Part of a public library containing court papers related to lawsuits involving Scientology in some way. Collected to help lawyers and critics of Scientology in future lawsuits from or against this cult. Please report back if this has been of help, or send new contributions to the collection. Thanks. Andreas Heldal-Lund (heldal@online.no)

                RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, et al., Plaintiffs,
                        Robin SCOTT, et al., Defendants.
                RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, et al., Plaintiffs,
                     Larry WOLLERSHEIM, et al., Defendants.
                       Nos. CV 85-711 MRP, CV 85-7197 MRP.
                          United States District Court,
                                C.D. California.
                                 March 9, 1987.
  Exclusive licensee and church brought action against alleged copyright
 infringers that used allegedly infringing documents in their church and
 religious practice.  Licensee and church moved for preliminary injunction.  The
 District Court, Pfaelzer, J., held that:  (1) expression of ideas in
 copyrighted religious documents and allegedly infringing religious documents
 was not substantially similar for purpose of determining licensee's likelihood
 of success on merits and right to preliminary injunction to prevent copyright
 infringement, and (2) hardship to alleged infringers as result of preliminary
 injunction against use of religious documents outweighed hardship to licensee
 and church and prohibited preliminary injunction to prevent possible copyright
  Motion denied.

 Alleged infringers failed to rebut presumption of authorship of religious
 documents by copyright holder and presumption of validity established by
 copyright registration.  17 U.S.C.A. ss 201(b), 410(c).

 Failure of exclusive licensee and church to assert copyright claim earlier did
 not estop them from seeking preliminary injunction to prevent alleged copyright
 infringement, where licensee and church asserted copyright claim shortly after
 dissolution of preliminary injunction on other legal theories, and where
 copyright in unpublished, nonpublic materials was not registered until after
 dissolution of preliminary injunction.  17 U.S.C.A. s 502(a).

 Copyright could be infringed by copying from memory or with originals in front
 of alleged infringers.  17 U.S.C.A. s 102(b).

 Similarities of expression dictated by nature of process described do not
 constitute copyright infringement.  17 U.S.C.A. s 102(b).

 Test for substantial similarity that is sufficient to establish copyright
 infringement, if access is shown, requires application of extrinsic test to
 determine whether ideas expressed in works are similar and application of
 intrinsic test to determine whether expression of ideas is substantially
 similar.  17 U.S.C.A. s 102(b).

 Religious scriptures meeting statutory formalities must receive same copyright
 protection as other works.  17 U.S.C.A. s 102(b).

 Establishment clause did not prohibit district court from determining whether
 substantial similarity existed between copyrighted religious documents and
 allegedly infringing religious documents, whether ideas expressed in two
 religious works were similar, and whether copyright was infringed, where
 district court was not required to evaluate religious significance of
 any differences and was making linguistic, rather than theological
 interpretations.  17 U.S.C.A. s 102(b);  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 Copyrighted religious documents and allegedly infringing documents expressed
 substantially same ideas for purpose of determining whether copyright was
 infringed, where procedures prescribed in both sets of documents treated same
 conditions in same ways by use of same commands and steps.  17 U.S.C.A. s

 Expression of ideas in copyrighted religious documents and allegedly infringing
 religious documents was not substantially similar for purpose of determining
 exclusive licensee's likelihood of success on merits and right to preliminary
 injunction to prevent copyright infringement, even though similarities existed
 throughout documents, where bulk of allegedly infringing documents consisted of
 text not found in copyrighted documents.  17 U.S.C.A. ss 102(b), 502(a).

