OPERATION CLAMBAKE: SCIENTOLOGY COURT FILES

Part of a public library containing court papers related to lawsuits involving Scientology in some way. Collected to help lawyers and critics of Scientology in future lawsuits from or against this cult. Please report back if this has been of help, or send new contributions to the collection. Thanks. Andreas Heldal-Lund (heldal@online.no)




                           Paulette COOPER, Plaintiff,
                                       v.
   CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF BOSTON, INC., Church of Scientology of California,
 Inc., L. Ron Hubbard, Mary Sue Hubbard, and Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co.,
                                   Defendants.
                             Civ. A. No. 81-681-MC.
                 United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.
                                 Jan. 27, 1982.
  Church raised objections to orders of a magistrate providing for substitute
 service of an individual for whom church was allegedly acting as agent.  The
 District Court, McNaught, J., held that magistrate's order allowing substitute
 service of process on individual by serving Commonwealth Secretary of State,
 publishing notice in newspaper, serving church which allegedly acted as
 individual's agent, and ordering church to send notice via its telex system to
 all terminals of church throughout world through which church could communicate
 with individual and ordering church to send copy of summons and complaint to
 individual was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
  Order allowing substitute service affirmed.

 [1] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
 Magistrate's order allowing substitute service of process on individual by
 serving Commonwealth Secretary of State, publishing notice in newspaper,
 serving church which allegedly acted as individual's agent, and ordering church
 to send notice via its telex system to all terminals of church throughout world
 through which church could communicate with individual and ordering church to
 send copy of summons and complaint to individual was not clearly erroneous or
 contrary to law.  28 U.S.C.A. s 636(b)(1)(A);  Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule
 4(e), 28 U.S.C.A.;  U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules D. Mass., Magistrates Rule 2(b);
 M.G.L.A. c. 223A, ss 3, 4, 6.

 [2] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
 Church lacked standing to challenge order for substitute service on individual
 for whom church was allegedly acting as agent based on its interest in
 protecting its reputation from being impugned by allegations in complaint where
 injury to its interest was merely speculative and whatever impact case would
 have on its reputation would not be result of service of process but would be
 due to charges brought by plaintiff.

 [3] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Church's First Amendment rights were not violated by order for substitute
 service on individual which required church to send copy of summons and
 complaint to individual and to send notices throughout world in its telex
 system to terminals through which it could communicate with individual where
 order did not impinge upon church's religious beliefs or interfere with or
 burden relationship between church members and those who provided spiritual
 guidance, and plaintiff was willing to pay cost of sending telex messages.
 U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 1.
  *784 Michael J. Flynn, Thomas M. Greene, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.
  Roger Geller, Geller & Weinberg, Boston, Mass., for Church of Scientology of
 Boston, Inc., L. Ron Hubbard and Mary Sue Hubbard.
  Norman S. Zalkind, Elizabeth A. Lunt, Robert Sheketoff, Zalkind & Zalkind,
 Boston, Mass., for Church of Scientology of Calif.
  Michael Lee Hertzberg, New York City, for defendant pro hac vice.
                              MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

  McNAUGHT, District Judge.
  This matter came on to be heard on the objections of the Church of Scientology
 of Boston, Inc. (Church-Boston) to two of the orders of Magistrate Princi
 issued on July 31, 1981.[FN1]  One of those orders allowed a motion by the
 plaintiff for approval of a real estate attachment and the other granted a
 motion approving substitute service on L. Ron Hubbard (Hubbard).  At the
 hearing on these two objections, this court denied plaintiff's motion for a
 real estate attachment without prejudice to its renewal at a later time.

      FN1. The other objections of Church-Boston were disposed of in an order
     issued by this court on September 1, 1981.

