policies is vitally important, and
 each is adequately served by requiring proof by a preponderance of the
 evidence [that the defendant would have reached the same result in the absence
 of improper motivation]."  Id. (rejecting proposal to require defendant's
 proof by clear and convincing evidence).  When a plaintiff shows by direct
 evidence that a sectarian or religious purpose was a substantial or motivating
 factor, the burden shifts to the defendant to show by a preponderance of the
 evidence that action challenged under the Establishment Clause would have been
 undertaken even in the absence of such improper considerations.  See
 Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 595, 107 S.Ct. at 2583 (citing Metropolitan
 Housing );  cf. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 451-52, 91 S.Ct.
 828, 837, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971) (requiring challenger to show the absence of
 legitimate purpose when there is no direct evidence of sectarian motive).
  B. Discussion
  The district court's opinion did not expressly address Scientology's
 claim of discriminatory purpose, see 756 F.Supp. at 1505, 1516, although the
 City concedes that the claim was vigorously argued throughout the course of
 this litigation.  Having granted the City's motion for summary judgment,
 however, the district court did deny Scientology's motion to alter or amend the
 judgment on the basis of this issue.  [R7-168-1;  R6-147-4-9.]
  [16][17] Scientology points to various materials, including newspaper
 articles, that it submitted to the district court and which it argues tend to
 show sectarian motivation.  Even if they would have been inadmissible at trial
 (and we do not hold that they would have been), such materials were
 appropriately submitted by the non-moving party in opposition to the motion for
 summary judgment.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319, 324, 106
 S.Ct. 2548, 2551, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (non-moving party opposing motion
 for summary judgment with hearsay documents need not "produce evidence in a
 form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment");
 see also Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1015 & n.
 1 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam) ("The claim by [the moving party] that the
 letter is inadmissible hearsay does not undercut the existence of any material
 facts the letter may put into question."). [FN11]

      FN11. Although the Former Fifth Circuit had previously held that hearsay
     newspaper articles are ordinarily not competent evidence that a court may
     consider in ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule
     of Civil Procedure 56(e), Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632
     F.2d 539, 556-57 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927, 102 S.Ct.
     427, 70 L.Ed.2d 236 (1981);  cf. Victoria L. ex rel. Carol A. v.
     District School Bd., 741 F.2d 369, 373 (11th Cir.1984) (dictum), this
     holding appears to have been overruled in part by Celotex.  See
     Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 426 & n. 15 (5th
     Cir.1989) (assuming for purposes of argument that hearsay medical journal
     article was competent to counter motion for summary judgment).  While
     decisions of the Fifth Circuit rendered before October 1, 1981, are binding
     upon panels of this court, Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,
     1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), we must disregard them if necessary to give
     effect to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.  E.g.,
     United States v. Giltner, 972 F.2d 1563, 1566 (11th Cir.1992).
     Celotex does not modify Pan-Islamic with respect to the materials
     that may be submitted by the moving party.  As noted, we express no opinion
     concerning the admissibility of these materials at trial, a matter that is
     initially committed to the sound discretion of the district court.

  *1531 [18] Construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
 as they must be in evaluating a motion for summary judgment, Adickes v. S.H.
 Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970),
 these materials provide explicit evidence that the city commission conducted
 its legislative process from beginning to end with the intention of singling
 out Scientology for burdensome regulation.  The record shows a widespread
 political movement, apparently driven by an upsurge of sectarian fervor, [FN12]
 intent on driving Scientology from Clearwater.  It also shows that various
 members of the commission had made their affiliation with that movement known
 to the public in the plainest terms possible, not only in the official
 legislative record leading to adoption of the ordinances but also in documents
 concerning unrelated government activity and in extemporaneous remarks.

      FN12. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98, 89 S.Ct. 266, 267, 21
     L.Ed.2d 228 (1968).

  The city commission hired a Boston lawyer named Michael Flynn to coordinate
 the publicly televised hearings that eventually led to adoption of the 1983 and
 1984 Ordinances.  [R1-18-Exh. S.]  As reported in the Clearwater media and well
 known to the commission and the public, Flynn had dedicated much of his career
 to fighting Scientology.  It was Flynn who first suggested adoption of a
 charitable solicitation ordinance, the avowed purpose of which was to target
 Scientology.  [Id. Exh. K.]  In his written report Flynn appealed to the
 prejudices of his clients when he observed that such an ordinance would require
 lengthy and costly litigation to defend but that "Scientology has rarely been
 successful in any judicial system in the world, including numerous cases in the
 U.S., in using its religious front to conceal its activities."  [Id. Exh. K-
 2.]  (He did observe that Scientology was likely to achieve preliminary success
 in such litigation, noting "the only analogy I can give is it's like dealing
 with the Nazis.  They will litigate right to the bunker."  [Id. Exh. N1-
 13.] )
  [19] Flynn told the commission that a primary purpose of the statute
 was the collection of data to support the City's position (since abandoned for
 purposes of this case) that Scientology is not a bona fide religion and
 therefore is not entitled to exemption from the payment of property taxes.
 [Id. N-1-9.]  Although proper enforcement of property tax laws is a
 legitimate local governmental interest, the highly charged political context in
 which it was pursued created a risk that the taxation purpose was a mere
 pretext.  Certainly, the City had no interest in depriving Scientology of its
 privilege to pay the lower non-profit rate for United States mail bulk
 postage.  [Id. Exh. N-3.]  Nor did the City have any interest in confounding
 Scientology's state and federal income tax exemptions.  [E.g., id. Exh. O-8-
 9.]  Rather, viewed in the light most favorable to Scientology, these
 statements of purpose reveal an underlying objective to employ the tax laws to
 discriminate against Scientology, a purpose that is patently offensive to the
 First Amendment.  See Powell v. United States, 945 F.2d 374 (11th Cir.1991).
  As late as June 1983, commission members continued to express concern over
 suggestions that the proposed ordinance would "create a hardship for legitimate
 organizations," including other "churches," [R1-18-Exh. ZZ-33 to 34, 36,] and
 ordered further consideration *1532 of the matter by City Attorney Thomas
 Bustin.  [Id. Exh. CCC, EEE (transcript of consultation between Bustin and
 Episcopal and Jewish representatives).]  Viewed in the light most favorable to
 Scientology, we may interpret this response as a sign of deference to the main-
 line denominations.  Yet when identical concerns had been raised by Scientology
 at a public meeting, [id. Exh. HH-49, 52-57,] [FN13] the commission's entire
 response had been limited to an argumentative discussion in which members of
 the body debated the constitutionality of the ordinance with Scientology's
 advocate.  [Id. at 57-64.] [FN14]  Clearwater did not invite Scientology
 representatives to consult with Bustin.  According to City Manager Anthony
 Shoemaker, "Why should we?  We've heard their objections over and over
 again."  [Id. Exh. FFF-3.] [FN15]

      FN13. Those concerns included the scope of the recordkeeping burden, the
     potential for governmental entanglement in matters of church organization,
     the adequacy of existing anti-fraud statutes, the need to avoid
     governmental participation in intra-denominational disputes, the
     questionable constitutionality of the measure and the likelihood of
     expensive litigation to defend it.

      FN14. The tone of that discussion was apparently determined at the outset
     when then-Mayor Charles LeCher took the opportunity to remind the assembly
     of the Scientology lawyer's allegiance.  [R1-18-Exh. HH-57;  see also R5-
     108-Exh. 1-Vol. I-15-17 (transcript of denial of Scientology motion for
     leave to make opening statement at televised hearings);  id. Exh. 2-Tape
     1 (videotape of same).]

      FN15. Shoemaker apparently was not a voting member of the commission,
     although he and Bustin participated as panelists in the televised hearings.

  Scientology also points to a number of changes embodied in successive drafts
 of the 1983 Ordinance, changes inserted at the instance of more popular
 denominations and other charities.  [See id. Exh. DD, FF, HH.]  For example,
 the 1983 Ordinance was redrafted to remove any requirement that charitable
 organizations report or retain records concerning the identity of individual
 donors, [id. Exh. ZZ-4,] a provision that main-line charities and churches
 suggested might discourage contributions.  Similarly, the exemption for small-
 scale solicitations was adopted in response to more respected religious groups'
 concern for affiliated charities based outside Clearwater whose local
 activities were likely to be regular but small in scope.  [Id. Exh. EEE;
 see generally id. Exh. III-30;  id. Exh. JJJ.]  Such tinkering creates a
 significant "risk of politicizing religion," Valente, 456 U.S. at 253-55,
 102 S.Ct. at 1688-89, a danger that for purposes of summary judgment appears to
 have been realized in the present case.
  Mayor Kathleen Kelly and others frequently voiced concern that main-
 line denominations opposed to the ordinance might express their dissension by
 refusing to comply with its provisions;  no such solicitude was ever expressed
 concerning Scientology's objections.  [R1-18-Exhs. MMM, III-6-15.]  In voting
 against the 1983 Ordinance, Commissioner James Berfield noted one of the
 competing concerns before the body as "Will the ordinance be so cumbersome on
 the legally recognized religions and charitable organizations that it will be
 burdensome to them?"  [Id. Exh. OOO-6.]  Voting in favor of the ordinance,
 Commissioner William Justice observed:
   [A]fter the amendments, I talked to a number of people in churches and
 charitable organizations, and they convinced me that [the 1983 Ordinance] would
 not work any hardship on them.  They felt it was a good ordinance.  Any [sic]
 of the ministers--I won't say all of them but many of them--ministers whom I'm
 very familiar with and trust their opinion said it would not affect their
 organization either way and they would be glad to show their records.
 Consequently, I changed my opinion and I will vote for the ordinance.
  [Id. Exh. 000-9-10.]
  In response to concerns over the cost of litigation to defend the ordinances,
 Commissioner James Calderbank noted in 1981 the relatively large size of the
 City's budget and further observed "[a]nd I think number two, even emotionally,
 we are representatives of the citizens ( [then-Commissioner] KELLY agreeing
 here) and I think in the last few elections, [Commissioner] Rita [Garvey] was
 the first one, and [then-Mayor] Charlie [LeCher], that I heard years ago say,
 We've *1533 got to find a legal route."  [Id. Exh. N-1-17.]  This
 reference to the continuing political movement against Scientology during
 election campaigns is amply corroborated by unrebutted newspaper clippings
 contained in several volumes of the record.  Then-candidate Calderbank declared
 in 1980 that "I will explore every avenue and support every legal means of
 encouraging the Scientologists to leave....  I am a doer, not a talker."
 [Id. Exh. D-7.]  In 1981 candidate Calderbank "said that Scientology 'has to
 be treated like a cancer--first you arrest its growth, then remove it from the
 city ... or nullify its existence.' "  [Id. Exh. D-13 (ellipses in
 original).]  During his successful 1983 re-election campaign Calderbank again
 emphasized his opposition to Scientology, although he remained careful to
 articulate his respect for the law. [FN16]  Mayor LeCher, successfully seeking
 re-election in 1981, characterized Scientology as a "dark cloud ... that is
 upon us."  [Id. Exh. D-16.] [FN17]  Candidate Rita Garvey, successfully
 seeking election to the commission in 1980, entertained a "position on
 Scientology [that] is forceful but balanced with a concern that the rule of law
 be followed.  Mrs. Garvey says that Scientologists lie, steal and cheat.  She
 feels the community must work to destroy the organization at the top."  [Id.
 Exh. E-2.]  Then-Commissioner Richard Tenney, unsuccessfully seeking re-
 election in 1980, "said his campaign will focus on one issue--forcing
 Scientology to leave town."  [Id. Exh. D-8.] [FN18]  Candidate Justice,
 successfully seeking election to the commission in 1983, stated his position
 that the City should "[u]se every legal means to show that they [Scientology]
 are a fraud."  [Id. Exh. D-33.]  During a press conference Flynn and another
 person engaged in a colloquy to the effect that enacting a charitable
 solicitation ordinance would drive Scientology out of Clearwater.  [Id. Exh.
 N-7.]