 Hardship to alleged copyright infringers as result of preliminary injunction
 against use of religious documents outweighed hardship to exclusive licensee
 and church and prohibited preliminary injunction to prevent possible copyright
 infringement, where injunction could prevent alleged infringers from practicing
 religion, where licensee did not make showing of reasonable likelihood of
 success on merits, where alleged infringers expressed opposition to
 publication, where licensee could be compensated for pecuniary damages through
 loss of parishioners' fees, and where injury to church's reputation could
 result from alleged infringers' ability to employ procedure that was expressed
 in documents and that was not subject to copyright protection.  17
 U.S.C.A. s 502(a);  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
  *516 Gary Bright, Bright & Powell, Carpinteria, Cal., Charles B. O'Reilly,
 Green, O'Reilly, Broillet, Paul, Simon, McMillan, Wheeler & Rosenberg, Los
 Angeles, Cal., Michael J. Treman, Santa Barbara, Cal., Jerold Fagelbaum, Shea &
 Gould, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.
  Joseph A. Yanny, Herzig & Yanny, Los Angeles, Cal., John G. Peterson,
 Peterson & Brynan, Beverly Hills, Cal., Earle C. Cooley, Cooley, Manion,
 Moore & Jones, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs and counterdefendants.
                             MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

  PFAELZER, District Judge.
  Plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction under 17 U.S.C. s
 502(a) was argued on January 26, 1987 before the Honorable Mariana R.
 Pfaelzer.  Having considered the oral and written arguments made and the
 evidence filed in this case, the Court has concluded that plaintiffs have not
 made a sufficient showing of likelihood of success on the merits, and have not
 shown that the balance of hardships justifies the preliminary injunction they
  This case originated in the theft in 1983 by Robin Scott of certain documents
 belonging to the plaintiff Church of Scientology International, Inc. ("the
 Church").  Plaintiffs and some defendants (David Mayo, The Church of the New
 Civilization, defendants Haber, Nelson, Zegel, Hartog and Reisdorf--
 collectively "the new Church") regard these documents as religious scriptures,
 embodying part of the advanced technology practiced by Scientologists.  In
 particular, the documents stolen included a series of bulletins describing a
 procedure known as "New Era Dianetics for Operating Thetans," "NED for OTs" or
 "NOTs" ("NOTs").  These stolen materials were eventually returned to the
 Church, but not, plaintiffs charge, before they had been passed to and copied
 by various defendants.
  *517 Plaintiffs brought this suit in 1985, alleging, inter alia, theft of
 trade secrets and RICO violations.  At that time, plaintiffs sought and were
 granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting use by the new Church of materials
 derived from the stolen documents.  Defendants appealed the granting of the
 preliminary injunction and, in August 1986, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
 injunction must be dissolved because injunctions are not available to private
 plaintiffs under civil RICO and because the documents at issue, as religious
 scriptures, did not have the independent economic value required to be
 protected by California's law of trade secrets.  Religious Technology Center
 v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088, 1090 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied,
 --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1336, 94 L.Ed.2d 187 (1987).  The court noted
 that "the higher level materials at issue in this suit have neither copyright
 nor trademark protection," id. at 1078 n. 2.  The court also expressed "no
 view whether the new Church's materials are copies of the Church materials
 stolen by Scott," id. n. 3.
  Following the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, Norman Starkey, as
 Executor of the Estate of L. Ron Hubbard dba L. Ron Hubbard Library ("the
 Hubbard Estate"), registered a copyright in the NOTs materials with the United
 States Copyright Office (Registration Number TXU 257 326, November 10, 1986).
 On November 20, 1986, the Hubbard Estate executed a license agreement granting
 plaintiff Religious Technology Center ("RTC") an exclusive license to
 reproduce, distribute and utilize NOTs and "[t]he right to pursue, litigate,
 settle, compromise, or deal with in any way, any and all actions and causes of
 action ... for the infringement or violation of any copyright" in the
 materials.  On December 5, 1986, this Court granted plaintiffs leave to file an
 amended complaint stating a new claim for copyright infringement.  This
 application for a preliminary injunction under 17 U.S.C. 502(a) followed.
  To obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must show either (1) a
 likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury,
 or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits and the balance
 of hardships tipping in plaintiff's favor.  Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
 International, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir.1984).  The more this balance
 of hardships weighs against the movants and in favor of defendants, the more
 robust must be the showing of movants' likelihood of success on the merits to
