OPERATION CLAMBAKE: SCIENTOLOGY COURT FILES

Part of a public library containing court papers related to lawsuits involving Scientology in some way. Collected to help lawyers and critics of Scientology in future lawsuits from or against this cult. Please report back if this has been of help, or send new contributions to the collection. Thanks. Andreas Heldal-Lund (heldal@online.no)




                CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner,
                                       v.
                        UNITED STATES and Frank S. Zolin.
                                   No. 91-946.
                       Supreme Court of the United States
                              Argued Oct. 6, 1992.
                             Decided Nov. 16, 1992.
  Church appealed from order of the United States District Court for the Central
 District of California, requiring state court clerk to comply with Internal
 Revenue Service (IRS) summons.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
 ruled that clerk's compliance with order rendered appeal moot, and church
 petitioned for certiorari.  The Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, held that
 clerk's compliance summons for production of tapes in clerk's custody recording
 conversations between church officials and their attorneys did not render
 church's appeal from order moot.
  Vacated and remanded.

 [1] FEDERAL COURTS
 Federal court has no authority to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
 propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
 matter in issue in case before it.

 [2] FEDERAL COURTS
 If event occurs while case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for
 court to grant any effectual relief whatever to prevailing party, appeal must
 be dismissed.

 [3] FEDERAL COURTS
 State court clerk's compliance with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summons for
 production of tapes in clerk's custody recording conversations between church
 officials and their attorneys did not render church's appeal from order moot;
 court had power to order IRS to return or destroy any copies of tapes that it
 may have had in its possession, so that effectual relief was not impossible.
 26 U.S.C.A. ss 7402(b), 7602(a), 7604(a).

 [4] INTERNAL REVENUE
 Statutes governing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summons enforcement
 proceedings did not preclude appellate review of district court's enforcement
 orders.  26 U.S.C.A. ss 7402(b), 7604(a).

 [5] FEDERAL COURTS
 Generally, district court's order enforcing discovery request is not "final
 order" subject to appellate review.
 See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and
 definitions.

 [6] FEDERAL COURTS
 Party that seeks to present objection to discovery order immediately to Court
 of Appeals must refuse compliance, be held in contempt, and then appeal
 contempt order.

 [7] FEDERAL COURTS
 Under "Perlman doctrine," discovery order directed at disinterested third
 party is treated as immediately appealable final order because third party
 presumably lacks sufficient stake in proceeding to risk contempt by refusing
 compliance.
 See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and
 definitions.

 [8] INTERNAL REVENUE
 District court order enforcing Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summons is an
 appealable final order.
                             **447 *9 Syllabus [FN*]

      FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has
     been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
     reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26
     S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

  Pursuant to its jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. ss 7402(b) and
 7604(a), the District Court ordered a state-court Clerk to comply with a
 summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the production
 **448 of, inter alia, two tapes in the Clerk's custody recording
 conversations between officials of petitioner Church of Scientology (Church)
 and their attorneys.  Although the Church filed a timely notice of appeal, its
 request for a stay of the summons enforcement order was unsuccessful, and
 copies of the tapes were delivered to the IRS while the appeal was pending.
 The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot, ruling that no controversy
 existed because the tapes had already been turned over to the IRS.
  Held:  Compliance with the summons enforcement order did not moot the Church's
 appeal.  Delivery of the tapes to the IRS did not mandate dismissal by making
 it impossible for the Court of Appeals to grant the Church "any effectual
 relief."  See Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 133, 40 L.Ed.
 293.  Although it is now too late to prevent, or to provide a fully
 satisfactory remedy for, the invasion of privacy that occurred when the IRS
 obtained the information on the tapes, the Court of Appeals does have power to
 effectuate a partial remedy by ordering the Government to return or destroy any
 copies of the tapes that it may possess.  Even if the Government is right that
 under ss 7402(b) and 7604(a) the jurisdiction of the district court is
 limited to those matters directly related to whether or not the summons should
 be enforced, the question presented here is whether there was jurisdiction in
 the appellate court to review the allegedly unlawful summons enforcement
 order.  There is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code to suggest that Congress
 sought to preclude such review, and, indeed, this Court has expressly held that
 IRS summons enforcement orders are subject to appellate review.  See Reisman
 v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449, 84 S.Ct. 508, 513-514, 11 L.Ed.2d 459.  Although
 several Courts of Appeals have accepted the Government's argument in IRS
 enforcement proceedings, the force of that line of authority is matched by a
 similar array of decisions reaching a contrary conclusion in proceedings
 enforcing Federal Trade Commission discovery requests.  There is no significant
 difference between the governing statutes that can explain the *10 divergent
 interpretations, nor any reason to conclude that production of records relevant
 to a tax investigation should have mootness consequences that production of
 other business records does not have.  Pp. 449-453.
  Vacated and remanded.
  STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
  Eric M. Lieberman, New York City, for petitioner.
  Lawrence G. Wallace, Washington, D.C., for respondents.
  For Transcript of Oral Argument See:
   1992 WL 687914 (U.S.Oral.Arg.)

  Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Two tapes recording conversations between officials of the Church of
 Scientology (Church) and their attorneys in July 1980 have been the principal
 bone of contention in this, and two earlier, legal proceedings.
  In an action filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, [FN1] the Church
 contended that the defendant had unlawfully acquired possession of the tapes.
 Pending resolution of that action, the state court ordered its Clerk to take
 custody of the tapes and certain other documents.

      FN1. Church of Scientology of California v. Armstrong, No. C420 153.

  In 1984, in connection with an investigation of the tax returns of L.
 Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology, the Internal Revenue
 Service (IRS) sought access to the Church documents in the state-court Clerk's
 possession. [FN2]  *11 After the Clerk **449 was served with an IRS
 summons, he permitted IRS agents to examine and make copies of the tapes.
 Thereafter, in a federal action initiated by the Church in the Central District
 of California, the District Court entered a temporary restraining order
 directing the IRS to file its copies of the tapes, and all related notes, with
 the federal court. [FN3]  Those copies were subsequently returned to the Clerk
 of the state court.

      FN2. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as the delegate of the
     Secretary of the Treasury, has broad authority to examine the accuracy of
     federal tax returns.  See generally Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.
     517, 523-525, 91 S.Ct. 534, 538-540, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971).  Section
     7602(a) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary to summon any
     person to provide documents relevant to such an examination:
     "For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a
     return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person
     for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any
     transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue
     tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is authorized--
     "(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
     relevant or material to such inquiry."  26 U.S.C. s 7602(a).

      FN3. Church of Scientology v. Armstrong, No. CV 84-9003-HLH (CD Cal.,
     Nov. 27, 1984).

  On January 18, 1985, the IRS commenced this proceeding by filing a petition to
 enforce the summons that had previously been served on the state-court Clerk.
 [FN4]  The Church intervened and opposed production of the tapes on the ground
 that they were protected by the attorney-client privilege.  After protracted
 proceedings, including review in this Court, see United States v. Zolin, 491
 U.S. 554, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), on April 15, 1991, the
 District Court entered an order enforcing compliance with the summons.  The
 Church filed a timely notice of appeal and unsuccessfully sought a stay of that
 order.  While the appeal was pending, copies of the tapes were delivered to the
 IRS.  Thereafter, the Court of Appeals ordered the Church to show cause why its
 appeal *12 should not be dismissed as moot.  After briefing on the mootness
 issue, the court dismissed the appeal.  It explained:

      FN4. Sections 7402(b) and 7604(a) confer jurisdiction on the federal
     district courts to enforce a summons issued by the IRS.  Title 26
     U.S.C. s 7402(b) provides:
     "If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to
     testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of
     the United States for the district in which such person resides or may be
     found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such
     attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data."
     Section 7604(a) is virtually identical to s 7402(b) except that the
     word "records" appears in s 7604(a).