      FN16. Speaking on the subject of Scientology, Calderbank said, "[t]he
     public record gives us a reason to enact ordinances to make sure fraud is
     not used in solicitation and the money goes for charitable purposes."  [R1-
     18-Exh. D-32.]

      FN17. LeCher was not mayor when the commission voted to adopt the
     ordinances.  He did, however, oversee the televised legislative hearings
     that preceded his defeat by former commissioner Kelly in 1983.

      FN18. Tenney was not a member of the commission during the hearings or
     when it voted to adopt the ordinances.

  Mayor LeCher gave a television interview concerning the hearings in
 which the following exchange took place.
   Interviewer:  ... Respond to the argument that at least some of the church
 members raise that this is, in essence, an organized effort to run
 [Scientology] out of town.
   LeCher:  It is an organized effort of the City of Clearwater, ... [ellipses
 in original] Where ever I go they say, "What about the Scientologists?"  They
 seem to care more [about] that than the boat, than the pier, or the hotel, or
 whatever.  It has been proven that street corner confrontation in politics no
 longer work in this issue.  So we believe that government should be of laws.
 And we are trying to carry out the wish of the people.  Again, if there is
 nothing there then there is nothing there.  And [the Scientologists] should
 want to come to a conclusion on this issue....
   Interviewer:  Would you like to see them run out of town?
   LeCher:  The county has a lawsuit with them.  I don't really care to comment
 publicly how I honestly feel with the threat of any possible litigation.  But I
 would like to say that I yearn for the olden days when the Fort Harrison Hotel
 was full of Canadian tourists spending lots of money in the city of Clearwater.
   ....
   Interviewer:  ... Is anyone other than the Scientologists being brought
 before these hearings?
   LeCher:  Not that I know of.  I don't know anyone else that is claiming to be
 a religion that is not.
  [Id. Exh. Q-2 to 3;  see also id. Exh. W-13, P 21.]  As late as August
 1983, Mayor Kelly was reported to have expressed "frustrati[on]" that the First
 Amendment restricted the City's ability to prevent Scientology from
 distributing literature in public fora, while Calderbank called for increased
 police patrols *1534 to deal with this problem.  [Id. Exh. FFF-3.] [FN19]

      FN19. Other evidence of animus toward Scientology can be found in the
     commission's derisive response to letters submitted by the group at the
     hearings.
     CALDERBANK:  There's a typo on the second page of the one where it says it
     should be.  We really could return this.
     (giggling from a woman).
     GARVEY:  I think you should get a paper shredder (to Flynn)[.]
     FLYNN:  Among other things....
     [R1-18-Exh. N1-20;  see also, e.g., R5-108-Exh. 1-Vol. I-249-50.]

  The City also considered but rejected proposals to employ its power of eminent
 domain to condemn Scientology property "even though the condemnation might put
 the organization out of business."  [Id. Exh. O-16.]  In response to
 concerns over the cost of acquiring and renovating the former hotel which
 Scientology had purchased in downtown Clearwater, Commissioner Calderbank
 observed:  "There are other locations that they own that might be more
 practical."  [Id. Exh. P-18 (emphasis added).]  A newspaper article reported
 that Mayor LeCher had expressed reservations that "even if the move were
 successful, it would not guarantee Scientology will leave the city."  [Id.
 Exh. P-30.]  As late as December 1983, City Manager Shoemaker stated in an
 official memorandum that "I think total condemnation of all the
 Scientologist's [sic] property in the city might be a workable solution to this
 problem facing the City.  This might even give them the needed boost to decide
 to relocate."  [Id. Exh. QQQ-1.]  In considering Flynn's proposal to create
 a special taxing zone in the downtown area and prohibit real estate conveyances
 to tax exempt owners, commissioners expressed concern that the impact of the
 action be limited to Scientology.  [See id. Exh. P-25;  id. Exh. KK-35-
 37.]
  The City may have tried to conduct a second round of hearings to
 sanitize the legislative record and suggest a neutral motivation.  [E.g.,
 id. Exhs. ZZ, III, JJJ.]  Whatever weight may be accorded this fact, the new
 legislative record is insufficient to warrant summary judgment in the face of
 all that had gone before.  [See also id. Exh. LLL (commission delayed vote
 on 1983 Ordinance pending receipt of "important" information from disenchanted
 ex-Scientologists to "help bolster Clearwater's legal position").]  Although it
 may not prove directly probative, we also note a Clearwater newspaper's 1983
 opinion that "[t]his charitable solicitation ordinance was conceived as a means
 of attacking the Church of Scientology, and nothing the city does now can
 remove that defect."  [Id. Exh. UU;  see generally id. Exh. DDD.]  There
 is sufficient evidence supporting that conclusion to shift to the City the
 ultimate burden of showing, under all the circumstances, that it would have
 enacted the ordinance even without impermissible motive. [FN20]  The same
 evidence precludes judgment as a matter of law for the City.  We therefore
 reverse the district court's order of summary judgment in the City's favor.
 The district court's order denying summary judgment for Scientology is vacated,
 and the case is remanded for further proceedings concerning the Lemon
 purpose criterion.  If the district court concludes that the City was
 improperly motivated then the entire ordinance will be invalid.  No further
 proceedings are necessary concerning Lemon's excessive entanglement
 analysis, however, in view of our discussion that follows.

      FN20. These references to the record do not reflect the only evidence
     tending to support Scientology's position.  [See generally, e.g., R5-108-
     Exh. 1 (transcript of hearings).]  We express no opinion about the
     magistrate judge's discovery orders denying Scientology's motion to compel
     deposition testimony concerning the legislators' subjective thought
     processes.  [R6-132;  R5-115.]  But see Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56-57, 105
     S.Ct. at 2490 (sponsor of legislation "confirmed this purpose before the
     District Court");  cf., e.g., Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1385-88
     (9th Cir.1991) (discussing prerequisites for discovery concerning
     subjective intent or motive in a suit against officials who may also be
     entitled to qualified immunity based on objective considerations, and
     citing cases).

                            VIII. EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT
  The three-prong Lemon inquiry also asks whether the challenged conduct
 "foster[s] 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "  Lemon,
 403 U.S. at 613, 91 S.Ct. at 2111 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
 674, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1414, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 *1535 (1970)).  Later decisions
 have clarified this aspect of the Establishment Clause in part.  In Jimmy
 Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 110 S.Ct. 688, 107
 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990), the Court held that the required recordkeeping and
 disclosure associated with administering neutral collection of sales taxes on
 transfers of religious and other materials did not excessively entangle the
 government in church affairs.  "[G]enerally applicable administrative and
 recordkeeping regulations may be imposed on religious organizations without
 running afoul of the Establishment Clause."  493 U.S. at 395, 110 S.Ct. at
 698.  Such "routine regulatory interaction which involves no inquiries into
 religious doctrine, no delegation of state power to a religious body, and no
 'detailed monitoring and close administrative contact' between secular and
 religious bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command."
 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696-97, 109 S.Ct. at 2147 (citations omitted);  see
 also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06,
 105 S.Ct. 1953, 1963-64, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) (holding that requirements of
 Fair Labor Standards Act foster no impermissible entanglement).
  A. Contentions of the Parties
  Scientology argues that the effect of the 1984 Ordinance is to mandate
 disclosure of its entire operation.  By requiring disclosure of the purpose for
 which funds are and have been solicited and the uses to which funds will be and
 have been put, the ordinance in effect makes the entire functioning of the
 church a matter of public record, either directly through reporting in the
 registration form and retrospective filing or indirectly by means of the
 "private" statement and disclosure of supporting records.  This effect is
 heightened by the further requirements of particular disclosures, such as the
 amount of funds spent on salaries, overhead and the like, and the names and
 addresses of every person in the organization with authority to spend its
 money.  And Scientology contends that, because funds solicited in Clearwater
 may be spent anywhere in the world, the ordinance perforce requires disclosure
 of its activities worldwide.  See generally Code ss 100.03(1),
 100.03(8). [FN21]

      FN21. Scientology raises a large portion of its revenues through its
     Clearwater activities.

