The CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CELEBRITY CENTRE, LOS ANGELES, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Roscoe L. EGGER, Jr., et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 81-1952.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
May 20, 1982.
Action was brought against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and others for
declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On motions to dismiss, the
District Court, John Lewis Smith, Jr., Chief Judge, held that: (1) request that
court order defendants to rule on applications currently pending for exemption
from self-employment tax was not request to restrain assessment or collection
of any tax, and thus fell outside jurisdictional bar imposed by Anti-Injunction
Act and Declaratory Judgment Act; but (2) for equity jurisdiction to exist,
plaintiffs were bound to demonstrate both irreparable injury and unavailability
of adequate remedy at law, and plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable
injury and unavailability of adequate remedy at law as to failure to rule on
applications; (3) alleged inhibition and discouragement allegedly experienced
by Scientology ministers as a result of alleged practices of IRS amounted to no
actual loss of free exercise of religion and showed no violation of First
Amendment; (4) allegations showing at most a distressed state of mind did not
allege irreparable injury for injunctive purposes; and (5) in tax field,
irreparable injury cannot be established by allegation of injury to reputation.
Claims dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction except first claim
under count one and first and third claims under count two.
[1] DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Despite its broad language, Declaratory Judgment Act provision bars only
declaratory relief sought for purpose of restraining assessment or collection
of any tax. 28 U.S.C.A. s 2201; 26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[2] DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Declaratory Judgment Act and Anti-Injunction Act did not contemplate barring
actions where litigation does not threaten to deny anticipated tax revenues to
government. 28 U.S.C.A. s 2201; 26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[2] INTERNAL REVENUE
Declaratory Judgment Act and Anti-Injunction Act did not contemplate barring
actions where litigation does not threaten to deny anticipated tax revenues to
government. 28 U.S.C.A. s 2201; 26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[3] DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Request that court order defendants to rule on applications currently pending
for exemption from self-employment tax was not request to restrain assessment
or collection of any tax, and thus fell outside jurisdictional bar imposed by
Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act. 28 U.S.C.A. s 2201;
26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[3] INTERNAL REVENUE
Request that court order defendants to rule on applications currently pending
for exemption from self-employment tax was not request to restrain assessment
or collection of any tax, and thus fell outside jurisdictional bar imposed by
Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act. 28 U.S.C.A. s 2201;
26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[4] DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Complaint counts requesting that court enjoin Internal Revenue Service from
denying applications for exemption from withholding tax fell squarely within
jurisdictional bar of Anti-Injunction Act and of Declaratory Judgment Act, and
same was true as to those counts asserting claims under Bivens. 28
U.S.C.A. s 2201; 26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[4] INTERNAL REVENUE
Complaint counts requesting that court enjoin Internal Revenue Service from
denying applications for exemption from withholding tax fell squarely within
jurisdictional bar of Anti-Injunction Act and of Declaratory Judgment Act, and
same was true as to those counts asserting claims under Bivens. 28
U.S.C.A. s 2201; 26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[5] INTERNAL REVENUE
For equity jurisdiction to exist, plaintiffs were bound to demonstrate both
irreparable injury and unavailability of adequate remedy at law for their claim
to enjoin Internal Revenue Service from denying applications for exemption
from self-employment tax, and plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable
injury and unavailability of adequate remedy at law. 28 U.S.C.A. s 2201;
26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[5] INTERNAL REVENUE
For equity jurisdiction to exist, plaintiffs were bound to demonstrate both
irreparable injury and unavailability of adequate remedy at law for their claim
to enjoin Internal Revenue Service from denying applications for exemption
from self-employment tax, and plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable
injury and unavailability of adequate remedy at law. 28 U.S.C.A. s 2201;
26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[6] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Alleged inhibition and discouragement allegedly experienced by Scientology
ministers as a result of alleged practices of Internal Revenue Service amounted
to no actual loss of free exercise of religion and showed no violation of First
Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 1.
[7] INJUNCTION
Allegations showing at most a distressed state of mind did not allege
irreparable injury for injunctive purposes.
[8] INTERNAL REVENUE
In tax field, irreparable injury cannot be established by allegation of injury
to reputation. 26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[9] INJUNCTION
Allegations of threatened financial penalties failed to show irreparable injury
for injunctive purposes. 26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[10] DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Although circumstances alleged might seem to warrant judicial intervention on
all of plaintiffs' claims despite jurisdictional bar imposed by Declaratory
Judgment Act and Anti-Injunction Act and inapplicability of case law exception,
court was bound to respect limits placed by Congress on court's jurisdiction.
