OPERATION CLAMBAKE: SCIENTOLOGY COURT FILES

Part of a public library containing court papers related to lawsuits involving Scientology in some way. Collected to help lawyers and critics of Scientology in future lawsuits from or against this cult. Please report back if this has been of help, or send new contributions to the collection. Thanks. Andreas Heldal-Lund (heldal@online.no)




    CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA, a nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff-
                                   Appellant,
                                       v.
   UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF the ARMY: Howard H. Callaway, Secretary of the
 Army; U. S. Intelligence Agency; Major Aaron, Assistant Chief of Staff for Army
                       Intelligence, Defendants-Appellees.
    CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA, a nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff-
                                   Appellant,
                                       v.
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; Office of the Secretary of Defense; James
      R. Schlesinger, Secretary of the Department of Defense; United States
   Department of the Navy; J. Wm. Middendorf II, Secretary of the Navy; Naval
      Intelligence Command: Rear Admiral E. F. Rectanus, Director of Naval
                      Intelligence, Defendants- Appellees.
                             Nos. 78-1168, 78-1169.
                         United States Court of Appeals,
                                 Ninth Circuit.
                                  Nov. 7, 1979.
                As Amended on Denial of Rehearing April 7, 1980.
                                  As Modified.
     Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc in No. 78-1169 Rejected April 7, 1980.
  Religious association brought action under Freedom of Information Act seeking
 to compel disclosure of certain documents of the Department of Defense and the
 Department of Army. The United States District Court for the Central District
 of California, Warren J. Ferguson, J., entered judgment releasing certain
 documents with details excised and refusing to release other documents, and
 plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, J. Blaine Anderson, Circuit Judge
 held that: (1) district court erred in simply approving the withholding of an
 entire document without entering a finding of segregability, or the lack
 thereof; (2) district court did not err in withholding from disclosure certain
 portions of documents on ground that disclosure would constitute a clearly
 unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; the deleted information pertained to
 personnel of plaintiff religious association and investigations of certain
 individuals, there was no legitimate public purpose served by disclosure of the
 excised information, information released adequately apprised plaintiff of the
 type of information it sought in bringing the action, and no more information
 than was necessary to protect privacy of individuals involved had been excised;
 and (3) district court erred in exempting a portion of document pertaining to
 background investigation of particular individual on ground that the portion
 excised constituted investigatory records compiled for law enforcement
 purposes, since evidence was insufficient to warrant a finding that the Naval
 Investigative Service had a law enforcement purpose based on properly delegated
 enforcement authority and since record did not disclose any enforcement
 proceeding pending.
  Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

 [1] RECORDS
 The nine exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act are to be narrowly
 construed.  5 U.S.C.A. ss 552, 552(b)(1,7).

 [2] FEDERAL COURTS
 The appellate court has essentially two tasks in reviewing judgments on Freedom
 of Information Act issues:  court must determine whether district judge had
 adequate factual basis for his or her decision, and if adequate factual basis
 was established, court must determine whether decision below was clearly
 erroneous.  5 U.S.C.A. s 552.

 [3] RECORDS
 In Freedom of Information Act case, burden is on government agency to establish
 that given document is exempt from disclosure;  in meeting its burden of proof,
 government may not rely upon conclusory and generalized allegations of
 exemptions, but, on the other hand, government need not specify its objections
 in such detail as to compromise the secrecy of information.  5 U.S.C.A. s
 552.

 [4] RECORDS
 In Freedom of Information Act case, the government, in meeting its burden of
 establishing that document is exempt from disclosure, may rely upon detailed
 affidavits or oral testimony so long as evidence offered enables court to make
 independent assessment of government's claim of exemption;  if agency supplies
 a reasonably detailed affidavit describing the document and facts sufficient to
 establish exemption, then district court need look no further in determining
 whether exemption applies.  5 U.S.C.A. s 552.

 [5] RECORDS
 In Freedom of Information Act suit, if trial court finds that government
 agency's affidavits or testimony are too generalized to establish eligibility
 for exemption, it may, in its discretion, proceed to examine disputed documents
 in camera for a firsthand determination of their exempt status.  5
 U.S.C.A. ss 552, 552(a)(4)(B).

 [6] RECORDS
 In Freedom of Information Act suit, district court's prerogative to conduct an
 in camera inspection of classified documents is not a substitute for
 government's burden of proof and should not be resorted to lightly.  5
 U.S.C.A. ss 552, 552(a)(4)(B).

 [7] FEDERAL COURTS
 On appeal from judgment entered in Freedom of Information Act suit, once
 reviewing court is satisfied that trial court had adequate basis to decide, it
 is guided by the "clearly erroneous" standard in evaluating substance of that
 decision.  5 U.S.C.A. s 552.

 [8] RECORDS
 The doctrine of segregability applies to the national security exemption as
 well as to the exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act.  5
 U.S.C.A. s 552(b).

 [9] FEDERAL COURTS
 In Freedom of Information Act suit, district court erred in simply approving
 the withholding of an entire document without entering a finding of
 segregability, or the lack thereof;  therefore, cause would be remanded to
 district court for findings on segregability of any portion of document which
 was withheld in its entirety.  5 U.S.C.A. s 552(b).