  Scientology further argues that the disclosure provisions "require disclosure
 of the financial affairs of churches and other voluntary associations and
 provide rights to members of a church (or other voluntary association[ ] ) that
 they would not have absent the Ordinance.  Thus, these requirements impose on a
 church the form of organization Clearwater deems proper ... [and] removes from
 churches the ability to decide how they will govern and organize themselves."
 (Appellant's Br. at 18).  Scientology contends, finally, that such an
 entanglement is categorically prohibited by Supreme Court precedent and can
 never be justified.
  The City responds that these are merely "generally applicable administrative
 and recordkeeping regulations" and therefore permissible.  Even if otherwise
 improper, it argues, the 1984 Ordinance is sufficiently closely tailored to
 serve the City's legitimate interest in preventing fraud.
  B. The Government Entanglement
  None of the recent cases discussed above addressed facts similar to the ones
 presented here.  All of the challenged regulations imposed recordkeeping and
 disclosure obligations that were narrowly drawn to specific regulatory
 objectives.  See Jimmy Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 394-97, 110 S.Ct. at 698-99
 (sales tax on books and similar material);  Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696-98,
 109 S.Ct. at 2147-48 (tax deductibility of contributions as quid pro quo);
 Tony & Susan, 471 U.S. at 305-06, 105 S.Ct. at 1963-64 (wage and hour
 regulation).  None of the regulations required a church to divulge its entire
 budget and all its operations on a continuing basis to a large group of
 governmental and non-governmental persons.  In contrast, the 1984 Ordinance
 mandates a "detailed monitoring and close administrative interaction" by
 empowering the city clerk to review in detail the disclosure of proposed
 spending for the coming year and to assess disclosure of all such activities
 over the preceding year, by mandating public access to a detailed accounting of
 church expenditures, *1536 by opening the books and records to members of
 organizations employing the private statement and by involving criminal courts
 in enforcing these provisions.  The disclosure and recordkeeping is
 "significantly more intrusive into religious affairs," Tony & Susan, 471
 U.S. at 306, 105 S.Ct. at 1964, than that imposed by any of the regimes
 recently upheld by the Supreme Court.
  [20] The monitoring imposed by the 1984 Ordinance is just as "close"
 as the surveillance of parochial school expenditures condemned in Aguilar v.
 Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985), and equally as
 "detailed" as the program at issue in that case, if not more so, for the 1984
 Ordinance in effect requires recordkeeping and disclosure concerning every
 expenditure.  As the Court noted in Jimmy Swaggart, even a generally
 applicable recordkeeping regulation is permissible only if "the statutory
 scheme requires neither the involvement of state employees in, nor on-site
 continuing inspection of, [the church's] day-to-day operations."  493 U.S.
 at 395, 110 S.Ct. at 699 (emphases added).  The 1984 Ordinance offends this
 principle because it involves executive and judicial authorities in every
 aspect of the church's activities, not only making them the ultimate arbiters
 of the appropriate level of disclosure to the church's members in all matters
 of ecclesiastical fiscal administration, but also conferring responsibility for
 apprising themselves and the public concerning such matters.  The City's law
 violates the command that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can,
 openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
 or groups and vice versa."  Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16, 67
 S.Ct. 504, 512, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947).
  Although it does not require continuous or on-site inspection by government
 employees, the private statement option for member solicitations subjects
 religious organizations to the continuous surveillance of their own members by
 requiring disclosure of all records underlying the statements upon request.
 The City's legislative officials may not delegate to an individual citizen a
 power that they do not possess themselves, no matter how intimate the
 individual's relationship with the subject of the regulation may be, when the
 exercise of that power by the City would have infringed impermissibly a
 fundamental liberty guaranteed under our Constitution.  Planned Parenthood
 v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-72, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2841-42, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976).
  [21] The potential for government invasion of church affairs is compounded
 by the ordinance's direct effect upon church hierarchy.  By requiring a church
 to make detailed information about its activities available to members and the
 public, the ordinance has the direct effect of subtly shifting the balance of
 power between the laity and the central ecclesiastical authority.  While
 democratic participation by individual members in the affairs of society is a
 cornerstone of our public life, government may not mandate such arrangements in
 private organizations.  March Fong Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic
 Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 232-33, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1025, 103 L.Ed.2d 271
 (1989).  In addition to this legislatively sanctioned reordering of church
 hierarchy, of course, the ordinance requires prosecutorial and judicial
 authorities to assure compliance with its provisions by investigation and
 criminal enforcement.  In accomplishing these results the legislative arm of
 the City's government has impermissibly imposed its own preferences concerning
 the degree of disclosure to members concerning daily operations.
   By fiat it displaces one church administrator with another.  It passes
 control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one church authority to
 another.  It thus intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a church the power
 of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the
 principles of the First Amendment.
  Presbyterian Church v. Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 448, 89
 S.Ct. 601, 606, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
 Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119, 73 S.Ct. 143, 156, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952)).  The
 interposition of official authority on behalf of a church's laity is equally as
 offensive to the Establishment Clause as the delegation of such authority to
 church leaders that was condemned in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S.
 116, 123, 103 S.Ct. 505, 510, 74 *1537 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982).  For these
 reasons the recordkeeping and disclosure requirements of the 1984 Ordinance
 cannot be characterized as "routine."
  This type of surveillance is not rendered permissible by virtue of the fact
 that it does not expressly require the clerk or the court to make an assessment
 of the religious content of Scientology's activities.  Cf. Jimmy Swaggart,
 493 U.S. at 396-97, 110 S.Ct. at 699.  For the imposition of civil authority in
 matters of "church policy and administration" by itself may pose a "substantial
 danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious
 controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal
 beliefs."  Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
 710, 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2381, 2380, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976);  cf. Jones v.
 Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603-04, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3025-26, 61 L.Ed.2d 775
 (1979) (holding that civil courts may apply only neutral principles of law to
 resolve disputes over church property).
  The Fifth Circuit applied a settled principle when it declared that "the law
 is clear:  civil courts are barred by the First Amendment from determining
 ecclesiastical questions."  Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490,
 493 (5th Cir.1974);  accord, e.g., Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance,
 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir.1989).  In applying this principle we must not "narrowly
 limit" its scope to actual
   differences in church doctrine.  The cases negative such a strict view.  A
 "spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular
 control or m[a]nipulation[,] in short, power to decide for themselves, free
 from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith
 and doctrine" is reflected in the Supreme Court's decisions.
  Simpson, 494 F.2d at 493 (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 73 S.Ct. at
 154).  The district court erred when it concluded that "[t]he present situation
 does not involve an ecclesiastical dispute," 756 F.Supp. at 1521.  To the
 contrary, the principle that civil authorities must abstain from interposing
 themselves in matters of church organization and governance is directly
 violated by the public financial, operational and organizational disclosures
 required of churches that solicit from members and the public and the
 alternative private statement procedures applicable to member solicitations.
  [22] The same excessive entanglement in church affairs that is
 triggered by member solicitation under the 1984 Ordinance occurs when churches
 solicit the public.  The Court has never suggested that an excessive government
 entanglement that happens to involve church solicitation is mitigated by the
 fact that the public rather than the church's membership is the object of a
 request for funds.  See Valente, 456 U.S. at 252-55, 102 S.Ct. at 1687-89
 (noting that facial denominational preferences in law regulating public
 solicitation implicates excessive entanglement concerns).  The ordinance
 provides for exactly the same public disclosure and exactly the same mechanisms
 for official monitoring and enforcement with respect to both member and non-
 member solicitations. [FN22]  The tendency toward establishing religion that
 inheres in laws requiring public disclosure and official surveillance of church
 finances and activities is the same whether the regulation is occasioned by
 solicitations of co-religionists or church outsiders.  See, e.g., Larkin,
 459 U.S. at 126-27, 103 S.Ct. at 511-12 (condemning entanglement of official
 and ecclesiastical authority in matters entirely external to church affairs).
 The effect of such disclosure upon the associational interests of members in
 maintaining the privacy of their activities is the same whether the church
 engages in public solicitation or not.  Moreover, the state may never require
 churches to forego protected religious and speech activity like public
 solicitation, see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-05, 60
 S.Ct. 900, 903-04, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), in order to avoid becoming entangled
 with civil authorities.  We need not determine in the present case whether
 prohibiting such speech in the absence of entangling regulation would be
 *1538 adequately tailored to some substantial interest, although we doubt
 that such a blanket prohibition could be sustained.  An unconstitutional
 entanglement may not be excused on the ground that it is imposed only as a
 condition of avoiding otherwise permissible regulation or as a prerequisite to
 receiving a valuable privilege.  See generally, e.g., Rutan v. Republican
 Party, 497 U.S. 62, 72, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 2736, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990). [FN23]

      FN22. As already noted, the optional private statement for member
     solicitations is equally as offensive as the alternative public disclosure.

      FN23. For example, the Court in Felton condemned government
     entanglement in the administration of benefits to religious schools even
     though the schools could have escaped the entanglement by foregoing the
     benefits and despite the fact that the government was under no obligation
     to provide such benefits in the first instance.

  It is clear from the many entanglement cases that have involved direct
 regulation by executive rather than judicial institutions, beginning with
 Walz and continuing through Jimmy Swaggart, as well as those addressed to
 intervention by legislatures, see Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363
 U.S. 190, 80 S.Ct. 1037, 4 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1960) (per curiam), that the same
 prophylactic rule must also apply to intervention in church affairs by non-
 judicial branches of civil government.  In general "[i]t is of no moment that
 the State" has selected a particular branch of its government to carry out the
 challenged conduct, "for whether legislative or judicial, it is still the
 application of state power which we are asked to scrutinize."  NAACP v.
 Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172, 2 L.Ed.2d
 1488 (1958).  The principle of abstention is equally applicable to the
 decisions of church authorities that are not constituted as canonical courts or
 judicatories but merely as administrators.  See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman
 Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 15-16, 50 S.Ct. 5, 7-8, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929).
 Thus, the potential for entanglement by executive officials like the city
 clerk, judicial officials involved in applying the ordinance's criminal
 provisions and legislative authorities like the commission, whether
 intentionally undertaken or not, is sufficiently "substantial" to invoke the
 abstention principles first articulated in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
 Wall.) 679, 728-29, 20 L.Ed. 666, 676-77 (1872), reiterated in Gonzalez, and
 incorporated into First Amendment jurisprudence by Kedroff. [FN24]

      FN24. Both Watson and Gonzalez were decided before the religion
     clauses had been deemed applicable to the states by virtue of their
     incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.  As a case arising under the
     diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts prior to the ruling in Erie
     R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), the
     decision in Watson was reached by reference to general principles of
     common law.  Gonzalez was decided under the Court's appellate
     jurisdiction over the inferior courts of the Philippines and applied the
     same principles.  In Kedroff the Court adopted Watson, as elaborated
     in Gonzalez, as federal constitutional law.