26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
[10] INTERNAL REVENUE
Although circumstances alleged might seem to warrant judicial intervention on
all of plaintiffs' claims despite jurisdictional bar imposed by Declaratory
Judgment Act and Anti-Injunction Act and inapplicability of case law exception,
court was bound to respect limits placed by Congress on court's jurisdiction.
26 U.S.C.A. s 7421(a).
*492 Stephen H. Glickman, Ronald R. Massumi, Jennifer E. Gold, Zuckerman,
Spaeder, Taylor & Kolker, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.
John J. McCarthy, Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Mitchell R. Berger, Asst. U. S.
Atty., Washington, D. C., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM
JOHN LEWIS SMITH, Jr., Chief Judge.
A Scientology church incorporated in California, four ordained ministers
affiliated *493 with other Scientology churches and a non-minister member of
an unspecified Scientology church bring this action against the Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue, Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., and several present and former
employees of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The action, which plaintiffs
attempt to bring as a class action, is before the Court on defendants' motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
I.
According to allegations in the complaint, from 1971 until 1974 defendants
discriminatorily and illegally held in abeyance and did not rule on
applications for exemption from self-employment tax properly filed by
Scientology ministers pursuant to section 1402(e) of the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. s 1402(e) (1976). In 1974, in response to the filing of a
petition for a writ of mandamus by Scientology ministers, see Sorenson v.
Alexander, No. 74-2168 (C.D.Cal.1974), defendants denied, without specification
of reasons, all pending applications for exemption from self-employment tax
filed by Scientology ministers. Beginning the following year, presumably on
the basis of Revenue Ruling 76-415, 1976-2 C.B. 255, defendants again held
in abeyance and did not rule on many of the applications for exemption from
self-employment tax filed by Scientology ministers. Defendants also denied,
without specification of reasons but again presumably on the basis of Revenue
Ruling 76-415, all of the applications not held in abeyance.
According to further allegations in the complaint, since 1971 defendants have
blocked every attempt of Scientology ministers to obtain a judicial resolution
of their entitlement to exemption from self-employment tax. Defendants have
refused to assess Scientology ministers for self-employment tax and, at the
same time, have refused to contest requests for refunds filed by Scientology
ministers who voluntarily paid the self-employment tax.
Plaintiffs set forth their claims in four counts. In Count One, plaintiffs
assert a right of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. s 702 (1976), and seek declaratory and injunctive relief from two
practices employed by defendants in violation of section 1402(e) of the
Internal Revenue Code. The two practices challenged include, first,
defendants' practice of holding in abeyance and not ruling on Scientology
ministers' applications for exemption from self-employment tax, and, second,
defendants' practice of denying Scientology ministers applications for
exemption from self-employment tax on the basis of Revenue Ruling 76-415. In
Count Two, plaintiffs proceed under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619
(1971), and seek declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief from three
practices employed by defendants, with the exception of defendant Egger, in
violation of section 1402(e) and various provisions of the Constitution.
The three practices challenged include the two that are the subject of Count
One and, as well, defendants' practice of not including a statement of reasons
with denials of Scientology ministers' applications for exemption from self-
employment tax.
In Counts Three and Four, plaintiffs proceed under sections 1985 and 1986 of
title 42, respectively, and seek declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief
arising out of a conspiracy in which defendants, with the exception of
defendant Egger, discriminatorily and illegally denied Scientology ministers'
applications for exemption from self-employment tax.
(1) Defendants, in their motion to dismiss, argue that all of plaintiffs'
claims are barred by either the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. s 2201
(Supp. III 1979), or the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. s 7421(a) (Supp. III
1979). The Declaratory Judgment Act restricts this Court's power to grant
declaratory relief by providing that federal courts shall grant declaratory
relief
except with respect to Federal taxes other than (in) actions brought under
section 7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or a proceeding under
section 505 or 1146 of title 11.
*494 28 U.S.C. s 2201 (emphasis added). The Anti-Injunction Act
restricts this Court's power to grant injunctive relief by providing that
(e)xcept as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6672(b),
6694(c), 7426(a) and (b)(1), and 7429(b) (of the Internal Revenue
Code), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such
person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.