 [9] RECORDS
 In Freedom of Information Act suit, district court erred in simply approving
 the withholding of an entire document without entering a finding of
 segregability, or the lack thereof;  therefore, cause would be remanded to
 district court for findings on segregability of any portion of document which
 was withheld in its entirety.  5 U.S.C.A. s 552(b).

 [10] RECORDS
 Case law identifies four factors to be balanced in weighing a claim of Freedom
 of Information Act exemption for a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
 privacy:  plaintiff's interest in disclosure, public interest in disclosure,
 degree of invasion of personal privacy, and availability of any alternative
 means of obtaining requested information;  in weighing the factors, courts keep
 in mind that the invasion of privacy must be "clearly" unwarranted.  5
 U.S.C.A. s 552(b)(6).

 [11] RECORDS
 For privacy exemption from the Freedom of Information Act to be applicable, the
 information must be contained in personnel or medical files or similar files,
 and a "similar" file is defined simply as a file which contains information
 similar to that found in a standard personnel file.  5 U.S.C.A. s 552(b)(6).

 [12] RECORDS
 In Freedom of Information Act suit brought by religious association,
 district court did not err in withholding from disclosure certain
 portions of documents of Department of Defense and Department of Army on ground
 that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
 privacy;  the deleted information pertained to personnel of plaintiff religious
 association and investigations of certain individuals, there was no legitimate
 public purpose served by disclosure of the excised information, information
 released adequately apprised plaintiff of the type of information it sought in
 bringing the action, and no more information than was necessary to protect
 privacy of individuals involved had been excised.  5 U.S.C.A. s 552(b)(6).

 [12] RECORDS
 In Freedom of Information Act suit brought by religious association,
 district court did not err in withholding from disclosure certain
 portions of documents of Department of Defense and Department of Army on ground
 that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
 privacy;  the deleted information pertained to personnel of plaintiff religious
 association and investigations of certain individuals, there was no legitimate
 public purpose served by disclosure of the excised information, information
 released adequately apprised plaintiff of the type of information it sought in
 bringing the action, and no more information than was necessary to protect
 privacy of individuals involved had been excised.  5 U.S.C.A. s 552(b)(6).

 [13] RECORDS
 For purpose of Freedom of Information Act exemption for investigatory records
 compiled for law enforcement purposes, agency which has a clear law enforcement
 mandate need only establish a "rational nexus" between enforcement of federal
 law and the document for which exemption is claimed;  however, an agency which
 has a "mixed" function, encompassing both administrative and law enforcement
 functions, must demonstrate that it had a purpose falling within its sphere of
 enforcement authority in compiling the particular document.  5 U.S.C.A. s
 552(b)(7)(D).

 [14] RECORDS
 In determining whether a "law enforcement purpose" is present for purposes of
 Freedom of Information Act exemption, courts must look to purpose behind
 compilation of document;  agency must show that files were compiled for
 adjudicative or enforcement purposes, and generally, files such as internal
 audits compiled simply to determine whether agency's internal operations
 comport with statute or regulation do not qualify.  5 U.S.C.A. s
 552(b)(7)(D).

 [15] FEDERAL COURTS
 On appeal from judgment entered in Freedom of Information Act suit, although
 Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence to justify upholding the "law
 enforcement" exemption for portions of specified document, it would not reverse
 the district court outright on the issue because of the highly sensitive nature
 of much of the deleted information, but instead would remand to the district
 court for further findings.  5 U.S.C.A. s 552(b)(7)(D).

 [16] FEDERAL COURTS
 In its classic formulation, the "comity doctrine" permits district court to
 decline jurisdiction over a matter if complaint has already been filed in
 another district.
 See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and
 definitions.

 [17] FEDERAL COURTS
 When considering issues raised by the comity doctrine, courts are not bound by
 technicalities.

 [18] FEDERAL COURTS
 On appeal from judgment entered in Freedom of Information Act suit, cause would
 not be remanded to district court as a result of district court's refusal,
 under the doctrine of federal comity, to disclose a certain document which was
 the subject of pending litigation in another district court, despite fact that
 complaint in the litigation before the other court was filed after the instant
 complaint;  the litigation in the other district had already progressed to
 judgment on the merits, appeal, and remand, and therefore, it could not be said
 that efficiency demanded a remand to the district court.

 [19] JUDGMENT
 Plaintiff in Freedom of Information Act suit was estopped from raising the
 issue of document's exempt status, since the same plaintiff had raised the same
 issue in two other suits.
  *741 Barry Leigh Weissman, Beverly Hills, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
  Barbara L. Herwig, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendants-
 appellees.
  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of
 California.