  [23] When combined with the imposition of criminal enforcement
 mechanisms, the regime may become doubly offensive.  We need not reiterate the
 many important concerns that underlie the principle of separation between the
 functions of government and those of churches under the First Amendment.  See,
 e.g., Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 73 S.Ct. at 154;  Illinois ex rel.
 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212, 68 S.Ct. 461, 465, 92 L.Ed. 649
 (1948);  Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29, 20 L.Ed. at 676-77.  We
 simply note that the procedures for citizen complaint to the city attorney and
 investigation by subpoena enacted in the 1984 Ordinance underscore the already
 substantial risk of government participation in intramural church conflict and
 decisionmaking.  The provisions of the 1984 Ordinance requiring prospective and
 retrospective disclosure of church finances, activities and organization as a
 condition of soliciting funds foster an excessive government entanglement.
 [FN25]

      FN25. We have no need to consider the validity of other governmental
     regimes for disclosure of financial information by churches, such as that
     imposed by the Internal Revenue Service in administering 26 U.S.C. s
     501(c)(3), which was evaluated against a claim of excessive entanglement by
     neither the Ninth Circuit in Church of Scientology v. Commissioner nor
     the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
     574, 604 n. 30, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035 n. 30, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983).  See
     generally, e.g., Rev.Rul. 89-74, 1989-1 C.B. 311 (explaining I.R.S.
     treatment of exemptions or deductions claimed in relation to "churches"
     that actually constitute tax shelters).  Such regimes may or may not be
     distinguishable from the City's in a number of respects, such as the scope
     or detail of required disclosure, the mechanisms for monitoring and
     enforcement and the confidentiality which routine filings are accorded.
     See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. ss 508(c)(1)(A), 6033(a)(2)(A)(i), 6042,
     6049(b)(2)(C)(i), (b)(4)(B), 6050N(c), 6104, 7611;  Rev.Proc.
     86-23, 1986-1 C.B. 564;  cf. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696-98 & n. 12,
     109 S.Ct. at 2147-48 & n. 12 (holding that determination of quid pro quo
     nature of religious contributions in administering 26 U.S.C. s 170
     threatened no excessive entanglement).

  *1539 [24] The ordinance requires organizations to make limited public
 disclosure even when other information is omitted from the registration form in
 reliance upon the private statement option.  This mandatory public disclosure
 includes the nature and identity of the organization, its tax-exempt status,
 other Florida cities in which it is registered and the criminal histories of
 its officers and solicitors.  Code s 100.03(1)(a), (b), (c), (j).  This
 limited disclosure requires no continuing monitoring by private or public
 entities, imposes only a minimal burden on the organization and does not
 significantly interfere in the ordering of church affairs voluntarily accepted
 by members.  This requirement standing alone does not foster an excessive
 entanglement.  "The internal operations of the organization ... remain under
 the veil of privacy."  ISKCON-Houston, 689 F.2d at 556.  The Supreme Court
 has said that "a state may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by
 requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to
 solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to
 act for the cause which he purports to represent."  Cantwell, 310 U.S. at
 306, 60 S.Ct. at 904;  see also Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487
 U.S. 781, 799 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2679 n. 11, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988).  Upon
 remand, if the district court finds that the ordinance as a whole was not
 enacted with impermissible motive, it should proceed to determine whether the
 severability provision may appropriately be applied to preserve such limited
 disclosure.
  C. Asserted City Justification
  [25] The protections of the First Amendment are not absolute.  The City
 argues that the excessive entanglement analysis also requires an evaluation of
 the objectives of the government's regulation and an assessment of whether it
 is adequately tailored to serve them.  Scientology argues to the contrary that
 such an approach is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's precedents, which it
 contends have followed a categorical rather a comparative balancing approach in
 applying the Lemon Establishment Clause criteria and have reserved the
 familiar "compelling interest" test of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83
 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and its progeny [FN26] for application under
 the Free Exercise Clause.  We note that the continuing vitality of the
 Sherbert test has been limited by the Court's decision in Employment
 Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), which
 held that generally applicable criminal laws need not be justified by a
 compelling interest to withstand attack under the Free Exercise Clause.  See
 also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, ----,
 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2226, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993).

      FN26. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42,
     107 S.Ct. 1046, 1049, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987);  United States v. Lee, 455
     U.S. 252, 257-58, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1055, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982);  Thomas
     v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-19, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1431-33, 67 L.Ed.2d
     624 (1981);  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21, 92 S.Ct. 1526,
     1535-36, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972);  Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,
     462, 91 S.Ct. 828, 842, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971);  see also West Va. State
     Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1186, 87 L.Ed.
     1628 (1943).

  The criteria adopted in Lemon and elaborated in its progeny are
 absolute in themselves, and a law that fails to meet any of them is per se
 invalid.  Unlike the limitations placed upon government power to protect the
 individual's freedoms of expression and conscience under other clauses of the
 First Amendment, limitations which are themselves circumscribed by the flexible
 analysis of compelling interests, those imposed by Lemon provide a
 prophylactic wall of separation between church and state.  See Everson, 330
 U.S. at 15-16, 67 S.Ct. at 511-12;  Larkin, 459 U.S. at 122-23, 103 S.Ct. at
 510.  The Supreme Court has often invalidated statutes without asking how the
 challenged *1540 legislation was related to a government objective.  See,
 e.g., Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 585-94, 107 S.Ct. at 2578-83 (impermissible
 purpose);  Felton, 473 U.S. at 408-15, 105 S.Ct. at 3236-39 (excessive
 entanglement);  Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-70, 95 S.Ct. 1753,
 1764-66, 44 L.Ed.2d 217 (1975) (same);  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618-19, 91 S.Ct.
 at 2114 (same).  In Larkin the Court noted that the state's asserted
 interests in providing for the regulation of liquor distribution and
 controlling the use of property in the vicinity of schools, churches, hospitals
 and similar institutions readily could have been furthered by other
 regulation, 459 U.S. at 124-25, 103 S.Ct. at 510-11, but it did not rely
 upon this observation to invalidate a statute that conferred government liquor
 licensing powers upon churches and thereby enmeshed secular and ecclesiastical
 authority, 459 U.S. at 126-27, 103 S.Ct. at 511-12.  Nor has the Court ever
 implied that it favored such an approach to the Lemon standards, even in
 decisions that simultaneously applied a compelling interest analysis under the
 Free Exercise Clause.  See, e.g., Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699-700, 109 S.Ct.
 at 2149;  Gillette, 401 U.S. at 461, 91 S.Ct. at 842;  cf. Corporation of
 the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 2870, 97
 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (stating that judicial review of statute that "passes the
 Lemon test" requires inquiry "whether Congress has chosen a rational
 classification to further a legitimate end").  The statement in Allegheny
 that "strict scrutiny" should be applied to the Lemon "effects" prong,
 492 U.S. at 608-09, 109 S.Ct. at 3109, appears to have been a misleading
 choice of words, for no compelling interest analysis was undertaken.  The
 Establishment Clause prevents seemingly important justifications from becoming
 a shield to defend the subtle and incremental advance of government
 administration into the field of church activities.  It is this function of the
 excessive entanglement analysis which helps to give meaning to the textual
 distinction in the First Amendment between "law[s] respecting an establishment
 of religion" on the one hand and "[laws] prohibiting the free exercise
 thereof."
  Moreover, nothing in Smith has thrown doubt upon the categorical
 analytical approach embodied in Lemon and its progeny.  The City's reliance
 upon Smith, together with Nineteenth Century decisions upholding laws that
 forbade polygamy, [FN27] decisions applying labor and tax laws in the face of
 religious objections, [FN28] and those sustaining zoning regulations, [FN29] is
 clearly misplaced, for those decisions involved Free Exercise rather than
 Establishment Clause challenges.  The City's invocation of Bob Jones
 University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157
 (1983), is unavailing for the same reason. [FN30]

      FN27. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637
     (1890);  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879).
     To the extent that Davis may have interpreted the Establishment Clause
     (as distinct from the Free Exercise Clause) as subordinate to state
     regulation of "acts recognized by the general consent of the Christian
     world in modern times as proper matters for prohibitory legislation,"
     133 U.S. at 343, 10 S.Ct. at 301, 33 L.Ed. at 640, we regard it as no
     longer controlling.  Neither Davis nor Reynolds presented issues of
     Establishment Clause concern, as those concerns are understood in
     contemporary decisions like Lemon.

      FN28. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.
     645 (1944);  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58, 102 S.Ct. 1051,
     1055, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982);  United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d
     1210, 1227 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S.Ct. 2344, 80
     L.Ed.2d 818 (1984).

      FN29. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir.1983), cert.
     denied, 469 U.S. 827, 105 S.Ct. 108, 83 L.Ed.2d 52 (1984);  Lakewood
     Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303,
     303 & n. 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815, 104 S.Ct. 72, 78
     L.Ed.2d 85 (1983).

      FN30. The bulk of the constitutional analysis in Bob Jones addressed
     the government's compelling interest in preventing racial discrimination,
     which the Court held was served by a narrowly tailored regulation denying
     religious and charitable tax exemptions to discriminatory schools and
     colleges.  This discussion applied the Free Exercise Clause.  The Court
     also found the regulation permissible under Lemon 's effects criterion
     of Establishment Clause analysis because it was "founded on a neutral,
     secular basis."  461 U.S. at 604 n. 30, 103 S.Ct. at 2035 n. 30
     (quoting Gillette, 401 U.S. at 452, 91 S.Ct. at 837).  Nothing in Bob
     Jones suggests a holding that regulations which are otherwise impermissible
     under Lemon may be justified by showing their close fit to a compelling
     interest.