 justify an injunction.  See Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. Andrus, 648 F.2d 496,
 502 (9th Cir.1980).
  A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
  Defendants argue that plaintiffs have no more than a remote chance of success
 on the merits.  They base this argument on two grounds:  first, that the
 copyright is invalid;  and second, that the new Church's materials do not
 infringe the NOTs materials.
                    1. The Validity of Plaintiffs' Copyright
  [1] Plaintiffs' certificate of copyright registration is prima facie
 evidence of the validity of the NOTs copyrights, 17 U.S.C. s 410(c).
 Defendants have the burden of overcoming this presumption of validity, Apple
 at 523.  Defendants attempt to carry this burden by pointing, first of all, to
 the testimony of defendant Mayo at the evidentiary hearing before the first
 injunction was issued that he and not L. Ron Hubbard was the author of the NOTs
 materials.  The NOTs copyright registration application ("the application")
 lists L. Ron Hubbard as the author of the work in question, and defendants thus
 hope to raise sufficient doubt as to the truthfulness of the application for
 registration to overcome the presumption of the copyright's validity.  However,
 there are a number of problems with Mayo's testimony, not the least of which is
 that the evidence shows him to have publicly attributed the NOTs materials to
 L. Ron Hubbard on more than one occasion, see, e.g., Reporter's Transcript,
 November 21, 1985, at 34.  Also, this Court did not find Mayo to be a credible
 witness.  Even if believed, Mayo's testimony is not inconsistent with
 plaintiffs' application.  *518 NOTs is registered as a compilation.  Mayo
 indicated that, while a number of people, including L. Ron Hubbard, worked on
 NOTs, Hubbard revised and approved the final product before it was issued,
 id. at 50-51.  Each NOTs series bears a copyright notice reading "Copyright
 Copr. [date]/by L. Ron Hubbard/ALL RIGHTS RESERVED."  Defendants, in short,
 have not succeeded in rebutting the presumption that L. Ron Hubbard was indeed
 the author of each NOTs series and of the compilation as a whole.  At most,
 defendants have created some doubt as to whether Hubbard owned the copyright as
 author or as the employer in a work-for-hire situation, see 17 U.S.C. s
  [2] Defendants' other challenges to the validity of the copyright are easily
 disposed of.  Defendants contend that the Hubbard Estate perpetrated a fraud on
 the Copyright Office by representing the materials as a "secure test" to get
 around the deposit requirement of 17 U.S.C. s 407(a), 37 C.F.R. Ch. 11 s
 202.19.  Plaintiffs, however, provide convincing evidence that they applied for
 and were granted "special relief" from the deposit requirement under 37
 C.F.R. s 202.20(d) and did not misrepresent the nature of their materials.
 Defendants also argue that plaintiffs are estopped from seeking this injunction
 by their failure to assert the copyright claim earlier.  However, plaintiffs
 were not dilatory in the filing of this suit, and haste, rather than delay,
 marks the registration and assertion of the copyright following the dissolution
 of the injunction on plaintiffs' other legal theories.  The Hubbard Estate
 cannot be faulted for its failure to register earlier its copyright in
 unpublished materials that were never meant to be distributed to the public.
  B. Do Defendants' Materials Infringe the NOTs Copyright?
  Defendants' claim that the new Church materials do not infringe the NOTs
 materials poses a somewhat more difficult problem.  To establish copying by the
 new Church, plaintiffs must show that the new Church had access to the
 copyrighted materials and that there is substantial similarity between NOTs and
 defendants' materials.  Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
 McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.1977).
  [3] Clearly, the new Church had access to the NOTs materials.  Even if
 plaintiffs cannot ultimately establish that the new Church received the stolen
 NOTs package or copies thereof, it is undisputed that Mayo and other officers
 of the new Church were intimately familiar with NOTs and had earlier assisted
 in writing or been trained through the use of the NOTs materials.  Mayo himself
 described his efforts to "reconstruct" NOTs from memory in creating the new
 Church's "Advanced Ability V" ("AAV") materials.  Reporter's Transcript,
 November 21, 1985, 28-30.  For the purposes of a claim for copyright
 infringement, it does not matter whether defendants, if they copied NOTs, did
 so with the originals in front of them or from memory.
  Given defendants' undeniable access to NOTs, the question to be answered is
 whether AAV is substantially similar to NOTs.  This inquiry is complicated by
 two characteristics of the copyrighted material:  (1) NOTs describes a process
 or procedure which cannot itself be copyrighted, see Mazer v. Stein, 347
 U.S. 201, 74 S.Ct. 460, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954);  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11
 Otto) 99, 25 L.Ed. 841 (1879);  17 U.S.C. s 102(b);  and (2) NOTs is alleged
 to be the sacred scripture of a religion.  Neither feature, of itself, requires
 the conclusion that NOTs is not protected by copyright or that AAV does not
 infringe that copyright, but taken together these features do serve to make the
 determination more difficult. [FN1]