  Before TUTTLE,[FN*] TRASK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

      FN* The Honorable Elbert Parr Tuttle, Senior Circuit Judge, United States
     Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

  J. BLAINE ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:
  Plaintiff Church of Scientology of California ("the Church") appeals in these
 cases, consolidated on appeal for oral argument and disposition, from judgments
 of the district court pertaining to certain documents requested of the
 defendants under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552. The
 judgments upheld the actions of the defendants in releasing certain documents
 with details excised, and their refusal to release three documents in any form.
 We affirm in part and reverse in part.
  I. JURISDICTION
  The district court took jurisdiction pursuant to 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(B).
 Our jurisdiction on appeal is based upon our authority to review the final
 order of a district court, 28 U.S.C. s 1291.
  II. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
  The Church filed requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5
 U.S.C. s 552, for any documents pertaining to the Church or its founder, L. Ron
 Hubbard, which were in the possession of defendant Department of Defense
 ("Defense"), and defendant Department of the Army ("Army"). Both defendants
 complied with the requests, releasing a number of documents in their entirety,
 releasing only edited versions of others, and refusing to release any portion
 of certain documents.
  Dissatisfied from some of the defendants' responses, the Church resorted to
 legal action to compel disclosure. On September 9, 1975, the Church filed a
 complaint seeking an injunction against withholding of records in Church of
 Scientology v. United States Department of the Army, No. CV-75-3056-F. On
 December 4, 1975, the Church filed a similar complaint in Church of Scientology
 v. United States Department of Defense, No. CV-75-4072-F. On June 2, 1977, the
 court below granted summary judgment for the defendants in each case.
  Numerous documents were involved. The Church appeals in each case the court's
 rulings on specific documents. In Department of Defense, the Church's appeal
 involves three documents, two of which were released with portions excised, and
 the other withheld entirely. In Department of the Army, the Church appeals on
 six documents, four of which were released with portions excised, and the other
 two withheld entirely. For all but two of the documents, the court below found
 that release of the excised information was protected by one of several
 specific exemptions to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. The
 court withheld two documents in Department of the Army because each was the
 subject of pending litigation in another federal district. Details on specific
 documents will be developed in the course of this opinion.
  III. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
  The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552, mandates a policy of broad
 disclosure of government documents when *742 production is properly
 requested. 552(a)(3) reads:
   ". . . each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably
 describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules
 stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall
 make the records promptly available to any person."
  When a request is made, an agency may withhold a document, or portions
 thereof, only if the information contained in the document falls within one of
 nine statutory exemptions to the disclosure requirement contained in s
 552(b). Three of the nine section (b) exemptions are relevant to this appeal.
 (b)(1) exempts from disclosure information specifically authorized by an
 Executive order to be kept secret "in the interest of national defense or
 foreign policy" and which is properly classified pursuant to such an order.
 (b)(6) authorizes the withholding of information which would constitute a
 "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" if found in "personnel and
 medical files and similar files." (b)(7) exempts from disclosure "investigatory
 records compiled for law enforcement purposes" if disclosure would have one of
 several specified adverse effects.
  [1] The nine exemptions to the Act are to be narrowly construed. See, e.
 g., Bristol-Meyers Company v. F. T. C., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 424 F.2d 935
 (D.C.Cir. 1970), Cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824, 91 S.Ct. 46, 27 L.Ed.2d 52
 (1970).
  IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
  [2] An appellate court has essentially two tasks in reviewing judgments on
 Freedom of Information Act issues: (1) the court must determine whether the
 district judge had an adequate factual basis for his or her decision, and (2)
 if an adequate factual basis was established, the court must determine whether
 the decision below was clearly erroneous.
  A. Factual Basis: Significance of the In Camera Inspection
  [3] The burden is placed upon the government agency to establish that a
 given document is exempt from disclosure. See, e. g., Environmental
 Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973);
 Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 550 F.2d 1139, 1141, 1142 (9th
 Cir. 1976). In meeting its burden of proof, the government may not rely upon
 "conclusory and generalized allegations of exemptions . . . ." Vaughn v.
 Rosen, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 346, 484 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C.Cir. 1973). On the
 other hand, the government need not specify its objections in such detail as to
 compromise the secrecy of the information. Id.
  [4] The government may rely upon detailed affidavits or oral testimony so
 long as the evidence offered enables the court to make an independent
 assessment of the government's claim of exemption. Harvey's Wagon Wheel,
 Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 550 F.2d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 1976); See also
 Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35
 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973). If the agency supplies a reasonably detailed affidavit
 describing the document and facts sufficient to establish an exemption, then
 the district court need look no further in determining whether an exemption
 applies.
  [5] If, however, the court finds the affidavits or testimony submitted too
 generalized to establish eligibility for an exemption, it may, in its
 discretion, proceed to examine the disputed documents In camera for a first-
 hand determination of their exempt status. 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(B). One of
 the major purposes of the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act,
 P.L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), was to clarify the discretion of the trial
 court to conduct an In camera inspection of classified *743 government
 documents.[FN1] Though the burden remains at all times on the government to
 establish exempt status, In camera inspection may supplement an otherwise
 sketchy set of affidavits. By first-hand inspection, the court may determine
 whether the weakness of the affidavits is a result of poor draftsmanship or a
 flimsy exemption claim. Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 471, n.6 (1st Cir.
 1979). Cf. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Department of the Air
 Force, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 359, 566 F.2d 242, 251 (D.C.Cir. 1977).