  *1541 Similarly, Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better
 Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980), involved
 asserted violations of the plaintiffs' freedom of speech by government conduct
 directly addressed to such protected activity.  Regulations having such an
 effect upon speech are also subject to strict scrutiny under the compelling
 interest standard.  See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989);  Citizens for a Better
 Environment, 444 U.S. at 637, 100 S.Ct. at 836;  First Nat'l Bank v.
 Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1421, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978).
 Regulations fostering an excessive entanglement between government and church
 are not.
  In Gonzalez the Court suggested by negative implication that civil courts
 may supplant a decision of church authorities "[i]n the [presence] of fraud,
 collusion, or arbitrariness."  280 U.S. at 16-17, 50 S.Ct. at 7-8;  cf.
 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 452 n. 7, 89 S.Ct. at 607 n. 7.  In
 Serbian Diocese, however, the Court cast doubt upon the continuing vitality
 of the Gonzalez dictum by holding that "whether or not there is room for
 'marginal civil court review' under the narrow rubrics of 'fraud' or
 'collusion' when church tribunals act in bad faith and for secular purposes,
 no 'arbitrariness' exception" to the rule of abstention in "matters of
 discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or
 law" is permissible under the First Amendment.  Serbian Diocese, 426 U.S. at
 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. [FN31]  Even if the common law reasoning of Gonzalez
 also embodies the constitutional rule governing civil review of particular
 church decisions, the Court has not imported a judicial inquiry concerning
 fraud or collusion into the general Lemon analysis embracing the broad range
 of potentially establishmentarianist laws.  In Felton, Meek and Lemon,
 for example, the Court did not pause to consider whether the state's interest
 in preventing "fraudulent" misappropriation of government funds to sectarian
 uses was "compelling" or otherwise substantial, or whether the means chosen
 were well tailored to accomplish that end, before it condemned the state's
 regulatory oversight of church expenditures.  Cf. Felton, 473 U.S. at 409,
 105 S.Ct. at 3236 ("At best, the supervision in this case would assist in
 preventing the Title I program from being used, intentionally or unwittingly,
 to inculcate the religious beliefs of the surrounding parochial school.").
 Indeed, even in applying the Free Exercise Clause itself, we have held that no
 flexible analysis of compelling interest justifications may be entertained when
 the challenger shows either that the law was actually enacted for a sectarian
 purpose or that "the 'essential effect' of the government action is to
 influence negatively the pursuit of religious activity or the expression of
 religious belief."  Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 733 (11th
 Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827, 105 S.Ct. 108, 83 L.Ed.2d 52 (1984).
 [FN32]

      FN31. See also Brundage v. Deardorf, 92 F. 214, 228-30 (6th Cir.1899).

      FN32. In addition, of course, "[t]he freedom to hold religious beliefs and
     opinions is absolute."  Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603, 81 S.Ct.
     1144, 1146, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961).

  [26] Lemon is not the only guiding light in the Establishment
 Clause firmament.  When the Court found explicitly preferential treatment for
 one sect over another to be plain on the face of an ordinance, it allowed the
 government to show that the preference was "closely fitted" to serve a
 "compelling governmental interest," Valente, 456 U.S. at 246 & n. 23, 102
 S.Ct. at 1684-85 & n. 23, and invalidated the statute only upon finding that
 the government had failed to carry this burden.  Nevertheless, the compelling
 interest justification held out by Valente is unavailable to the City in the
 present case because the 1984 Ordinance is facially neutral among religions and
 indeed applies to wholly secular charities as well as churches.  See
 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 695-96, 109 S.Ct. at 2146-47. [FN33]  Therefore, we
 need not decide how Valente's strict scrutiny complements Lemon.  See
 Amos, 483 U.S. at 339, 107 S.Ct. at *1542 2870;  Donnelly, 465 U.S. at
 696 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. at 1371 n. 2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). [FN34]  Thus, we
 need go no further to conclude that the law's recordkeeping and disclosure
 requirements associated with the prospective and retrospective public
 disclosure and alternative private statements are invalid as applied to church
 solicitations of members and the public.  The district court's orders denying
 summary judgment to Scientology and granting summary judgment to the City must
 be reversed in this respect.

      FN33. The exemption provided by Code s 100.02(1) for volunteer and
     small scale organizations is a denominational preference favoring such
     groups at the expense of larger denominations.  Scientology has not
     challenged the exemption directly and the City has articulated no
     justification, compelling or otherwise, in support of this classification.

      FN34. Moreover, to the extent that the concerns presented in the instant
     case are similar to the concerns implicated in Valente, we believe our
     holding in this case--regarding which disclosures pass muster and which are
     too intrusive--is consistent with Valente.  See Valente, 456 U.S. at
     253-54 & n. 29, 102 S.Ct. at 1688 & n. 29.  We believe the same can be said
     with respect to Village of Schaumburg, supra, and the other strict
     scrutiny cases relied upon by the city.

  D. Free Exercise Analysis
  [27] Some early cases appeared to proscribe civil intervention in church
 affairs by applying the Free Exercise Clause.  See, e.g., Kedroff, 344 U.S.
 at 114, 73 S.Ct. at 153-54.  The Fifth Circuit's citation of free exercise
 cases in Simpson, 494 F.2d at 493, shows that it viewed the principle as
 flowing from that source.  As such, the prohibition against civil intervention
 arguably might be overcome by showing that it was necessary to serve a
 compelling interest, although at the time Kedroff was decided in 1952 the
 Court had not yet applied contemporary strict scrutiny standards to the Free
 Exercise Clause.  See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 117-19, 73 S.Ct. at 155-56
 (distinguishing American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399-
 400, 70 S.Ct. 674, 684-85, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950)). [FN35]  Nevertheless, as our
 discussion above shows, the Establishment Clause also is implicated when the
 government entangles itself on a continuing basis in the non-doctrinal affairs
 of church functioning.

      FN35. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 463, 78 S.Ct. at 1172;
     Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1219, 1
     L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("For a citizen to be
     made to forego even a part of so basic a liberty as his political autonomy,
     the subordinating interest of the State must be compelling.").  That
     expansion was not explicitly accomplished until Sherbert was decided in
     1963.  Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 323, 89
     L.Ed. 430 (1945).

  The two clauses are closely related in their purposes.  For instance, the
 Establishment Clause prohibition of denominational preferences "is inextricably
 connected with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause."
 Valente, 456 U.S. at 245, 102 S.Ct. at 1683.  And the Court has observed,
   [w]hen the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters
 of religious significance, the freedom of religious belief of those who are not
 adherents of that denomination suffers, even when the governmental purpose
 underlying the involvement is largely secular.  In addition, the freedom of
 even the adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion
 into sacred matters.
  Felton, 473 U.S. at 409-10, 105 S.Ct. at 3236 (condemning excessive
 entanglement).  In Serbian Diocese, for instance, the Court referred broadly
 to "the First Amendment," without specifically citing either the Free Exercise
 or the Establishment Clause, and employed language that plainly implicated
 Establishment Clause concerns, 426 U.S. at 709, 710, 96 S.Ct. at 2380,
 2381.  In Presbyterian Church the Court adverted to both Free Exercise and
 Establishment Clause concerns.  393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. at 606;  see also
 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 121, 73 S.Ct. at 157 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
 ("What is at stake here is the power to exercise religious authority.").  In
 the seminal case establishing the principles of civil abstention upon which our
 opinion relies so heavily, the Court unmistakably identified Establishment
 Clause values as contributing.  "The law knows no heresy, and is committed to
 the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect."  Watson, 80 U.S. (13
 Wall.) at 728, 20 L.Ed. at 676 (distinguishing American legal principles from
 the British jurisprudence respecting "the Established Church").
  [28] Yet the two clauses are distinct.  E.g., Gillette, 401 U.S. at 453,
 91 S.Ct. at 838.  Although government conduct may be impermissible under both
 the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses, challenged conduct *1543
 that satisfies the former may offend the latter.  E.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at
 430-31, 82 S.Ct. at 1266-67.  Thus, we have concluded, the Establishment Clause
 may condemn certain entanglements that take the form of civil intervention in
 church political organization under Lemon even if they might otherwise have
 been justifiable under the strict scrutiny of the Free Exercise Clause.
   The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
 this:  Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither
 can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
 over another....  Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
 secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
 and vice versa.
  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 591, 109 S.Ct. at 3100 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S.
 at 15-16, 67 S.Ct. at 511-12).
  In support of the ordinance the City has pointed to its interests in
 the prevention of fraud in charitable solicitations, together with concerns
 that Scientology may continue to engage in alleged illicit surveillance,
 intimidation and blackmail of political adversaries, dissident members and
 apostates, as well as bizarre physically and psychologically coercive forms of
 social control over members.  The prevention of these ills is legitimate.
 Nevertheless, even if the 1984 Ordinance's entangling provisions were capable
 of justification as narrowly tailored to serve important or compelling
 interests, the justifications offered by the City are lacking.
  [29][30][31] Neutral and generally applicable criminal laws may be applied
 to an individual without compelling justification even if they conflict with
 his religious beliefs.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-90, 110 S.Ct. at 1602-
 06.  But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-24, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1535-
 37, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (holding that generally applicable regulatory law
 requiring mandatory school attendance cannot be applied without exemption for
 religious objectors unless denial of exemption is necessary to serve compelling
 interest).  But the 1984 Ordinance is not a "generally applicable" law
 "unconcerned with regulating" protected activity, Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.
 3, 110 S.Ct. at 1604 n. 3.  Rather, the law applies only to the solicitation of
 funds by religious and charitable organizations.  As such, the statute is
 directed solely to activity protected by the First Amendment.  Solicitation by
 secular charities, e.g., National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. at 789, 108
 S.Ct. at 2673;  Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947,
 967 & n. 16, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2852-53 & n. 16, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984), as
 well as fundraising by political advocacy groups, e.g., Citizens for a
 Better Environment, 444 U.S. at 632, 100 S.Ct. at 834, no less than
 solicitation by religious organizations, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
 U.S. 105, 108-12, 63 S.Ct. 870, 872-74, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943), are protected as
 aspects of First Amendment speech and associational freedoms.  The ordinance
 thus has no application to conduct whose exercise is not regarded as a
 fundamental constitutional liberty and the rule of Smith therefore does not
 apply. [FN36]  In lieu thereof, we employ "exacting First Amendment
 scrutiny."  National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. at 789, 108 S.Ct. at 2673.