      FN1. To make this determination, the Court compared NOTs to the AAV
     materials contained in Volume 1 of defendants' exhibits in opposition to
     the first preliminary injunction.  This version of AAV seems to be the
     final one, and bears a copyright notice, " Copr. Church of the New
     Civilization 1984."

  Defendants argue that, as a process or procedure, NOTs is not subject to
 copyright *519 protection at all.  This assertion by defendants is somewhat
 disingenuous, since each series of the AAV materials, like NOTs, is clearly
 marked with a copyright notice.  It is, however, true that copyright protection
 does not extend to the ideas expressed in a work.  Presumably, it was for this
 reason that plaintiffs originally relied on the laws of trade secret, not
 copyright, as the basis of their suits against defendants.  The Church has
 already failed in its attempt to obtain a preliminary injunction on its trade
 secret theory.  While plaintiffs are not foreclosed from pursuing this theory
 at trial, see City of Anaheim v. Duncan, 658 F.2d 1326, 1328 n. 2 (9th
 Cir.1981);  11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil s 2962 at
 630-31 (1973), it cannot form the basis of the injunction they now seek.
  [4] Even if an idea, procedure or discovery is in the public domain, it is
 well established that the expression of the idea can be protected by copyright,
 see, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft at 1163.  The nature of the procedure
 described in NOTs and in AAV, however, requires a certain level of similarity
 of expression.  The NOTs procedure, briefly, treats a particular condition of
 the adherent through the use of a structured sequence of questions, dictated in
 part by the adherent's response to the questions as registered on a device
 known as the Hubbard E-meter.  It appears that the wording of the questions
 must conform to a standard;  in addition, there is a fairly large vocabulary of
 specialized terminology used to describe phenomena that might be encountered
 during the procedure.  It can also be assumed that the use and behavior of the
 needles or dials on an E-meter can be described only in a limited number of
 similar ways.  Similarities of expression dictated by the nature of the process
 described do not constitute infringement, cf., Frybarger v. International
 Bus. Mach., Inc., 812 F.2d 525, 529-530 (9th Cir.1987);  Apple Computer,
 Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir.1984).  In
 comparing NOTs with AAV, this Court has taken care to look for similarities
 that are not the result of the similarity of the procedures being described.
 Due in part to the indirect style in which both works are written, there is
 ample text to compare.
  [5] The religious nature of the ideas expressed in NOTs and AAV also renders
 comparison difficult.  AAV is not identical to NOTs, but substantial
 similarity, not identity, is all that plaintiffs must show.  The test for
 substantial similarity is two-fold:  first, an "extrinsic" test is applied to
 determine whether the ideas expressed in the two works are similar;  and
 second, an "intrinsic" test is used to determine whether, given similarity of
 ideas, the expression of these ideas is substantially similar, Sid & Marty
 Krofft at 1164.  The extrinsic test may require analytic dissection of the work
 or even expert testimony, id.
  [6][7] Defendants argue that this Court cannot apply the extrinsic test to
 determine whether NOTs and AAV express the same or similar ideas, because to do
 so would impermissibly entangle the Court in determining religious doctrine,
 see, Serbian Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada v.
 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2380, 49 L.Ed.2d 151
 (1976);  Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
 Hull Mem. Presby. Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 606, 21 L.Ed.2d 658
 (1969).  Defendants' argument is a troubling one, because it seems to lead to
 the conclusion that religious scriptures cannot be protected by copyright.
 This result is untenable, however.  Where the statutory formalities have been
 met, scriptures must receive the same protection as other works.  Not only
 would any other result offend the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of
 religion, it would also inevitably involve courts in deciding whether various
 works are or are not religious scriptures--an inquiry of even greater
 constitutional infirmity.  Where "neutral principles of law" are available to
 resolve religious property disputes, see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604,
 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3026, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979), courts can, and in this case must,
 apply them.