   "Because it is undisputed that the tapes have been turned over to the IRS in
 compliance with the summons enforcement order, no controversy exists presently
 and this appeal is moot."  United States v. Zolin, No. 91-55506 (CA9, Sept.
 10, 1991).
  We granted the Church's petition for certiorari to consider the narrow
 question whether the appeal was properly dismissed as moot.  503 U.S. 905,
 112 S.Ct. 1261, 117 L.Ed.2d 490 (1992).
                                        I
  [1][2][3] It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority "to
 give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
 principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case
 before it."  Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 133, 40 L.Ed.
 293 (1895).  See also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330,
 2334, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975);  North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92
 S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971).  For that reason, if an event occurs
 while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to
 grant "any effectual relief whatever" to a prevailing party, the appeal must be
 dismissed.  Mills, 159 U.S., at 653, 16 S.Ct., at 133.  In this case, after
 the Church took its appeal from the April 15 order, in compliance with that
 order copies of the tapes were delivered to the IRS.  The Government contends
 that it was thereafter impossible for the Court of Appeals to grant the Church
 any effectual relief.  We disagree.
  **450 While a court may not be able to return the parties to the status
 quo ante--there is nothing a court can do to withdraw all knowledge or
 information that IRS agents may have acquired by examination of the tapes--a
 court can fashion some form of meaningful relief in circumstances such as
 *13 these.  Taxpayers have an obvious possessory interest in their records.
 When the Government has obtained such materials as a result of an unlawful
 summons, that interest is violated and a court can effectuate relief by
 ordering the Government to return the records.  Moreover, even if the
 Government retains only copies of the disputed materials, a taxpayer still
 suffers injury by the Government's continued possession of those materials,
 namely, the affront to the taxpayer's privacy.  A person's interest in
 maintaining the privacy of his "papers and effects" is of sufficient importance
 to merit constitutional protection. [FN5]  Indeed, that the Church considers
 the information contained on the disputed tapes important is demonstrated by
 the long, contentious history of this litigation.  Even though it is now too
 late to prevent, or to provide a fully satisfactory remedy for, the invasion of
 privacy that occurred when the IRS obtained the information on the tapes, a
 court does have power to effectuate a partial remedy by ordering the Government
 to destroy or return any and all copies it may have in its possession.  The
 availability of this possible remedy is sufficient to prevent this case from
 being moot. [FN6]

      FN5. The Fourth Amendment provides:
     "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
     effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
     and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
     affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
     persons or things to be seized."  U.S. Const., Amdt. 4.

      FN6. Petitioner also argues that a court can effectuate further relief by
     ordering the IRS to refrain from any future use of the information that it
     has derived from the tapes.  Such an order would obviously go further
     towards returning the parties to the status quo ante than merely
     requiring the IRS to return the tapes and all copies thereof.  However, as
     there is no guarantee that the IRS will in fact use the information gleaned
     from the tapes, it could be argued that such an order would be an
     impermissible advisory opinion.  Cf. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
     States, 429 U.S. 338, 359, 97 S.Ct. 619, 632, 50 L.Ed.2d 530
     (1977) (suppression of fruits of illegal IRS search "premature" as issue
     can be considered "if and when proceedings arise in which the Government
     seeks to use the documents or information obtained from them").  But see
     FTC v. Gibson Products of San Antonio, Inc., 569 F.2d 900, 903 (CA5
     1978) (court can effectuate relief, despite compliance with FTC subpoena,
     by requiring FTC to return subpoenaed documents and forbidding FTC from
     using materials in adjudicatory hearing).  Because we are concerned only
     with the question whether any relief can be ordered, we leave the "future
     use" question for another day.  For now, we need only hold that this case
     is not moot because a court has power to order the IRS to return or destroy
     any copies of the tapes that it may have in its possession.

  *14 The Government argues, however, that these basic principles are
 inapplicable in IRS summons enforcement proceedings because of the particular
 nature of the statute governing such proceedings.  Reasoning from the premise
 that federal courts are empowered to consider only those matters within their
 jurisdiction, the Government argues that in IRS summons enforcement proceedings
 the subject-matter jurisdiction of the District Court is limited to determining
 only whether the court should "compel ... production of" the information
 requested by the summons.  26 U.S.C. ss 7402(b), 7604(a).  See n. 4,
 supra.  Once the court has answered that question and compliance has occurred,
 there is nothing more for the District Court to decide and the jurisdiction of
 the District Court evaporates.
  [4] We think the Government misconceives the inquiry in this case.  The
 Government may or may not be right that under ss 7402(b) and 7604(a) the
 jurisdiction of the District Court is limited to those matters directly related
 to whether or not the summons should be enforced.  Indeed, the scope of the
 District Court's jurisdiction under those provisions was the issue over which
 **451 this Court deadlocked in United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 109
 S.Ct. 2619, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989). [FN7]  The question presented in the
 current incarnation of this case is whether there was jurisdiction in
 the appellate court to review the allegedly unlawful summons enforcement
 order.  On that question, the Government's elaborate statutory argument is
 largely irrelevant.  There is nothing in the statute to suggest that Congress
 sought to preclude appellate review of district court enforcement orders.  To
 the contrary, we have expressly held that IRS summons enforcement orders are
 subject to appellate review.  See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449, 84
 S.Ct. 508, 513-514, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964).  Thus, whether or not there is
 jurisdiction in the appellate court to review the District Court's order turns
 not on the subject matter of Congress' jurisdictional grant to the district
 courts, but on traditional principles of justiciability, namely, whether an
 intervening event has rendered the controversy moot.  And, as we have already
 explained, this case is not moot because if the summons were improperly issued
 or enforced a court could order that the IRS' copies of the tapes be either
 returned or destroyed.