      FN36. We therefore need not consider whether the lenient review envisioned
     by Smith embodies the appropriate standard for assessing criminal laws
     that merely enforce malum prohibitum regulatory provisions like these, or
     whether Smith is limited to malum in se offenses like the drug crimes
     there at issue.  In other words, we do not decide whether the government
     may evade strict scrutiny of particular regulatory statutes merely by
     employing more severe criminal sanctions.  See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-
     22, 92 S.Ct. at 1535-36 (applying strict scrutiny to mandatory schooling
     law);  cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S.Ct. at 1603 ("Whether or not
     the [Court's precedents requiring strict scrutiny] are ... limited [to
     unemployment benefit decisions], they at least have nothing to do with an
     across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of
     conduct.").   But cf. Montgomery v. County of Clinton, 743 F.Supp. 1253,
     1259 & n. 5 (W.D.Mich.1990) (applying Smith as if it had overruled
     Yoder), aff'd without opinion, 940 F.2d 661 (6th Cir.1991).

  The Supreme Court has never expressly decided whether the state's interest in
 preventing church-sponsored fraud upon members or the public should be
 considered "compelling," although in National Federation of the Blind the
 Court concluded that the state's interest in protecting secular charities and
 the public from fraudulently *1544 excessive fundraisers' fees was "a
 sufficiently substantial interest to justify a narrowly tailored regulation."
 487 U.S. at 792, 108 S.Ct. at 2675.  Faced with the state's asserted
 interest in "protecting its citizens from abusive practices in the solicitation
 of funds for charity," including religious causes, the Court in Valente
 "assume[d], arguendo, that the Act generally is addressed to a sufficiently
 'compelling' governmental interest," 456 U.S. at 248, 102 S.Ct. at 1685, but
 proceeded to hold that the regulation at issue was not "closely fitted" to
 serve that interest.  See also Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S.
 at 636, 100 S.Ct. at 836 (same).
  [32] We conclude that the state does indeed have a compelling
 interest in protecting church members from affirmative, material
 misrepresentations designed to part them from their money.  "Nothing we have
 said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion,
 persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon the public.  Certainly, penal
 laws are available to punish such conduct."  Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306, 60
 S.Ct. at 904.  The same interests are not diminished by the fact that victims
 may be voluntary members of a religious association.  See, e.g., Wright v.
 Downs, 972 F.2d 350 (6th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (unpublished) (imposing
 securities fraud liability upon pastor who touted fraudulent mortgage notes
 from the pulpit), aff'g Guthrie v. Downs, [1992 Transfer Binder]
 Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) P 96,896, 1991 WL 354939 (E.D.Mich. Aug. 7, 1991);
 United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847-48 (9th Cir.1981) (affirming
 mail fraud convictions for church-sponsored Ponzi scheme), cert. denied, 454
 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct. 1031, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982).  This is so whether the ill-
 gotten funds are used for a "legitimate" religious purpose (however that might
 be defined by civil authorities), for the personal benefit of church leaders or
 for some other ends.
  [33][34] When no affirmative misrepresentations are made concerning the uses
 for which funds will be employed, either explicitly or by clear implication,
 the state has no compelling interest in requiring members or the public to be
 made aware of such matters.  If Scientologists are willing to contribute money
 without being told how it will be used, then the City has no interest in
 forcing the church to make such information available.  "All who unite
 themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and
 are bound to submit to it."  Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728, 20 L.Ed. at
 676.  The continuing vitality of this principle is demonstrated by the 1989
 decision in March Fong Eu, in which the Court held that "a State cannot
 substitute its judgment for that of [a political] party as to the desirability
 of a particular internal party structure, any more than it can tell a party
 that its proposed communication to party members is unwise."  489 U.S. at
 233, 109 S.Ct. at 1025 (citation omitted). [FN37]  Therefore, the City may not
 substitute its own judgment as to the desirable level of disclosure to church
 members.

      FN37. Associational interests protected by the religion clauses stand on
     equal footing with protected political rights.  NAACP v. Alabama, 357
     U.S. at 460-61, 78 S.Ct. at 1171.

  The City's argument that devout church members may refrain from availing
 themselves of information that the ordinance requires to be disclosed is
 specious, for it fails to address the concerns of adherents whose interests in
 maintaining the privacy of church finances are impaired by disclosure to the
 public or to dissident members.  The City may not intervene on behalf of such
 dissidents.  If they remain dissatisfied with the church's voluntarily assumed
 disclosure policy then they may attempt to reform that policy from within, they
 may acquiesce in the policy despite their objections or they may leave the
 church.  Civil authority "cannot penetrate the veil of the church for the
 forbidden purpose of vindicating the alleged wrongs of ... members;  when they
 became members they did so upon the condition of continuing or not as they and
 their churches might determine, and they thereby submit to the ecclesiastical
 power and cannot now invoke the supervisory power of the civil tribunals."
 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 731, 20 L.Ed. at 677 (quotations omitted).
  [35] Similarly, the Court has held that "the State's interest in
 unilaterally imposing *1545 its notions of fairness in the [charitable]
 fundraising contract is ... constitutionally invalid."  National Fed'n of
 the Blind, 487 U.S. at 792, 108 S.Ct. at 2675.  For this reason, as the
 district court recognized, the state may not compel specific disclosures merely
 because, in its view, some potential contributors to some causes might tend to
 think that those facts evidence unfairness or some other objectionable quality
 in the use to which funds will be put.  756 F.Supp. at 1515-16 (citing
 Indiana Voluntary Firemen's Ass'n v. Pearson, 700 F.Supp. 421, 442
 (S.D.Ind.1988)).  Just as a church-goer may refrain from tithing if he or she
 is unsatisfied with the degree of disclosure, a non-member may also demand any
 information desired, and "if the solicitor refuses to give the requested
 information, the potential donor may (and probably would) refuse to donate."
 National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. at 799, 108 S.Ct. at 2679.  Although
 substantial, the City's interest in preventing affirmative misrepresentations
 is not precisely furthered by the broad disclosures compelled by the 1984
 Ordinance.
  [36][37] The City could not defend the ordinance by contending that the
 tenets of Scientology are fantastic or false and by arguing as a consequence
 that its collection of funds under the cloak of religion is therefore
 fraudulent.  The First Amendment precludes civil authorities from evaluating
 the truth or falsity of religious beliefs.  United States v. Ballard, 322
 U.S. 78, 85-88, 64 S.Ct. 882, 886-87, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944).  Thus, the fact
 that Scientology's doctrine of "exchange" may appear to non-adherents as a
 crass rationalization to justify the enrichment of a few select leaders at the
 expense of neophytes provides no basis for imposing burdensome and entangling
 regulations for the "benefit" of church members who voluntarily choose to
 adhere to that doctrine.  Nor, for that matter, could such an official
 perception of theological unsoundness justify regulation respecting church
 disclosure to non-members.
  [38][39] The City's brief does refer to certain evidence in the legislative
 record suggesting that Scientology's now-deceased founder L. Ron Hubbard and
 others may have been insincere in professing church doctrines.  (Appellees' Br.
 at 5-12).  Although the City does not rely upon the principle directly, the
 Supreme Court has long held that civil tribunals may adjudicate the sincerity
 with which a religious belief is held by an individual.  See, e.g., United
 States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185, 85 S.Ct. 850, 863, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965).
 We need not consider how a determination concerning the sincerity of an
 organization's religious beliefs might appropriately be made in support of a
 specific administrative adjudication consistent with the procedural
 requirements of due process.  To the extent that such a determination as to a
 single church is the sole support for legislation having general applicability
 and effect, however, the law must be fatally imprecise.  Even assuming that the
 commission properly relied upon a conclusion that Scientology's beliefs were
 insincere, a contention only implicitly advanced by the City in this appeal,
 [FN38] the imposition of recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon all
 churches and charities engaged in public and private solicitation would burden
 a great deal of protected expression without serving any legitimate purpose.
 The law would not be narrowly tailored, for a blanket application of regulation
 cannot distinguish between "fraudulent" and sincere religions.  Joseph H.
 Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 964-68, 104 S.Ct. at 2851-53;  City Council v.
 Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 & n. 14, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2125 & n. 14,
 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984).  Moreover, any City interest in the administrative
 convenience of dispensing with an individualized determination concerning the
 sincerity of particular religious beliefs is not compelling.  Memorial Hosp.
 v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 267-69, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1086-88, 39 L.Ed.2d
 306 (1974) (concluding that interest in convenient prevention of fraud did not
 justify denying health care benefits to all out-of-state immigrants in first
 year of residency). [FN39]  In addition, whatever evidence might
 *1546 appropriately be considered at such a hearing, religious adherents
 have never been required to show the sincerity with which their deceased
 prophets espoused religious revelations per se;  only the sincerity of
 contemporary church leadership might properly be put in issue. [FN40]

      FN38. The City has conceded "for purposes of the summary judgment motion"
     that "Scientology's beliefs, as opposed to its actions, are religious in
     character."  (Appellees' Br. at 15).

      FN39. See also Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin.,
     --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2365, 2371-72, 120 L.Ed.2d 59
     (1992) (holding that avoiding "marginal loss in convenience" does not
     constitute a "compelling justification" for discrimination against foreign
     commerce);  Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693,
     48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976) (finding that convenience to jail administrators is
     no "essential state policy" imposing a "substantial need" sufficient to
     justify requiring the wearing of jail clothing at criminal trials);
     Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653-58, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1213-16, 31
     L.Ed.2d 551 (1972);  Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29
     L.Ed.2d 90 (1971);  Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13
     L.Ed.2d 675 (1965).

      FN40. We express no opinion concerning whether a finding of insincere
     belief would validate the regulation imposed by this ordinance, nor do we
     decide its validity as applied to non-religious voluntary associations
     engaged in protected speech activities.  The Supreme Court has noted that a
     regulatory scheme requiring such inquiries into the beliefs of an entire
     religion may itself pose a risk of excessive government entanglement.
     E.g., Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 604 n. 30, 103 S.Ct. at 2035 n. 30.