  *520 [8] Defendants also overstate the constitutional pitfalls involved
 in comparing these two works.  This Court need not evaluate the religious
 significance of any differences between NOTs and AAV.  It is only necessary to
 determine whether such differences exist and, if they do, whether similarities
 or differences predominate.  The inquiry is one of linguistic, not theological,
 interpretation.  The difficulty of this inquiry is also reduced by the nature
 of the procedures described in NOTs and AAV.  Both works deal, not with
 abstract matters of religious principle, but with concrete applications laid
 out step-by-step.  If A happens, the student auditor is told, do B.  At this
 level of examination, the similarities between NOTs and AAV overwhelm any
 differences between them.  The AAV and NOTs procedures treat the same
 conditions in the same ways by use of the same commands and steps.  The two
 works clearly express substantially the same ideas.
  Defendants, in any event, have rendered the application of the extrinsic test
 unnecessary by admitting, at least for the purposes of this application for a
 preliminary injunction, that the procedure described in AAV is substantially
 similar to that described in NOTs.  For example, the Advanced Ability Center
 ("AAC"), run by the new Church, published a price list in its Journal in which
 the "Name Used by Church of SCN" is given for each "Name of Service at AAC,"
 see, e.g., The Journal of the Advanced Ability Center, Vol. 1 No. 4, May-
 June 1984 at 31.  On this list, under "Training," item seven is the AAC's
 "Advanced Ability 5 Pro Auditor's Crse."  The corresponding Church of
 Scientology entry is "NOTs Auditor Course."  As another example, at the
 November 21, 1985 hearing on plaintiff's first application for a preliminary
 injunction, a videotape was played in which defendants Mayo and Zegel both said
 that the techniques and procedures offered at the AAC were standard Scientology
 services, Reporter's Transcript at 56-57, but had to be given different names
 because the Church of Scientology had registered their trademark in the name
 "Scientology," id. at 58-59.  On the tape, Zegel explained that "[i]t's not
 an interpretation or a reinterpretation of the material;  a very precise
 application and exactly the way the material was laid out, just legally we will
 be in jeopardy if we call it Scientology," id. at 59.  Mayo claimed that the
 tape was made under false pretenses, but did not deny the truth of the
 statements made in it.
  Having determined that NOTs and AAV express substantially the same idea, the
 Court must apply the intrinsic test for similarity of expression.  See Sid &
 Marty Krofft, at 1164.  Defendants argue that, by this test, the two works are
 not substantially similar because NOTs contains more headings than AAV, the
 discussions of individual issues vary in length between the two works, and the
 order and sequence of subject matter are not alike.  New Church defendants'
 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 7.
 This analysis, however, resembles the extrinsic test, cf. Sid & Marty Krofft
 at 1166;  the intrinsic test depends not on dissection of the works, but on
 "the response of the ordinary reasonable person," id. at 1164.
  Keeping in mind the similarities required by the subject matter of the two
 works, and scrupulously avoiding any evaluation of the religious doctrine
 contained therein, this Court cannot conclude that the ordinary reasonable
 person would find NOTs and AAV substantially similar in expression.  This
 finding is different from but not inconsistent with the Court's finding of
 substantial similarity that led to the imposition of the first preliminary
 injunction in this case in November 1985.  At that time, the Court concluded,
 as above, that the two documents described the same procedure.  The Court
 further concluded, and remains convinced, that nobody could have created AAV
 without having a copy of NOTs at hand.  Such a conclusion does not necessarily
 imply a finding of substantial similarity of expression justifying an
 injunction under 17 U.S.C. s 502(a).
  NOTs and AAV do share a number of similarities of expression.  Like NOTs, AAV
 consists of numbered "series";  while NOTs is apparently in this format because
 *521 it was originally issued piecemeal in a series of bulletins as research
 on the technology progressed, there is no evident reason for AAV to be in this
 format except to more closely resemble NOTs.  While the sequence of topics
 dealt with in AAV and NOTs is similar, there are differences.  Whether the
 sequence is dictated by the demands of the subject matter is not clear.
  [9] AAV is written in much the same informal style as NOTs, and the two
 works have a number of sentences and images in common.  For example, NOTs notes