      FN1. The Senate Conference Report on P.L. 93-502 commented on the
     significance of the mandate to conduct In camera review in this manner:
     "(w)hile In camera examination need not be automatic, in many situations it
     will plainly be necessary and appropriate. Before the court orders In
     camera inspection, the Government should be given the opportunity to
     establish by means of testimony or detailed affidavits that the documents
     are clearly exempt from disclosure. The burden remains on the Government
     under this law." S.Conf.Rep.No. 93-1200, 93rd Conf., 2d Sess. (1974),
     Reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 6267, 6285, 6287, 6288.

  [6] We cannot stress strongly enough, however, that the district court's
 inspection prerogative is not a substitute for the government's burden of
 proof, and should not be resorted to lightly. In cases involving requests for
 hundreds of documents, no trial court can reasonably be expected to wade
 through a mass of exhibits In camera. We also underscore similar limitations
 upon In camera inspection at the appellate level.
  The Church here has argued that the government failed in either case to
 present sufficiently detailed affidavits or depositions, and thereby failed to
 meet its burden of proof. While we agree that some of the affidavits presented
 were drafted in a somewhat conclusory fashion, we find that the trial court
 properly undertook an In camera inspection of the disputed documents, and
 therefore had an adequate factual basis for its decision. The small number of
 documents requested, and their relative brevity, made these cases appropriate
 instances for exercise of the district court's inspection prerogative. In
 viewing both the edited and unedited versions of the documents, the trial court
 had the opportunity to inspect specific portions which the government claimed
 to be exempt from disclosure. We stress again, however, that the burden of
 proof in FOIA cases remains squarely on the government, and that In camera
 inspection is a procedure which the trial court need invoke only where it finds
 inspection appropriate, in its discretion.
  B. The "Clearly Erroneous" Standard
  [7] Once we are satisfied that the trial court had an adequate basis to
 decide, we are guided by the "clearly erroneous" standard in evaluating the
 substance of that decision. See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States
 Department of the Air Force, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 359, 566 F.2d 242, 251, n.
 13 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
  V. THE ISSUE OF SEGREGABILITY
  Document No. 5 in Department of Defense was withheld in its entirety, and
 the district court approved the Department's action here on the basis of
 exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(7)(D).
  5 U.S.C. s 552(b) provides, in part, that:
   "Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any
 person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt
 under this subsection."
  Courts are, therefore, required to segregate exempt portions of documents from
 those portions which are not exempt.
  [8][9] The court below entered no findings on whether any specific portions
 of the document might be released without endangering *744 national
 security.[FN2] We find it necessary to remand to the district court for
 specific findings on the issue of segregability. There is no longer any
 question that the doctrine of segregability applies to the national security
 exemption as well as to the exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act.
 See Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D. C., Inc. v. Bell, 195
 U.S.App.D.C. 363, 603 F.2d 945 (D.C.Cir. 1979). Accordingly, it is error for a
 district court to simply approve the withholding of an entire document without
 entering a finding on segregability, or the lack thereof.

      FN2. In its memorandum opinion, the district court made the following
     findings with regard to Document No. 5:
     "Document No. 5 is a 2-page naval message from Commander-in-Chief U.S.
     Naval Forces Europe to U.S. Defense Attache Copenhagen, date-time group
     1016442 FEB 71. This message has been entirely withheld by the defendants
     and the court finds that the withholding is lawful pursuant to the
     provisions of 5 U.S.C. ss 552(b)(1) and (b)(7)(D) in that it is
     classified confidential and determination of this classification was made
     in the interest of national defense under Executive Order No. 11652 of 8
     March 1972. The message is an investigatory record compiled for law
     enforcement purposes, the release of which would disclose the identity of
     confidential sources by an agency conducting a lawful national security
     investigation and would disclose confidential information furnished only by
     confidential sources."

  We remand to the district court for findings on the segregability of any
 portion of Document No. 5 consistent with the exemptions to the Freedom of
 Information Act. On remand, the district court should consider again all
 affidavits and depositions, and perhaps call for additional testimony dealing
 with any portions of the document which might be revealed without damaging
 either national security or a criminal investigation. It may well be the case
 that no portion of Document No. 5 may be revealed without damaging national
 security. However, we cannot discern from the record whether the court actually
 considered that issue.[FN3]

      FN3. Even though we have been supplied with an unexpurgated copy of
     Document No. 5, we decline to attempt any judgment on segregability. Not
     only is our scope of review limited on appeal, but we also find it
     important that evidence be submitted to the court bearing directly on the
     issue of segregability. See Founding Church of Scientology of
     Washington, D. C. v. Bell, 195 U.S.App.D.C. 363, 369, 603 F.2d 945, 951
     (D.C.Cir. 1979).