  [40] Only a few provisions of the 1984 Ordinance appear narrowly
 tailored to serve the City's compelling interest in preventing affirmative
 fraud.  For example, Code s 100.05(1)(c) prohibits the "use of any scheme or
 artifice to defraud or obtain money or property by means of any false statement
 or representation." [FN41]  Consistent with the dicta of Cantwell, 310 U.S.
 at 306, 60 S.Ct. at 904, and National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. at
 799 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. at 2679 n. 11, we hold that the identifying disclosure
 requirements of Code s 100.03(1)(a), (b), (c) and (j) are narrowly tailored
 to prevent fraud by religious and charitable organizations.  We therefore must
 reject Scientology's claim that the ordinance, as we have circumscribed it,
 impermissibly imposes discriminatory regulation of speech on the basis of the
 speaker's identity as a religion or charity.  See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
 U.S. 569, 576, 61 S.Ct. 762, 766, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941). [FN42]

      FN41. The validity of this provision is not before us.

      FN42. We recognize the tension between cases addressing regulation of
     charitable and religious solicitation like Cantwell and National
     Federation of the Blind, on the one hand, and cases addressing more broadly
     applicable regulation of speech like Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,
     63-64, 80 S.Ct. 536, 538, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960), in which the Court has held
     that a speaker may not be forced to identify himself as a condition of
     obtaining a license to sell or distribute books, handbills and the like
     even for the purpose of preventing fraud.  Cf. Thornburgh v. American
     College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 767, 106 S.Ct.
     2169, 2182, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) ("the Court consistently has refused to
     allow government to chill the exercise of constitutional rights by
     requiring disclosure of protected, but sometimes unpopular, activities");
     Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 624-30 &
     n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 1763-65 & n. 2, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
     concurring) (finding "substantial questions whether identification
     requirements" for charitable solicitation were "so adequately related to
     their purpose as to withstand First Amendment challenge").  We do not
     attempt to reconcile the two lines of cases.

  [41] Despite many volumes of testimony and exhibits, however, there is
 simply nothing in the record to suggest that any more extensive regulation is
 necessary to control fraudulent conduct by charitable organizations than is
 available to sanction similar activities by other entities.  See, e.g.,
 United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 847-48 (affirming fraud
 convictions);  Fla.Stat.Ann. ss 812.012-812.021 (larceny, including fraud
 and false pretenses) (West 1993).  One witness at the legislative hearings did
 testify that she would have abstained from membership in Scientology if more
 complete financial disclosure had been made available.  [See R5-108-Exh. 1-Vol.
 IV-71-73;  see also id. at 345, 412-13.]  To be sure, even when a speaker's
 express statements are truthful in the literal sense, wilful omissions which
 render those statements materially misleading half-truths may constitute fraud
 just as surely as overt falsehoods. [FN43]  Even if we construed *1547 this
 and other testimony as evidence that Scientology's finances and operations were
 implicitly or explicitly misrepresented to members and contributors, however,
 we would not regard this conclusion as sufficient to justify the far-reaching
 regulation advanced by the City.  In light of the potent but significantly less
 intrusive regulatory alternatives available to authorities for dealing with
 such fraud, the ordinance cannot be characterized as narrowly tailored.  Nor
 has the City tried to explain why less restrictive alternatives like generally
 applicable penal laws that proscribe extortion, burglary, kidnapping and the
 like are inadequate to address its other asserted interests in controlling the
 alleged illegal and coercive conduct of charitable and religious organizations
 like Scientology.  See, e.g., Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d at 1227 (affirming
 religious leaders' convictions for filing false tax returns, obstructing
 justice, perjury and making false statements and submitting false documents to
 government agencies); [FN44]  United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1241 n.
 2, 1242, 1244 (D.C.Cir.1981) (per curiam) (affirming Scientologists'
 convictions for theft of government property and conspiracy to steal government
 property, to intercept oral communications, to forge United States government
 credentials, to burglarize offices of the Internal Revenue Service, the
 Department of Justice and a United States Attorney, to obstruct justice, to
 obstruct a criminal investigation, to harbor and conceal a fugitive and to make
 false declarations to a federal grand jury), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926, 102
 S.Ct. 1971, 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982);  Fla.Stat.Ann. ss 812.021(1)(e),
 836.05 (extortion and obtaining property thereby), 810.011-810.115 (burglary
 and trespass), 787.01-787.02 (kidnapping and false imprisonment) (West 1993).
 [FN45]  Thus, we conclude that the City has not carried its burden of showing
 that the required financial, operational and organizational disclosures are
 narrowly tailored to serve compelling interests.  Those provisions are
 therefore void even under the strict scrutiny of the Free Exercise Clause.

      FN43. See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S.
     1083, ---- & n. 7, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 2761 & n. 7, 115 L.Ed.2d 929 (1991);
     United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 77 & n. 3, 83 S.Ct. 173, 174 & n.
     3, 9 L.Ed.2d 136 (1962);  United States v. Romano, 736 F.2d 1432, 1439
     (11th Cir.1984), vacated in other respects as moot, 755 F.2d 1401
     (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam);  United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367,
     393 (5th Cir. June 1981), vacated in other respects as moot sub nom.
     United States v. Holt, 650 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. July 1981) (per curiam),
     and aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
     16, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983);  Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
     576 So.2d 728, 730 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), review denied, 589 So.2d 290
     (Fla.1991);  Whigham v. Muehl, 500 So.2d 1374, 1379-81
     (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987).

      FN44. We respectfully express no approval of Sun Myung Moon to the
     extent that the Second Circuit's opinion could be read to authorize a jury
     to displace a church's sincere determination of appropriate religious
     purposes under the terms of a charitable trust, 718 F.2d at 1225-27.
     See Serbian Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382.

      FN45. Cf. Church of Scientology v. Armstrong, 232 Cal.App.3d 1060, 283
     Cal.Rptr. 917, 925 (1991) (disaffiliated church worker's reasonable fear of
     physical harm to himself and his family justified his taking of church
     records and rebutted Scientology's tort claims of conversion and invasion
     of privacy), review denied, (Cal. Oct. 17, 1991).

                                 IX. PRIOR RESTRAINT
  Scientology contends that the city clerk's discretion in administering
 the prospective disclosure requirements for obtaining a registration
 certificate is overly broad, and therefore constitutes an impermissible prior
 restraint of religion.  The City contends that the ordinance's provision
 allowing continued solicitation pending judicial review through an action for
 declaratory judgment, Code s 100.03(3), makes the clerk's denial of a
 registration statement an insignificant act.
  [42] A system of licensing speech or religious activity may be upheld
 against First Amendment challenge only if the criteria for denying a license
 are narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interests.  See, e.g.,
 Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 967-68 & n. 13, 104 S.Ct. at 2852-53 & n.
 13;  Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d at 628.  Closely related to this
 requirement, although distinct, is the rule that "[s]uch a scheme may not
 delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official."
 Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2395,
 2401, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992);  see also, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948).
  [43][44][45] The requirement of definite and precise standards to guide
 regulations of speech is distinct from the procedural requirements *1548
 imposed by Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649
 (1965), and its progeny. [FN46]  See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
 Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 771, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2151-52, 100 L.Ed.2d 771
 (1988).  For whether speech is prohibited before the exercise of judicial
 review functions or after, the effect of such a ban is to impose a prior
 restraint.  Moreover, a vague law is not rendered more precise by virtue of a
 court having passed upon its application to particular facts.  Rather, such a
 process merely shifts the exercise of impermissibly broad discretion from
 executive officials to judges, a shift that has no significance in First
 Amendment jurisprudence.  Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373, 84 S.Ct.
 1316, 1323, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964) ("judicial safeguards do not neutralize the
 vice of a vague law" under the First Amendment);  see also, e.g., Maynard v.
 Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1859, 100 L.Ed.2d 372
 (1988) (holding that judicial finding of factual basis for death sentence did
 not cure vagueness in criteria for penalty determination);  cf. Vance v.
 Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317, 100 S.Ct. 1156, 1162, 63 L.Ed.2d
 413 (1980) (per curiam) (requiring procedural safeguards for judicial
 injunctions of speech).  Indeed, we note that declaratory judgment under
 Fla.Stat.Ann. s 86.011 (West 1993) is itself a discretionary remedy, and the
 circuit court's decision to grant or deny review is accorded great deference.
 E.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Emery, 579 So.2d 798, 800-01
 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991).

      FN46. A system of prior restraint must guarantee prompt and final judicial
     review of an executive determination to deny a license, so that an
     erroneous abridgment of freedom of speech may be corrected as quickly as
     reasonably possible in the adversarial setting of a courtroom.  E.g.,
     National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. at 802, 108 S.Ct. at 2680-81.  In
     most circumstances, the scheme must place upon the government the burden of
     initiating such proceedings and demonstrating the propriety of the
     restraint.  See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-27,
     110 S.Ct. 596, 604-07, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (three-Justice opinion of
     O'Connor, J.);  id., 493 U.S. at 238-42, 110 S.Ct. at 611-13 (three-
     Justice opinion of Brennan, J.).  Scientology has not challenged the
     procedural safeguards adopted in the 1984 Ordinance, and we therefore
     express no opinion concerning them.

  [46] Nevertheless, the limited prospective disclosure requirements of
 identifying information under Code s 100.03(1)(a), (b), (c) and (j), which
 we have held to be otherwise permissible against the religion clause challenges
 raised by Scientology, are not void for vagueness.  It is a purely ministerial
 function to determine whether a registration form provides a statement of the
 nature and identity of the organization, its tax-exempt status, other Florida
 cities in which it is registered, and the criminal histories of its officers
 and solicitors.  The ordinance on its face provides the clerk with no authority
 to make an investigation of the truthfulness of these statements or an
 evaluation of their completeness, and Scientology has not pointed to evidence
 that responsible administrative officials have inferred such authority.  Nor
 may the clerk pass judgment upon the truthfulness or persuasiveness of any
 proffered explanation under Code s 100.03(1)(n) why such information is not
 available to be disclosed.  Thus, the clerk has no latitude to engage in
 invidious discrimination against disfavored speakers or religions.  Cf., e.g.,
 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58, 85 S.Ct. 453, 466, 13 L.Ed.2d 471
 (1965).  In this respect the district court's order upholding the ordinance is
 affirmed. [FN47]

      FN47. We express no opinion concerning the degree of discretion afforded
     the clerk to review disclosures that we have held cannot be required in any
     event.  To the extent that the district court's order addressed these
     provisions it is vacated as moot.  Scientology has not argued that the
     circuit court's authority to excuse disclosure on grounds of "special or
     unique hardship to the charitable organization," Code s 100.03(4),
     embodies impermissible discretion and we therefore express no opinion as to
     that provision.