 that "stress is also a heavy button," NOTs Series 6, page 1, while AAV says
 that "Stress can be a heavy button," AAV Series 8.  In NOTs, certain entities
 are described as saying "Yah, yah, I'm your nemesis ...," NOTs Series 7, page
 3;  in AAV they say " 'Yeah, I'm your nemesis' or whatever," AAV Series 8.
 Similarities like these are found throughout the documents.  However, the bulk
 of AAV consists of text not found in NOTs.  The actual percentage of text that
 appears to have been copied verbatim is very small, although a much larger
 proportion of AAV seems to be a paraphrase of NOTs.  In summary, the
 similarities between the two documents raise serious questions going to the
 merits of plaintiffs' claim of copyright infringement, but are not so clear as
 to require a finding of a reasonable likelihood of success.
  IV. The Balance of Hardships
  [10] Since plaintiffs have shown only a possibility of eventual success on
 their claim of copyright infringement, they must demonstrate that the hardship
 to defendants that would result from the granting of an injunction is exceeded
 by the hardship to plaintiffs should their application be denied.  Apple
 Computer, Inc. v. Formula International Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th
 Cir.1984).  A preliminary injunction could and very likely would cause
 irreparable injury to defendants.  Defendants and the adherents of the new
 Church are likely to be prevented from practicing their religion by the
 issuance of an injunction.  While in theory the new Church would be permitted
 to practice--and could not, of course, be enjoined from practicing--the
 auditing procedures described in AAV, in practical effect they would find this
 practice significantly chilled by the fear that whatever materials they used
 might violate an injunction.  The first preliminary injunction in this case
 apparently put the new Church's Advanced Ability Center out of business.  A
 very strong showing of hardship to plaintiffs would be required to justify the
 imposition of an injunction so severely affecting defendants' constitutional
 rights to practice their religion unhindered.
  Balanced against this harm of constitutional proportions is plaintiffs' fear
 that their confidential scriptures will be made public.  However, defendants
 have repeatedly expressed their own opposition to the publication of the
 advanced technology of Scientology, so the risk of this injury seems remote.
 In addition, if it was defendants' intention to make the technology public,
 they could do so without infringing plaintiffs' copyright by creating and
 publishing a noninfringing description of the procedure.
  Plaintiffs also expect to suffer pecuniary damage through the loss of
 parishioners' fees if the lack of an injunction allows the new Church to lure
 adherents away by offering the same services more cheaply.  It is apparent that
 many new Church adherents were once members of the Church, and that there is
 competition for members and for the fees that they pay for services, between
 the two groups.  Until enjoined in November 1985, defendant Mayo and the new
 Church offered adherents standard Scientology services for less than the prices
 charged by the Church.  The Church will undoubtedly lose revenues if the new
 Church is once again able to compete for parishioners.  It is unclear how much,
 if any, of this loss could be traced to copyright infringement and how much to
 defendants' ability to offer the same procedures.  In any event, monetary
 damages are available to redress such injury.
  Finally, plaintiffs fear the loss of control over the integrity of their
 materials.  They claim that defendants are modifying the procedure by revising
 NOTs, resulting not *522 only in spiritual harm to adherents of the new
 Church, but also in damage to the Church's reputation.  The new Church clearly
 advertises its procedure to be the same as that offered by the Church;  if the
 procedure actually delivered by the new Church is somehow less effective than
 that offered by the Church, plaintiffs' reputation may suffer injury.  Again,
 however, this injury would result more from defendants' ability to employ a
 procedure not subject to copyright protection than from infringement of the
  On balance, it appears that the potential hardship from interference with
 defendants' religious freedom that would result from a preliminary injunction
 in this case exceeds the possible injury to plaintiffs if the injunction does
 not issue.  In the absence of a showing of a reasonable likelihood of
 plaintiffs' success on the merits of their claim of copyright infringement,
 plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction must be, and hereby is,

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