26 U.S.C. s 7421(a) (emphasis added). Although the two acts are not
similarly worded, in this Circuit the two acts are interpreted coterminously.
Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert.
denied sub nom. First Investment Annuity Co. v. Miller, 446 U.S. 981, 100
S.Ct. 2961, 64 L.Ed.2d 837 (1980); Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1283 (D.C.Cir.1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 426 U.S. 26, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); "Americans
United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1175-76 (D.C.Cir.1973), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 94
S.Ct. 2053, 40 L.Ed.2d 518 (1974). Thus, despite its broad language, the
Declaratory Judgment Act bars only declaratory relief sought "for the purpose
of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax."
II.
(2) In the first of their claims under Count One, plaintiffs request that
this Court declare unlawful and enjoin defendants' practice of holding in
abeyance and not ruling on Scientology ministers' applications for exemption
from self-employment tax. Affirmatively, plaintiffs request that this Court
order defendants to rule promptly on all of the Scientology ministers'
applications currently pending. In opposing defendants' motion to dismiss,
plaintiffs argue that this claim falls outside the jurisdictional bar imposed
by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act.
As the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has explained, the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act "did not contemplate barring
actions ... where the litigation did not threaten to deny anticipated tax
revenues to the Government." Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
v. Simon, 506 F.2d at 1284. Accord, Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal,
609 F.2d at 4-5; McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.Supp. 448, 453-54
(D.D.C.1972) (three-judge court). Under this interpretation of the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act, plaintiffs' claim cannot be
characterized as "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection
of any tax" and thus falls outside the jurisdictional bar imposed by the acts.
(3) Plaintiffs do not request that this Court order defendants to grant all
of the Scientology ministers' applications for exemption from self-employment
tax currently pending. Cf. Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725,
738-42, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 2046-48, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974); Alexander v.
"Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 760-61, 94 S.Ct. 2053, 2058, 40 L.Ed.2d
518 (1974); Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d at 4-5;
Oldland v. Kurtz, 528 F.Supp. 316, 320 n.5 (D.Colo.1981). Rather,
plaintiffs request only that this Court order defendants, as in an action for a
writ of mandamus, to rule on all of the Scientology ministers' applications
currently pending. If the Court were to grant this request for relief, the IRS
would not be precluded from assessing and collecting self-employment taxes from
Scientology ministers. See Fisher v. Secretary of United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, 522 F.2d 493, 504 (7th Cir. 1975); Oldland
v. Kurtz, 528 F.Supp. at 320-21; Lugo v. Simon, 453 F.Supp. 677, 689-90
(N.D.Ohio 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lugo v. Miller, 640 F.2d
823 (6th Cir. 1981).
(4, 5) In the second of their claims under Count One, plaintiffs request
that this Court declare unlawful and enjoin defendants' practice of denying
Scientology ministers' applications for exemption from self- *495 employment
tax on the basis of Revenue Ruling 76-415. As plaintiffs concede, this claim
falls within the jurisdictional bar imposed by the Declaratory Judgment Act and
the Anti-Injunction Act. Plaintiffs nevertheless insist that this Court should
exercise equitable jurisdiction over this claim in accordance with the
judicially created Williams Packing exception. Under this exception, first
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation
Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7, 82 S.Ct. 1125, 1129, 8 L.Ed.2d 292 (1962), plaintiffs must
demonstrate that under no circumstances could the Government prevail on the
merits and that a basis for equity jurisdiction otherwise exists. For equity
jurisdiction to exist, plaintiffs must demonstrate both irreparable injury and
the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law. Id. See Bob Jones
University v. Simon, 416 U.S. at 745-46, 94 S.Ct. at 2050; Alexander v.
"Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 761-62, 94 S.Ct. at 2058-59.
Despite plaintiffs' contentions to the contrary, this Court lacks jurisdiction
to grant the relief requested in this claim because the requirements of the
Williams Packing exception are not satisfied. Specifically, plaintiffs have
not met their burden of demonstrating irreparable injury and thus that a basis
for equity jurisdiction exists.
According to plaintiffs, defendants' practice of denying Scientology
ministers' applications for exemption from self-employment tax has caused
Scientology churches, ministers and members to suffer several forms of
irreparable injury. First, defendants' practice has "impaired and continue(s)
to impair the ability of ... Churches of Scientology to engage in financial
planning and to implement plans calling for the expenditure of Church funds."