                            X. REFUND POLICY REGULATIONS
  As part of its doctrine of "exchange," Scientology collects payments from
 adherents whenever they receive religious services or training.  As a corollary
 to that doctrine, the organization has a practice of offering to refund the
 payments to anyone who is not satisfied with the spiritual benefits he or she
 derives from such services.  Scientology challenges the provision of the 1984
 Ordinance requiring that it provide a written *1549 statement of any refund
 policy "at the time such representation is made."  Code s 100.05(1)(g).  It
 also objects to the provision mandating that money be returned within sixty
 days of request.  Code s 100.05(1)(f).  Wilful violations of these
 provisions are criminal offenses.  Code s 100.05(2).
  The district court recognized, and the parties agree, that the City may not
 require an organization to adopt a refund policy in the first instance.  756
 F.Supp. at 1523.  Scientology contends that the ordinance "both mandates the
 manner in which a church policy is communicated to a church member ..., and
 engrafts an additional condition upon the church policy, i.e., a time limit in
 which to make the refund."  (Appellant's Br. at 24).  The City contends that it
 has a compelling interest in preventing fraudulent offers of refunds that
 justifies the provisions.
  A. Standard of Judicial Review
  [47][48] Under the Free Exercise Clause we apply strict scrutiny to
 legislation that imposes a substantial burden on the observation of a religious
 belief or practice.  Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699, 109 S.Ct. at 2148.  (As
 already noted, the more lenient standard of Smith is inapplicable to the
 1984 Ordinance).  Solicitation of funds by religious organizations is protected
 religious expressive activity under the First Amendment.  See Murdock, 319
 U.S. at 108-12, 63 S.Ct. at 872-74;  Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-05, 60 S.Ct.
 at 903-04.  There can be no contention that the practice of "exchange" in the
 solicitation of funds in connection with religious services and training is
 anything other than central to Scientology's religious practice, because "[i]t
 is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs
 or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants'
 interpretations of those creeds."  Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699, 109 S.Ct. at
 2149. [FN48]

      FN48. We therefore need not consider the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in
     ISKCON-Houston that "conduct relating to the solicitation of funds from
     the public [is] primarily a secular function."  689 F.2d at 556.  Nor
     must we address the significance of this conclusion in considering the
     impact of solicitation regulation upon freedoms protected by other aspects
     of the First Amendment.  Cf. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. at
     789, 108 S.Ct. at 2673;  Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. at
     632, 100 S.Ct. at 834.

  B. Discussion
  [49] We have held above that the City has a compelling interest in
 preventing affirmatively fraudulent conduct but no interest in regulating
 religious conduct as such.  The legislative history contains substantial
 evidence that the refund policy had not been followed as promised, with the
 consequence that many contributors were deprived of their money by their
 reliance on statements appearing to be incomplete or only half-true.  For
 instance, it appears that most contributors were not informed of the
 substantial procedural obstacles placed before applicants seeking refunds from
 Scientology, [see R5-108-Exh. 1-Vol. II-205-06,] and some contributors who had
 previously signed prospective waiver forms may have been led to the erroneous
 belief that their refund rights would be unaffected, [see id. Vol. III-79-
 81.]  As we have already pointed out, wilful omission of such material facts
 constitutes fraud.  The clear scope of Code s 100.05(1)(g)'s requirement
 that solicitors provide "a written statement of the terms and conditions upon
 which refunds are made" at the time when a refund promise is given encompasses
 the very sort of deception revealed at the hearings.  We agree with the
 commission's apparent conclusion that requiring a complete and contemporaneous
 written statement will help substantially in preventing subtle and overt
 misrepresentations about the substance of a refund policy.
  To the extent that the ordinance requires the statement to be contemporaneous
 with the offer of a refund, it merely duplicates the generally applicable
 principle that one may not wilfully and fraudulently omit material facts in the
 course of attempting to secure money from others.  The requirement that the
 statement be given in writing goes beyond otherwise applicable law, but is
 narrowly tailored to meet the specific problems presented by the sophisticated
 practices of coercion, deception and psychological manipulation of groups like
 Scientology.  This particular *1550 provision does not, by itself, require
 civil authorities to attempt to interpret or apply a church policy, an
 undertaking that is forbidden under both religion clauses by Serbian
 Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. [FN49]  Moreover, we can think of
 no significantly less restrictive alternative proposal for combatting this
 established evil, particularly in view of the fact that the restriction on
 religious practice is sharply reduced by the limited role that civil
 authorities may play in enforcing such a policy. [FN50]  The provision is
 closely fitted to serve its evident purposes, and the need for regulation is
 supported by actual evidence.  This limited and precise disclosure provision,
 based on empirical evidence of actual abuses, is valid under the First
 Amendment.  Cf. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496
 U.S. 91, 106-11, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 2290-93, 110 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990) (plurality
 opinion);  id., 496 U.S. at 112-1, 110 S.Ct. at 2294-95 (Marshall, J.,
 concurring) (analyzing reasonable regulation of commercial speech).  The
 district court's order granting summary judgment to the City and denying
 summary judgment to Scientology is affirmed in this respect.

      FN49. The requirement of a written statement thus fosters no excessive
     entanglement under the Establishment Clause.

      FN50. We have no occasion in this appeal to consider the circumstances in
     which the terms of such a policy might appropriately be construed or
     applied by a civil court.

  [50] The City concedes that it may not require a church to adopt a
 refund policy or dictate the terms of a policy voluntarily adopted.  Yet Code
 s 100.01(5)(g) would require a policy of refunding money within sixty days
 of request whenever a refund policy is adopted, a course of conduct at odds
 with Scientology's current policy of submitting refund requests to a church
 authority that determines the bona fides of the request and counsels the member
 who is dissatisfied with the spiritual benefits he has received.  [R5-110-Tab
 1-2-3.]  The statute has the principal effect of mandating a church policy, an
 effect on the free exercise of religion which is sufficiently direct to
 implicate our strict scrutiny.  In this respect it differs from the incidental
 financial burden upon free exercise imposed by generally applicable, neutrally
 applied taxation laws like the sales tax upheld in Jimmy Swaggart, and the
 non-deductibility and exemption provisions construed in Hernandez and Bob
 Jones.  In addition, we also note that the mandated policy would be especially
 burdensome in cases where a refund is requested many years after the
 contribution is given, [FN51] for by imposing potentially limitless contingent
 liabilities the provision would significantly undermine the security of a
 church's finances. [FN52]

      FN51. The 1984 amendment eliminated a clause restricting the mandatory
     sixty day refund to cases in which the request is made within a
     "reasonable" time.

      FN52. Unlike the district court, 756 F.Supp. at 1522-23, we do not
     believe that the non-deductibility of such contributions under the Internal
     Revenue Code following Hernandez is at all material.

  The sixty-day refund is not narrowly tailored to serve the City's compelling
 interests.  Although we agree that the provision conceivably might help to
 deter or remedy fraud, those interests are far better served by the less
 restrictive alternatives of requiring written disclosure of whatever policy the
 church adopts and enforcing generally applicable anti-fraud laws to the extent
 permitted by the First Amendment.  Cf., e.g., Ballard, 322 U.S. at 85-88, 64
 S.Ct. at 886-87;  Dovydenas v. The Bible Speaks (In re The Bible Speaks),
 869 F.2d 628, 643-44, 645-46 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816, 110
 S.Ct. 67, 107 L.Ed.2d 34 (1989);  Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d
 at 1161, 1163-64;  Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F.Supp. 1125,
 1140, 1141 (D.Mass.1982). [FN53]  At best the provision affords only marginal
 additional benefits beyond those already conferred by other regulation.  See
 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1505,
 1515, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (commercial speech case).  Instead, the provision
 advances the City's illegitimate goal of dictating to churches what the policy
 *1551 shall be, simultaneously imposing its own enforcement mechanisms in
 support of the mandated policy.  The provision is void under the Free Exercise
 Clause, [FN54] and the district court's order granting the City's motion for
 summary judgment and denying Scientology's motion for summary judgment is
 reversed in this respect.

      FN53. Not coincidentally, the plaintiff in Van Schaick was also a
     client of Flynn's and a witness at the televised hearings.

      FN54. We therefore need not consider the Establishment Clause implications
     of the provision.

                                   XI. CONCLUSION
  With the exception of the limited prospective disclosure of identifying
 information, the provisions of the 1984 Ordinance requiring prospective and
 retrospective disclosure and recordkeeping concerning solicitations directed
 toward members and the public foster an excessive entanglement between
 government and religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, substantially
 interfere in church organization without compelling justification in violation
 of the Free Exercise Clause, and are therefore void as applied to churches.
 The requirement of the otherwise valid disclosure in the registration form,
 however, does not impermissibly restrain free speech and religion by conferring
 undue discretionary power to deny a certificate.  The district court's order
 upholding these provisions against the claim of vagueness is affirmed, although
 its order is vacated with respect to the invalid disclosure requirements.
  The mandatory sixty-day refund provision is an impermissible intrusion on
 Scientology's free exercise of religion and is void as applied to churches.
 The requirement of providing a written statement of a refund policy, however,
 is otherwise valid.  Upon remand, the district court should determine,
 consistent with this opinion, whether the 1984 Ordinance was enacted with
 impermissible sectarian motives.  If the district court finds a predominantly
 or pre-eminently sectarian motive then it should permanently enjoin the City
 from enforcing the ordinance.  If the district court finds no such motive then
 it should consider which of the otherwise valid provisions, if any, may
 appropriately be preserved by the ordinance's severability clause.
  AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

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