  VI. UNWARRANTED INVASION OF PERSONAL PRIVACY
  For each of the remaining documents in both cases, the court below found the
 exemption for material, the disclosure of which would constitute a "clearly
 unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(6) applicable.
 Each document had been released with portions excised, and the Church
 essentially challenged the propriety of the excisions. We affirm the court's
 ruling on the (b)(6) exemption for each document. For the sake of convenience,
 we adopt the lower court's numbering scheme for each document.
  A. The Documents
  1.) Department of Defense
  Document No. 3 in Department of Defense is a background investigation of a
 particular individual. Among the information contained in this somewhat lengthy
 document is the name of the individual under investigation, and various pieces
 of information which would tend to identify the individual if revealed to the
 Church. The unexpurgated document reveals details such as employment
 background, a number of religious affiliations, and other information relating
 to this individual's personal life. For certain of the excisions, the defendant
 has claimed exemption (7)(D) only, and these will be considered later in this
 opinion.
  Other excisions in Document No. 3 do not deal directly with the individual
 under investigation, but do reveal affiliations of various other individuals.
  *745 Document No. 4 was released with eleven deletions. The document
 consists of a single-page memorandum regarding an individual who was
 interviewed by the Naval Investigative Service. The excised portions are either
 references to the individual's name or to details which would tend to identify
 the individual if revealed. The unexpurgated document reveals details of the
 individual's employment history, group affiliations, and personal life.
  2.) Department of the Army
  Document Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Department of the Army appear to be
 related documents involving a security investigation of a particular
 individual. The (b)(6) exemption claim for each document largely involves
 material which would tend to identify this individual.
  Document No. 3 is a single-page memorandum dealing mainly with an
 investigation of the Church of Scientology and potential prosecutions of the
 Church and its leadership. The only information deleted consists of the names
 of the individuals under investigation, an interviewee, and minor details
 tending to identify each of them.
  Document No. 4 appears to be a general background memorandum dealing with the
 doctrine of Scientology. The only deletions are references to names of two
 individuals who were reportedly associated with the Church, and some details
 tending to identify each of them. As a whole, the unexpurgated document tends
 to reveal details of those individuals' affiliations, both religious and
 political, and of their employment background.
  Document No. 5 is a report of an interview with the subject of the
 investigation, consisting of two pages. Large chunks of this document have been
 deleted, all of it information tending to identify the individual. The
 information reveals details such as educational background, religious
 affiliations, employment history, and some allusions to emotional make-up.
  Document No. 6 is the full text of the interview referred to in Document No.
 5. It largely elaborates on details contained in Document No. 5, and refers to
 a wide range of information dealing with the subject individual's private life.
 The bulk of the interview was excised.
  B. The Privacy Exemption
  The legislative history of 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(6) is sparse, but instructive.
 The exemption for "personal and medical files and similar files the disclosure
 of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"
 has remained virtually unchanged since the passage of the original version of
 the Freedom of Information Act in 1966. P.L. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). House
 Report No. 1497 noted that governmental agencies such as the Veterans
 Administration, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and others
 had accumulated large quantities of files which contained intimate personal
 details of people's private lives. The Report explained that:
   "The limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy'
 provides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of
 privacy and the preservation of the public's right to Government information by
 excluding those kinds of files, the disclosure of which might harm the
 individual."
  Reprinted at 1966 U.S.Code Cong. and Admin.News, pp. 2418, 2428.
  The concept of a "proper balance" between competing privacy and disclosure has
 been taken literally by the courts. In Department of the Air Force v. Rose,
 425 U.S. 352, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976), the Supreme Court noted that
 a "balancing" was what Congress had in mind when it created exemption (b)(6).
 Lower federal courts have been more explicit in developing a balancing test
 under (b)(6). In Getman v. N. L. R. B., 146 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 450 F.2d 670
 (D.C.Cir. 1971), the court held that, on balance, the names and telephone
 *746 numbers of persons entitled to vote in a union election were not exempt
 under (b)(6). The Getman court balanced the public interest in disclosure, the
 potential harm from disclosure, the minimal nature of the privacy intrusion,
 and the lack of any alternative means of obtaining the information. See 146
 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 213, 214, 215, 450 F.2d 670, 674, 675, 676. The court in
 Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture, 162
 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C.Cir. 1974), spelled out the balancing test
 for exemption (6) in detail:
   "(Discussing Getman, supra ) Specifically we suggested that in balancing
 interests the court should first determine if disclosure would constitute an
 invasion of privacy, and how severe an invasion. Second, the court should weigh
 the public interest purpose of those seeking disclosure, and whether other
 sources of information might suffice. Such balancing is unique for exemption 6;
 normally no inquiry into the use of information is made, and the information is
 made available to any person."
  162 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 126, 498 F.2d 73, 77.
  The weight of the authority among the various circuits is clearly in accord
 with the "balancing" rationale. See Pacific Molasses Co. v. N. L. R. B., 577
 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978) (union preference cards signed by employees exempt);
 Committee on Masonic Homes, etc. v. N. L. R. B., 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir.
 1977) (union preference cards exempt since little public interest in disclosure
 and great potential for "chilling effect" in exercise of union privileges if
 disclosure takes place); Columbia Packing Co., Inc. v. U. S. Dept. of
 Agriculture, 563 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1977) (privacy interest in personnel files
 outweighed by public interest in performance of government meat inspectors
 suspected of accepting bribes); Campbell v. United States Civil Service
 Commission, 539 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1976) (privacy interest in personnel files
 of government employees who were erroneously classified not outweighed by
 public interest in smooth operation of Civil Service Commission); Wine
 Hobby, U. S. A. v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 502 F.2d 133 (3d
 Cir. 1974) (forms filed by persons seeking "family use" exception to alcohol
 production taxes exempt when balanced against the interest of a private firm in
 obtaining names of these persons for mailing list advertisement purposes). But
 see Robles v. E. P. A., 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
  [10] The case law thus identifies four factors to be balanced in weighing a
 claim of exemption for a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy":
 (1) the plaintiff's interest in disclosure; (2) the public interest in
 disclosure; (3) the degree of the invasion of personal privacy; and (4) the
 availability of any alternative means of obtaining the requested information.
 In weighing the factors, we keep in mind that the invasion of privacy must be
 "clearly" unwarranted.
  [11] For the privacy exemption to be applicable, the information must be
 contained in "personnel (or) medical files (or) similar files." 5 U.S.C. s
 552(b)(6). A "similar" file is defined simply as a file which contains
 information similar to that found in a standard personnel file. See Pacific
 Molasses Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 577 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1978) (information
 contained on union preference cards signed by employees found to be of a
 sufficiently "personal" nature to qualify the cards as "similar" files);
 Rural Housing Alliance v. United States, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 498 F.2d 73
 (D.C.Cir. 1974) (government report on housing discrimination found to qualify
 as a "similar file" because of information concerning marital status,
 legitimacy of children, medical condition, etc. of individual homeowners).
  C. Application of the Exemption
  [12] On the threshold issue of whether the documents at issue here qualify
 as "personnel," *747 "medical," or "similar" files, we find that each of the
 documents may be classified as protected files. Each contains a sufficient
 amount of personal information to merit consideration for exemption (6) status.
  Applying the balancing test to the portion of Document Nos. 3 and 4 in
 Department of Defense for which exemption (6) is claimed, we find no error
 committed. The Document No. 3 security background information involves various
 details of employment and personal history of the subject individual. Release
 of the bulk of the exempt portions of this document would tend to identify the
 individual [FN4] and to reveal details of this individual's life which are
 clearly exempt under current case law. Other deleted portions of Document No. 3
 would tend to identify certain individuals who are associated with the
 Church, and various positions which they have held in the Church and
 affiliated organizations. On balance, we cannot say that the court erred in
 upholding the government's excision of the information pertaining to Church
 personnel. A reasonable person would be very likely to find that disclosure of
 religious affiliations and activities would constitute an invasion of his or
 her privacy. Additionally, the Church can obtain this information simply by
 checking its own membership and personnel files. There is no reason in this
 case to order public disclosure of such information. Disclosure of Document No.
 4 would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The
 deleted information pertains only to the name, address, and employment of a
 certain individual, and also describes an incident in the individual's life
 that the individual would apparently prefer not to disclose publicly. There
 could be no legitimate public purpose served by disclosure of this information.