      FN7. In Zolin, the District Court enforced the IRS summons, but placed
     restrictions on the IRS' ability to disclose the summoned materials to any
     other government agency.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, United States v.
     Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1416-1417 (1987), and we granted certiorari in part
     to consider whether the District Court, in conditioning its enforcement of
     the IRS summons, exceeded its jurisdiction under ss 7402(b) and
     7604(a).  Zolin, 491 U.S., at 556, 109 S.Ct., at 2622-2623.  We were
     evenly divided on that question and therefore affirmed the Ninth Circuit.
     Id., at 561, 109 S.Ct., at 2625.  The issue still divides the lower
     courts.  Compare United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d, at 1416-1417, and
     United States v. Author Services, Inc., 804 F.2d 1520, 1525-1526 (CA9
     1986) (district court has "considerable" discretion to set terms of
     enforcement order), opinion amended, 811 F.2d 1264 (1987), with
     United States v. Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341 (CA5 1988) (en banc) (district
     court lacks authority to "conditionally enforce" IRS summons;  inquiry
     limited to single question of whether summons should be enforced), cert.
     denied, 492 U.S. 926, 109 S.Ct. 3264, 106 L.Ed.2d 609 (1989).

                                         II
  We recognize that several Courts of Appeals have accepted the Government's
 argument in IRS enforcement proceedings, [FN8] but the force of that line of
 authority is matched *16 by a similar array of decisions reaching a contrary
 conclusion in proceedings enforcing Federal Trade Commission (FTC) dis-covery
 requests. [FN9]  There is no signifi- **452 cant difference between the
 governing statutes that can explain the divergent interpretations. [FN10]  Nor
 is there any reason to conclude that *17 production of records relevant to a
 tax investigation should have mootness consequences that production of other
 business records does not have.  Moreover, in construing these provisions of
 the Internal Revenue Code, the Court has considered it appropriate to rely on
 its earlier cases involving other statutes, including the Federal Trade
 Commission Act.  See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57, 85 S.Ct. 248,
 254-255, 13 L.Ed.2d 112 (1964) (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
 U.S. 632, 642-643, 70 S.Ct. 357, 363-364, 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950)).

      FN8. United States v. Kersting, 891 F.2d 1407, 1410, n. 8 (CA9 1989),
     cert. denied, 498 U.S. 812, 111 S.Ct. 49, 112 L.Ed.2d 25 (1990);
     Hintze v. IRS, 879 F.2d 121, 124-125 (CA4 1989);  United States v.
     Church of World Peace, 878 F.2d 1281 (CA10 1989);  United States v.
     Sherlock, 756 F.2d 1145, 1146-1147 (CA5 1985);  United States v. First
     Family Mortgage Corp., 739 F.2d 1275, 1278-1279 (CA7 1984);  United
     States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 533 (CA7 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
     1018, 102 S.Ct. 1712, 72 L.Ed.2d 135 (1982);  United States v. Equity
     Farmers Elevator, 652 F.2d 752 (CA8 1981);  United States v. Silva &
     Silva Accountancy Corp., 641 F.2d 710, 711 (CA9 1981);  United States v.
     Deak-Perera Int'l Banking Corp., 610 F.2d 89 (CA2 1979);  Kurshan v.
     Riley, 484 F.2d 952 (CA4 1973);  United States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144,
     1145 (CA1 1971).  But see Gluck v. United States, 771 F.2d 750 (CA3
     1985).

      FN9. See FTC v. Gibson Products of San Antonio, Inc., 569 F.2d, at 903
     (compliance with district court order enforcing FTC subpoena does not moot
     appeal;  court can effectuate relief by requiring FTC to return subpoenaed
     documents and forbidding FTC from using materials in adjudicatory
     hearing);  FTC v. Ernstthal, 197 U.S.App.D.C. 174, 175, 607 F.2d 488,
     489 (1979) (compliance with FTC subpoena does not moot appeal where court
     can order FTC to return subpoenaed documents);  Atlantic Richfield Co.
     v. FTC, 546 F.2d 646, 650 (CA5 1977) (same);  FTC v. Browning, 140
     U.S.App.D.C. 292, 293-294, n. 1, 435 F.2d 96, 97-98, n. 1 (1970) (same).
     Cf. FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 296 U.S.App.D.C. 124, 127, n. 1,
     965 F.2d 1086, 1089, n. 1 (1992) (compliance with district court order
     enforcing FTC civil investigative demand pursuant to 15 U.S.C. s 57b-
     1(e) does not moot appeal as court could order FTC "to return responsive
     materials and to destroy any records derived from them");  Casey v. FTC,
     578 F.2d 793 (CA9 1978) (action seeking to enjoin FTC investigation
     presents live controversy despite parties' compliance with FTC subpoena as
     appellate court can order FTC to return wrongfully subpoenaed records).
     See also Government of Territory of Guam v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 294
     U.S.App.D.C. 292, 295, 958 F.2d 1150, 1153 (1992) (compliance with district
     court order enforcing Federal Maritime Commission discovery order does not
     moot appeal where party seeks return of discovered materials).
     There is no merit to the Government's contention that the FTC cases are
     distinguishable in that they involve adjudicative, as opposed to
     investigative, subpoenas.  While Gibson Products involved an
     adjudicative subpoena, Invention Submission, Casey, and Atlantic
     Richfield all involved investigative subpoenas.