Second, defendants' practice has "inhibited and discouraged ministers of the
Churches of Scientology from freely practicing their calling and serving the
Churches and Church members." Third, defendants' practice has "stigmatized the
religion of Scientology and its ministers." Fourth, defendants' practice has
"threatened Church of Scientology ministers, the Churches themselves, and
ultimately the membership thereof with financial penalties."
Plaintiffs do not attempt to explain how the financial planning of Churches of
Scientology is impaired by defendants' practice of denying Scientology
ministers' applications for exemption from self-employment tax. Plaintiffs do
not assert, for example, that the churches pay part or all of the ministers'
self-employment taxes. In any case, plaintiffs' allegation of impairment of
financial planning does not establish irreparable injury. Plaintiffs must
allege a more serious injury, such as the likely financial ruin of the churches
or some other serious consequence, to establish irreparable injury. Bob
Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. at 745, 94 S.Ct. at 2050 (quoting Enochs
v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. at 6, 82 S.Ct. at 1128). Cf.
Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 761-62, 94 S.Ct. at 2058-
59; Lucia v. United States, 447 F.2d 912, 921-23 (5th Cir. 1971). See
Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d at 7-8.
(6, 7) Plaintiffs also contend that the inhibition and discouragement
allegedly experienced by Scientology ministers represents an infliction of
injury in violation of the First Amendment's guarantee to the free exercise of
religion and thus constitutes irreparable injury. The inhibition and
discouragement allegedly experienced by Scientology ministers, however, amounts
to no actual loss of the free exercise of religion. Plaintiffs do not allege
that any Scientology minister, as a result of defendants' practice of denying
Scientology ministers' applications for exemption from self-employment tax,
became inhibited and discouraged enough to forsake the ministry or to lose the
desire and ability to serve Scientology churches and members. Cf. Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2689, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976);
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171-72, 2
L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). The inhibition and discouragement allegedly experienced
by Scientology ministers represents, at most, a distressed state of mind and
thus *496 does not constitute irreparable injury. Smaldone v. Kurtz, 450
F.Supp. 1138, 1140 (D.D.C.1978); Henry Vlietstra Plastering & Accoustical
Co. v. Internal Revenue Service, 401 F.Supp. 829, 834 (W.D.Mich.1975).
(8) The stigmatization of Scientology ministers and the religion of
Scientology, as alleged and supported by plaintiffs, amounts to no more than
injury to reputation. As is well settled in the tax field, irreparable injury
cannot be established by an allegation of injury to reputation. Kemlon
Products & Development Co. v. United States, 638 F.2d 1315, 1322 (5th Cir.),
modified, 646 F.2d 223 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct.
320, 70 L.Ed.2d 162 (1981); Detwiler v. United States, 406 F.Supp. 695, 698
(E.D.Pa.1975), aff'd mem., 544 F.2d 512 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1105, 97 S.Ct. 1135 (1977); Heller v. Scanlon, 196 F.Supp.
832, 834 (E.D.N.Y.1961).
(9) The threat of financial penalties allegedly facing not only Scientology
ministers but also Scientology churches and members does not constitute
irreparable injury. Indeed, even if the threatened financial penalties
actually were imposed on Scientology ministers, churches and members, the
resulting injuries would not be of a sufficiently serious nature to constitute
irreparable injury. As above, to establish irreparable injury, plaintiffs must
allege that the financial penalties likely would cause Scientology ministers,
churches or members financial ruin or other serious consequences. Bob Jones
University v. Simon, 416 U.S. at 745, 94 S.Ct. at 2050 (quoting Enochs v.
Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. at 6, 82 S.Ct. at 1128). Cf.
Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 761-62, 94 S.Ct. at 2058-
59; Lucia v. United States, 447 F.2d at 921-23. See Investment Annuity,
Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d at 9-10.
III.
In Count Two, plaintiffs assert three claims under Bivens. Plaintiffs seek
declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief from three practices employed by
defendants, with the exception of defendant Egger, in violation of section
1402(e) and various provisions of the Constitution. In opposing defendants'
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs apparently contend only that the three claims
fall outside the jurisdictional bar imposed by the Declaratory Judgment Act and
the Anti-Injunction Act and not that the Williams Packing exception applies.
In the first of the three claims, plaintiffs ask this Court to declare
unlawful and enjoin defendants' practice of holding in abeyance and not ruling
on Scientology ministers' applications for exemption from self-employment tax.