      FN4. The Church cites Ferguson v. Kelley, 448 F.Supp. 919
     (D.C.D.C.1978), for the proposition that there is no primary interest in
     disclosure of a name. The case is not merely so broad, however. It merely
     holds that the names of FBI agents are not barred from disclosure unless
     some threat to personal safety may be discerned.

  The Church's purpose in seeking the excised information in Document Nos. 3
 and 4 can only be surmised, but must be considered under current case law. In
 all likelihood, the Church's purpose in seeking government files pertaining to
 its activities is to discover whether it is under any investigation, or what
 sort of information the government might be accumulating for purposes which the
 Church may or may not consider legitimate. The Church may harbor some very real
 fears as to the motives of various agencies in gathering such information. The
 information which has been released in each of the two Department of Defense
 cases adequately apprises the Church of the type of information gathered. In
 neither case do we find that any more information than necessary to protect the
 privacy of the individuals involved has been excised.
  Document Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 in Department of the Army were also properly
 excised. The four documents are interrelated as pertinent to the investigation
 of one individual. In no instance has any more information than is necessary to
 protect the identity, employment, and private life of the subject individual
 been excised. The factors considered with regard to the documents in
 Department of Defense are also relevant here. The Church's legitimate
 purposes in seeking the information are clearly outweighed by the subject
 individual's privacy interest.
  Document No. 4 in Department of the Army bears special consideration
 because some of the deleted information does not relate to the subject
 individual, but to members of the Church. Again, the balance strikes in favor
 of the privacy interest. There is no purpose to be served by disclosure, and
 the Church may obtain the information by other means, such as consulting its
 own records. If any individual members *748 of the Church fear that they
 have been subjected to surveillance, it is they who should seek disclosure, and
 not the Church.
  VII. INVESTIGATORY FILES COMPILED FOR A LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSE
  Certain portions of Document No. 3 in Department of Defense were excised on
 the authority of exemption (b)(7)(D), the "law enforcement" exemption to
 disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. In its entirety, (b)(7)(D)
 exempts:
   "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
 extent that the production of such records would (D) disclose the identity of a
 confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law
 enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an
 agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation,
 confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, . . ."
  5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7)(D).
  [13] The threshold issue in any exemption (7) claim is whether the agency
 involved may properly be classified as a "law enforcement" agency. The term
 "law enforcement purpose" has been construed to require an examination of the
 agency itself to determine whether the agency may exercise a law enforcement
 function. Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 474 (1st Cir. 1979). An agency which
 has a clear law enforcement mandate, such as the FBI, need only establish a
 "rational nexus" between enforcement of a federal law and the document for
 which an exemption is claimed. Id. at 472. However, an agency which has a
 "mixed" function, encompassing both administrative and law enforcement
 functions, must demonstrate that it had a purpose falling within its sphere of
 enforcement authority in compiling the particular document.[FN5] Id. at 473.
 See also Weissman v. Central Intelligence Agency, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 565
 F.2d 692 (D.C.Cir. 1977).