  Magistrate Princi's order regarding substitute service was as follows:
   It appears that L. Ron Hubbard has continuously attempted to avoid service of
 process and pursuant to M.G.L.A. C. 227 Sec. 7 and pursuant to M.G.L.A.
 C. 223A, Sec. 6, service may be made on the defendant outside the Commonwealth
 as directed by the Court.
   Therefore, the following Order is issued, namely that service of process may
 be made on L. Ron Hubbard in the following manner:
   1. Service of a summons and a copy of the complaint on the Secretary of State
 for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts;
   2. Service on the Church of Scientology of Boston, Inc. as an agent of
 Hubbard transacting his affairs, and conducting his business and holding 10% of
 its gross revenues for him;
   3. Service by publication in the Boston Globe, for three successive weeks the
 following notice:
   Notice is hereby published and made that a Complaint has been filed by
 Paulette Cooper of New York City against Lafayette Ronald Hubbard, a. k. a. L.
 Ron Hubbard, and others in the United States District Court for the District of
 Massachusetts, Civil Docket No. 81-681-MC.  The said Lafayette Ronald
 Hubbard is hereby directed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to
 file an Answer or other responsive pleading to said Complaint on or before
 twenty (20) days following the third successive publication of this Notice.
   4. Service by ordering the Church of Scientology of Boston, Inc. to send via
 its telex system the Notice set forth in Item 3 to all telex terminals of the
 Church of Scientology throughout the world, and to all telex terminals through
 which it may communicate with Lafayette Ronald Hubbard, a/k/a L. Ronald
 Hubbard.
   5. The Church of Scientology of Boston shall send, pursuant to its Standing
 Order No. 1, a copy of the Summons and a copy of the Complaint in Civil Action
 81-681-MC to Lafayette Ronald Hubbard, a/k/a L. Ronald Hubbard.
  Non-dispositive pretrial orders of a magistrate are reviewable under the
 "clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard".  28 U.S.C. s 636(b)(1)(A);
 Rule 2(b) of Rules for the United States Magistrates for the District of
 Massachusetts.  Since I find, as set forth hereinafter, that the order allowing
 substitute service is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law, that order must
 be affirmed.
  In a federal diversity action, which this action purports to be, service of
 process is *785 accomplished according to the law of the state in which the
 federal district court sits.  See Rule 4(e) F.R.C.P.  The applicable state
 law in this case is the Massachusetts Long-Arm Statute, M.G.L. c. 223A.
 That statute provides in part:
   s 3. Transactions or conduct for personal jurisdiction
   A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or
 by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person's
   (c) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this commonwealth;
   s 4. Service outside commonwealth
   When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by this chapter,
 service may be made outside this commonwealth.
   s 6. Mode of service outside commonwealth; proof of service
   (a) When the law of this commonwealth authorizes service outside this
 commonwealth, the service, when reasonably calculated to give actual notice,
 may be made:
   (1) by personal delivery in the manner prescribed for service within this
 commonwealth;
   (2) in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is
 made for service in that place in an action in any of its courts of general
 jurisdiction;
   (3) by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requiring a
 signed receipt;
   (4) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory; or
   (5) as directed by the court.
  Accordingly, if personal jurisdiction over Hubbard is authorized by s 3,
 service may be made upon him by order of this court in any manner reasonably
 likely to provide notice of this suit to him.  In this regard, two issues must
 be resolved: (1) Is personal jurisdiction over Hubbard authorized by M.G.L.
 c. 223A, s 3 and (2) Is the manner of service provided in the July 31, 1981
 order by the magistrate reasonably likely to provide to Hubbard notice of this
 suit?
  Plaintiff's allegations regarding Hubbard sufficiently state claims of
 tortious acts committed by Church-Boston and others at the direction of Hubbard
 to allow this court to assert its jurisdiction over him and to permit service
 on him outside of Massachusetts.
  I recognize that the burden of proving jurisdiction over a defendant rests
 with the plaintiff; however, at this point in the proceedings, in determining
 whether or not service can be made upon Hubbard outside of Massachusetts, I
 accept as true the allegations contained in the complaint and find them
 sufficient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction over Hubbard.
  The second question, the efficacy of the substituted service in providing
 notice, is more difficult.  I accept plaintiff counsel's representations
 regarding the practical impossibility of serving Hubbard by any of the manners
 usually employed in effecting service.  There is conflict among the affidavits
 provided by both parties concerning the alleged service-dodging techniques
 employed by Hubbard and others on his behalf.  I do not rely on those
 affidavits in reaching my determination to allow substituted service.  For
 support for the conclusion that regularly employed methods of service of
 process would be ineffective here, I need only point to the efforts of Judge
 Krentzman, of the Middle District of Florida, to arrive at a means of serving
 the Hubbards in proceedings in that district.  After extensive hearings on the
 issue, Judge Krentzman has decided [FN2] that constructive service may be made
 upon the Hubbards by service of process upon the Secretary of State of Florida.

      FN2. This information was provided by plaintiff's counsel in the form of
     an order issued by Judge Krentzman on January 8, 1982 in the case of
     Burden v. Church of Scientology of California, 526 F.Supp. 44.  I have
     relied also on excerpts from a deposition taken before Judge Krentzman and
     provided to the court by plaintiff's counsel.

  (1) The method of service ordered by Magistrate Princi does appear to be
 "reasonably calculated to give actual notice" to Hubbard.  Again, I note the
 opposing contentions *786 concerning the likelihood of Hubbard's receiving
 the proposed service of process which are contained in the affidavits provided
 by both parties and propounded by counsel at the hearing on this matter.  I
 find that procedures ordered by Magistrate Princi, while extraordinary, are
 reasonably likely to provide notice to Hubbard.
  (2) Church-Boston has objected to the order on a number of grounds.  I find,
 however, that unless Church-Boston is acting as an authorized agent for
 Hubbard, it has no standing to object to those portions of the order which do
 not require action by Church-Boston.  Church-Boston's argument that its
 interest in protecting its reputation which is derivatively impugned by the
 allegations of the plaintiff and that, therefore, it has standing to challenge
 the order is without merit.  Such injury is merely speculative and cannot
 provide the defendant with standing to challenge the order.  Whatever impact
 this case has on the reputations of Hubbard or Church-Boston will not be the
 result of the act of service of process but will be due to the charges brought
 by the plaintiff.
  (3) The arguments of Church-Boston that requiring it to perform service of
 process violates the First Amendment and would unduly burden Church-Boston lack
 merit.
  The plaintiff has stated that she is willing to pay the cost of sending out
 the telex messages.  Indeed, she says she will send the messages herself if she
 is provided with the telex addresses of the various Churches of Scientology.
 Since that is so, there is no burden placed on the Church by requiring it to
 send the messages or to provide plaintiff with the telex addresses.
  The order of Magistrate Princi does not impinge upon the religious beliefs of
 the members of the Church of Scientology.  There is no issue of religion
 whatsoever involved in the service of process in a civil case.  Such service
 will not interfere with nor burden the relationship between the members of the
 Church and those who provide spiritual guidance.  The order merely requires
 Church-Boston to send notice through channels established by the Church of
 Scientology to provide access to Hubbard.  As such, the ordered mode of service
 does not constitute an infringement of any rights guaranteed by the First
 Amendment.
  For the foregoing reasons, the order allowing substitute service on L. Ron
 Hubbard is affirmed in the form issued by Magistrate Princi.  Additionally,
 plaintiff must bear the cost of the sending of telex messages to the Churches
 of Scientology throughout the world.

End of file...