As further relief, plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages. Here,
the declaratory relief, on which the monetary relief is necessarily predicated,
and the injunctive relief are identical for purposes of this analysis to the
relief requested by plaintiffs in the first claim under Count One. Thus, like
the first claim under Count One, the first of the three claims under Count Two
falls outside the scope of the jurisdictional bar imposed by the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act.
In the second of the three claims, plaintiffs ask this Court to declare
unlawful and enjoin defendants' practice of denying Scientology ministers'
applications for exemption from self-employment tax on the basis of Revenue
Ruling 76-415. As further relief, plaintiffs again seek compensatory and
punitive damages. Here, as above, the declaratory and injunctive relief is
identical for purposes of this analysis to the declaratory and injunctive
relief requested by plaintiffs in the second claim under Count One. Thus, like
the second claim under Count One, the second of the three claims under Count
Two is barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act and
does not fall within the Williams Packing exception. See Alexander v.
"Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 760-61, 94 S.Ct. at 2058-59.
In the last of the three claims, plaintiffs ask this Court to declare unlawful
and enjoin defendants' practice of not including a *497 statement of reasons
with denials of Scientology ministers' applications for exemption from self-
employment tax. As further relief, plaintiffs once again seek compensatory and
punitive damages.
As plaintiffs maintain, this claim falls outside the jurisdictional bar
imposed by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act.
Litigation of this claim will not "threaten to deny anticipated tax revenues to
the Government." Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506
F.2d at 1284. Plaintiffs ask only that this Court order defendants to
accompany any denial of a Scientology minister's application for exemption from
self-employment tax with a statement specifying the reasons for that denial.
See Oldland v. Kurtz, 528 F.Supp. at 320-21. Plaintiffs do not ask this
Court to enjoin defendants from assessing and collecting self-employment taxes
from any Scientology minister whose application for exemption has been denied
unless defendants also inform the minister of the specific reasons for that
denial. See Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398, 400-01 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 1006, 71 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982);
Oldland v. Kurtz, 528 F.Supp. at 321 n.6.
IV.
In Counts Three and Four, plaintiffs proceed under sections 1985 and 1986 of
title 42, respectively, and seek declaratory relief as well as compensatory and
punitive damages arising out of a conspiracy in which defendants, with the
exception of defendant Egger, discriminatorily and illegally denied Scientology
ministers' applications for exemption from self-employment tax. Here also,
plaintiffs apparently contend only that these two claims fall outside the
jurisdictional bar imposed by the Declaratory Judgment Act.
As a prerequisite to awarding plaintiffs the monetary relief that they request
under sections 1985 and 1986, the Court would have to declare unlawful either
defendants' interpretation of section 1402(e) or defendants' reliance on
Revenue Ruling 76-415 in denying Scientology ministers' applications for
exemption from self-employment tax. Thus, plaintiffs' claims under sections
1985 and 1986 fall squarely within the jurisdictional bar imposed by the
Declaratory Judgment Act. If the Court were to declare unlawful either
defendants' interpretation of section 1402(e) or defendants' reliance on
Revenue Ruling 76-415, the IRS clearly would be restrained in its attempts
to assess and collect self-employment taxes from Scientology ministers. See
Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. at 760-61, 94 S.Ct. at 2058-
59; Jolles Foundation, Inc. v. Moysey, 250 F.2d 166, 169 (2d Cir. 1957);
Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc. v. Voskuil, 389 F.Supp. 412, 414
(E.D.Mo.1974); Wahpeton Professional Services, P. C. v. Kniskern, 275
F.Supp. 806, 808 (D.N.D.1967).
V.
Accordingly, all of plaintiffs' claims are dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction except plaintiffs' first claim under Count One and
plaintiffs' first and third claims under Count Two.
(10) Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, the plight of
Scientology ministers may seem to warrant judicial intervention on all of
plaintiffs' claims despite the jurisdictional bar imposed by the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the Anti-Injunction Act and the inapplicability of the
Williams Packing exception. As the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has
explained, however,
(t)his is not a situation where there are no remedies .... Congress keeps a
watchful eye on developments in the tax field, and will listen to citizens with
a grievance or plea....
So far as judicial remedies are concerned, however, in the absence of
constitutional impediment, and we see none, this court must respect the limits
placed by Congress on its jurisdiction.
Investment Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d at 9-10 (footnotes
omitted).