      FN5. The Department of Defense has cited Koch v. Department of Justice,
     376 F.Supp. 313 (D.C.D.C.1974), in which files similar to those at issue
     here were held to have been properly withheld under exemption (7). Koch,
     however, is not persuasive because the agency involved was the FBI, for
     whom a separate showing of "law enforcement purpose" is unnecessary.
     Citation to Koch appears to beg the primary question here, namely, whether
     the Department of Defense may claim a law enforcement purpose in the first
     instance.

  [14] In the case of Document No. 3, we do not find sufficient evidence in
 the record to warrant a finding that the Naval Investigative Service (NIS)
 of the Office of Naval Intelligence had a law enforcement purpose based upon
 properly delegated enforcement authority. While the NIS was clearly within its
 rights to conduct the investigation which produced Document No. 3, there is no
 showing that the investigation involved the enforcement of any statute or
 regulation within the authority of the NIS. In determining whether a "law
 enforcement purpose" is present, courts must look to the purpose behind the
 compilation of the document. Rural Housing Alliance v. United States
 Department of Agriculture, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 129, 130, 498 F.2d 73, 80, 81
 (D.C.Cir. 1974). The agency must show that the files " . . . were compiled For
 adjudicative or enforcement purposes." Id., at 129, 498 F.2d at 80.
 (Emphasis in the original). Generally, files such as "internal audits" compiled
 simply to determine whether an agency's internal operations comport with
 statute or regulation do not qualify. Id. at 130, 498 F.2d at 81. See also
 Center for National Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger,
 163 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C.Cir. 1974).
  In the case of Document No. 3, exemption (7)(D) only is claimed for a passage
 which appears approximately halfway down page 1, following an unexcised
 sentence which reads, " 'the HUBBARD ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTOLOGISTS (HASI),
 where Subject lists attendance, is a black-mailer's *749 paradise.' "
 Deleted is the sentence immediately following "black-mailer's paradise," and a
 short phrase preceding the unexcised sentence which identifies the source of
 the information. The same passage is repeated on page 3, page 6, and again on
 three supplementary pages which are copies of an investigation request. (7)(D)
 is also claimed for a passage at the top of page 4, two deletions at the bottom
 of page 4, two deletions at the top of page 5, and one deletion midway through
 page 7. In addition, one seven-page set of attachments was deleted in its
 entirety, and it was not clear whether exemption (b)(7) was claimed for the
 attachment set. We surmise that (b)(7) was the basis for deletion of the
 attachment, without implying any judgment on the correctness of such an
 assertion.
  [15] While we find insufficient evidence to justify upholding exemption
 (b)(7) for those portions of Document No. 3 mentioned above, we do not reverse
 the district court outright on this issue. Much of the deleted information is
 of a highly sensitive nature, and we believe it appropriate to remand for
 further findings. On remand, the district court should inquire into questions
 of NIS' law enforcement authority, and whether the document was compiled for a
 law enforcement purpose. Any findings on these issues should be as detailed as
 possible without compromising the secrecy of the information. The court should
 also give serious consideration to the applicability of any other exemptions.
 [FN6]

      FN6. We have also remanded Document No. 5 in Department of Defense for
     further consideration on the segregability issue under exemption (b)(1).
     Should the court rule adversely to the government on that question, it
     should also consider exemption (b)(7) for Document No. 5. The possibility
     of revelation of a confidential source was apparently critical for the
     government in determining that no portion of the document could be
     segregated. See Affidavit of Rear Admiral B. R. Inman, U. S. Navy, Director
     of Naval Intelligence and Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, p. 4 (C.R.
     222, 225).