      FN10. In fact, the summons enforcement provisions of the Internal Revenue
     Code "closely paralle[l]" the corresponding provisions of the Federal Trade
     Commission Act.  See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments--1964, 63
     Mich.L.Rev. 59, 90 (1964).  Section 9 of the FTC Act provides, in pertinent
     part:
     "Any of the district courts of the United States ... may, in case of
     contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, partnership,
     or corporation issue an order requiring such person, partnership, or
     corporation ... to produce documentary evidence if so ordered...."  38
     Stat. 722, as amended, 15 U.S.C. s 49.
     In the words of Professor Handler:
     "Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of
     the Treasury or his delegate to summon taxpayers or other witnesses to
     testify and to produce relevant and material documents.  Section 9 of the
     FTC Act grants the same power to the Commission.  Should a recipient of a
     summons or subpoena refuse to comply, both statutes afford the same
     enforcement procedures.  In neither case is the administrative subpoena
     self-executing:  obedience can be obtained only by court order.  In
     addition, both statutes, which are in pari materia, make it a criminal
     offense to 'neglect' to appear or to produce subpoenaed documents."  63
     Mich.L.Rev., at 91 (footnotes omitted).

  [5][6][7][8] We therefore conclude that the appeal was improperly
 dismissed as moot.  In so concluding we express no opinion on the merits of the
 Church's argument that the Government did not establish an adequate evidentiary
 basis to support the District Court's determination that the tapes fell within
 the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.  Nor do we express
 any opinion about the res judicata contention advanced in the Government's
 brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari.  Brief for United States in
 Opposition *18 13-14.  We simply hold that compliance with the summons
 enforcement order did not moot the Church's appeal. [FN11]

      FN11. In reaching this conclusion, we reject petitioner's "fall back"
     argument that even if compliance with a summons enforcement order by the
     subject of the IRS investigation moots an appeal, compliance by a
     disinterested third party--here, the Clerk of the Los Angeles Superior
     Court--does not.  Brief for Petitioner 25-34;  Reply Brief for Petitioner
     16-18.  We agree with the Government that a "difference in the method of
     compliance does not create a distinction for the purpose of the
     constitutional case or controversy requirement."  Brief for United States
     30.  This case presents a justiciable controversy not because a third party
     complied with the summons enforcement order, but because petitioner has a
     stake in the outcome of the proceeding and a federal court can effectuate
     relief should petitioner prevail on the merits.
     There is a distinction in the law between the enforcement of discovery
     orders directed at parties and the enforcement of discovery orders directed
     at disinterested third parties, but that distinction derives from concerns
     regarding finality, not mootness.  As a general rule, a district court's
     order enforcing a discovery request is not a "final order" subject to
     appellate review.  A party that seeks to present an objection to a
     discovery order immediately to a court of appeals must refuse compliance,
     be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt order.  See United
     States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971).
     However, under the so-called Perlman doctrine, see Perlman v. United
     States, 247 U.S. 7, 38 S.Ct. 417, 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918), a discovery order
     directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately
     appealable final order because the third party presumably lacks a
     sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing
     compliance.  Ibid.  See generally 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,
     Federal Practice and Procedure s 3914.23, pp. 156-167 (2d ed. 1992).  This
     distinction has no bearing on this case because a district court order
     enforcing an IRS summons is an appealable final order.  See Reisman v.
     Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 84 S.Ct. 508, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964).  There is no
     "third-party exception" because there is no general rule barring immediate
     appeal of IRS summons enforcement orders.

  **453 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is
 remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
  It is so ordered.

End of file...