  VIII. COMITY
  The district court declined to release Document No. 2 in Department of the
 Army because that document was the subject of pending litigation in federal
 district court for the District of Columbia, The Founding Church of Scientology
 of Washington, D.C. v. Edward H. Levy, et al., Civil Action No. 75-1577. That
 litigation has since progressed considerably. On January 24, 1978, the D.C.
 district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On June 25,
 1979, the court of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit handed down its
 decision in Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. Bell, 195
 U.S.App.D.C. 363, 603 F.2d 945, reversing the district court's decision, and
 remanding for further consideration.
  [16] In deferring to the jurisdiction of another district court, the court
 below invoked the doctrine of federal comity, a discretionary doctrine which
 permits one district to decline judgment on an issue which is properly before
 another district. See Kerotest Manufacturing Company v. C-O-Two Fire
 Equipment Company, 342 U.S. 180, 72 S.Ct. 219, 96 L.Ed. 200 (1952). In its
 classic formulation, the comity doctrine permits a district court to decline
 jurisdiction over a matter if a complaint has already been filed in another
 district. E. g., Great Northern Railway Co. v. National Railroad Adjustment
 Board, 422 F.2d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir. 1970). The Church's complaint in
 Department of the Army was filed on September 9, 1975. The complaint in the
 D.C. litigation was filed on September 26, 1975. Technically, therefore, the
 comity doctrine is inapplicable and the court below improperly refused to
 determine the exempt status of Document No. 2.
  [17] When considering issues raised by the comity doctrine, however, courts
 are not bound by technicalities. The Supreme Court in Kerotest Manufacturing
 Company, supra, noted that the handling of multiple *750 litigation
 involving the same subject matter does not lend itself to " . . . rigid
 mechanical solution. . . . " 342 U.S. 180, 183, 72 S.Ct. 219, 221, 96 L.Ed.
 200. Citing Kerotest Manufacturing, the Eighth Circuit observed in
 Florida v. United States, 285 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1960) that "(t)here is no
 rigid or inflexible rule for determining priority of cases pending in federal
 courts involving the same subject matter."
  [18] The purpose of the comity principle is of paramount importance. The
 doctrine is designed to avoid placing an unnecessary burden on the federal
 judiciary, and to avoid the embarrassment of conflicting judgments. Great
 Northern Railway Co. v. National Railroad Adjustment Board, 422 F.2d 1187,
 1193 (7th Cir. 1970). Comity works most efficiently where previously-filed
 litigation is brought promptly to the attention of the district court, and the
 court defers. In the present case, the litigation in the D.C. Circuit has
 already progressed to a judgment on the merits, an appeal, and a remand. While
 judicial economy would have been best served by the district court in D.C.
 deferring to the Central District of California at the outset, we cannot now
 say that efficiency demands that we remand to the district court below. Under
 the circumstances, the goal of judicial efficiency will be best met if we
 overlook the "first to file" rule, and defer to the litigation in progress in
 the D.C. Circuit.
  The need for fashioning a flexible response to the issue of concurrent
 jurisdiction has become more pressing in this day of increasingly crowded
 federal dockets. Our own circuit recently addressed this issue in another
 context. Speaking in Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1979), we
 noted that:
   " . . . increasing calendar congestion in the federal courts makes it
 imperative to avoid concurrent litigation in more than one forum whenever
 consistent with the rights of the parties. A court may choose not to exercise
 its jurisdiction when another court having jurisdiction over the same matter
 has entertained it and can achieve the same result."
  Id. at 893.
  We emphasize that the "first to file" rule normally serves the purpose of
 promoting efficiency well and should not be disregarded lightly. Cf. Motor
 Vessels Theresa Ann v. Kreps, 548 F.2d 1383, 1384 (9th Cir. 1977).
 Circumstances and modern judicial reality, however, may demand that we follow a
 different approach from time to time, as we do in the present case.[FN7]

      FN7. The Church characterized the district court's deference to concurrent
     litigation on both Documents No. 1 and No. 2 in Department of the Army
     as an impermissible judicial creation of a new exemption to the Freedom of
     Information Act's disclosure requirement. We disagree. While it is true
     that the Act forbids the equitable creation of exemptions which are not
     specified, Wellman Industries, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 490 F.2d 427 (4th
     Cir. 1974), it does not prohibit the application of traditional judicial
     doctrines to the overall administration of the Act. See Renegotiation
     Board v. Bannercraft Co., 415 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1028, 39 L.Ed.2d 123 (1974).
     Application of the comity doctrine where the plaintiff is pursuing its
     rights under the Act in another forum, and where the plaintiff is afforded
     a full and fair opportunity to be heard in the other forum, is not
     inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. Cf. Consumers Union of U. S.
     v. Consumer Product, etc., 192 U.S.App.D.C. 93, 590 F.2d 1209 (D.C.Cir.
     1978); Robertson v. Department of Defense, 402 F.Supp. 1342
     (D.C.D.C.1975).

  IX. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
  [19] With regard to Document No. 1 in Department of the Army, the
 district court abstained from ruling because the document was the subject of
 concurrent litigation in the district court for the District of Columbia in
 Church of Scientology of California v. Department of the Air Force, et al.,
 Civil Action No. 76-1008. On April 12, 1978, the court ruled in Department
 of the Air Force that Document No. 1 was exempt from disclosure. We conclude
 that the Church is estopped from raising the issue of the document's exempt
 status in this litigation.
  There really is no question that the same issue was involved in Department
 of the Air Force, namely, the exempt status of Document *751 No. 1. Nor is
 there any question that the Church was the plaintiff in both cases. Under such
 circumstances, the issue of exemption cannot be relitigated. See, e. g.,
 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d
 552, 559, n. 5 (1979).
  Both cases AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED and REMANDED in part, for further
 proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

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