CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY of Arizona, an Arizona Corporation, Appellant,
                                       v.
   CITY OF PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT, a municipal agency, Lawrence M. Wetzel,
                   Chief of Police, John Does I-X, Appellees.
                               No. 1 CA-CIV 3825.
             Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.
                                 April 26, 1979.
  Appeal was taken from judgment of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Cause
 No. C-335234, Warren L. McCarthy, J., denying disclosure of certain documents
 in the possession of police department.  The Court of Appeals, Schroeder, P.
 J., held that disclosure was not precluded on ground that documents constituted
 investigative files and inter and intraagency communications, where the
 documents were all over 20 years old and there was no ongoing investigation to
 which they pertained nor any further investigation contemplated and police
 department never specifically articulated any potential harm likely to result
 from disclosure.
  Reversed and remanded with instructions.
  Ogg, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 [1] RECORDS
 Proper way to view all requests for information is not to determine whether a
 record is technically a public record or other matter, but instead to determine
 if release of the information would have an important and harmful effect on the
 official duties of the official or agency.  A.R.S. ss 39-121, 39-121.01[B, D].

 [2] RECORDS
 Where documents in the possession of police department were all over 20 years
 old, there was no ongoing investigation to which they pertained nor was any
 further investigation contemplated, and no specific harm that would be done by
 disclosure of the particular documents was suggested, but it was merely
 contended that investigative files, and particularly inter and intraagency
 communications, originally intended to be confidential, should ever remain so
 and that efficient functioning of law enforcement agencies would be undermined
 by any disclosure of investigatory materials no matter how stale, disclosure
 was required under statutes regarding inspection of public agency records.
 A.R.S. ss 39-121, 39-121.01[B, D].

 [2] RECORDS
 Where documents in the possession of police department were all over 20 years
 old, there was no ongoing investigation to which they pertained nor was any
 further investigation contemplated, and no specific harm that would be done by
 disclosure of the particular documents was suggested, but it was merely
 contended that investigative files, and particularly inter and intraagency
 communications, originally intended to be confidential, should ever remain so
 and that efficient functioning of law enforcement agencies would be undermined
 by any disclosure of investigatory materials no matter how stale, disclosure
 was required under statutes regarding inspection of public agency records.
 A.R.S. ss 39-121, 39-121.01[B, D].
  **1034 *338 Jules I. Firetag, Phoenix, for appellant.
  Venable, Rice, Lee & Capra by Gilbert T. Venable, Phoenix, for appellant.
  Jones, Teilborg, Sanders, Haga & Parks, P. C. by Linda A. Drake, Phoenix, for
 appellees.
                                     OPINION

  SCHROEDER, Presiding Judge.
  This is an action brought by the appellant, Church of Scientology of Arizona,
 for the disclosure of certain documents in the possession of the appellee, City
 of Phoenix Police Department.  The appellant sought disclosure of the documents
 pursuant to Arizona's document inspection statutes, A.R.S. s 39-121 et seq.
 This is an appeal from the trial court's judgment denying disclosure.
  Appellant is a nonprofit organization which, along with affiliated
 corporations throughout the country, was at one time subjected to considerable
 scrutiny and investigation by various law enforcement agencies apparently
 leading to unfavorable publicity.  In an effort to quell some of the
 controversy, and to present its side of the story, appellant sought disclosure
 of records in the possession of the Phoenix Police Department relating to
 appellant, its affiliates, *339 **1035 and certain designated leading
 members.  The appellee police department did furnish some material, but
 declined to disclose a group of approximately twenty-two pieces of paper which
 it designated as "inter or intra-agency communications."  Appellant then filed
 this special action in the trial court seeking to compel disclosure.
  It is undisputed that the documents are all over twenty years old.  There is
 no ongoing investigation to which they pertain, nor is any further
 investigation contemplated.  Appellee has never suggested that the documents
 reveal any confidential information sources or information gathering
 techniques, or that disclosure to appellant would involve any invasion of
 privacy.  Indeed appellee has never specifically articulated any potential harm
 likely to result from disclosure of the documents.  Rather, it has adhered to
 the premise that investigative files, and particularly inter and intra-agency
 communications, originally intended to be confidential should, as a matter of
 policy, ever remain so.
  The appellant brought this action pursuant to statutory provisions regarding
 inspection of public agency records.  A.R.S. s 39-121 et seq.  The original
 Arizona statute, A.R.S. s 39-121, adopted from a similar California statute,
 provides simply that
   Public records and other matters in the office of any officer at all times
 during office hours shall be open to inspection by any person.
  After an in-camera inspection the trial court ruled in favor of the appellee
 police department finding that the documents subject to disclosure were not
 "public records."
  There has been very little Arizona judicial interpretation of A.R.S. s 39-
 121.  The leading case is Mathews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, 251 P.2d 893 (1952),
 in which a newspaper sought access to an investigative report submitted to the
 Governor on the activities of the Attorney General's Office.  The Court there
 held that the report was not a "public record" which it defined as " 'one made
 by a public officer in pursuance of a duty, the immediate purpose of which is
 to disseminate information to the public, or to serve as a memorial of official
 transactions for public reference.' " 75 Ariz. at 78, 251 P.2d at 895.  The
 Court held, however, that the report might be subject to inspection as an
 "other matter."  In determining whether records other than "public records"
 should be available for inspection, the Court held that disclosure is
 appropriate unless the documents are "confidential or of such a nature that it
 would be against the best interests of the state to permit a disclosure of
 their contents."  75 Ariz. at 80, 251 P.2d at 896.  The Court ordered an in-
 camera inspection by the trial court to determine whether disclosure of the
 particular document in question was appropriate.
  [1][2] In 1975, the legislature added A.R.S. s 39-121.01.  That provision,
 which now incorporates subsequent amendments not material to the questions
 before us, defines a responsibility of all officers of public bodies to
   maintain all records reasonably necessary or appropriate to maintain an
 accurate knowledge of their official activities and of any of their activities
 which are supported by funds from the state or any political subdivision
 thereof.  A.R.S. s 39-121.01(B).
  It further provides in subsection (D), that the custodian of such records
 shall furnish copies on request.  We agree with a 1976 opinion of the Attorney
 General that, following passage of the 1975 provisions,
   the proper way to view all requests for information is not to determine
 whether or not a record is technically a public record or other matter, but
 instead to determine if release of the information would have an important and
 harmful effect upon the official duties of the official or agency.  76-43
 Ariz.Op.Att'y Gen. (1976).
  The appellee's principal underlying contention is that, even though no
 specific harm will be done by the disclosure of these particular documents, the
 efficient functioning of law enforcement agencies will be undermined by any
 disclosure of investigatory materials, no matter how stale.  In
 **1036 *340 support of this contention, the appellee relies upon a series
 of California cases, holding that various investigatory materials are not
 subject to disclosure.  See Runyon v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 26
 Cal.App.2d 183, 79 P.2d 101 (1938) (letters to parole board); People v.
 Wilkins, 135 Cal.App.2d 371, 287 P.2d 555 (1955) (current police records);
 People v. Pearson, 111 Cal.App.2d 9, 244 P.2d 35 (1952) (sheriff records
 described as "public records but confidential"); City Counsel of City of
 Santa Monica v. Superior Court, 204 Cal.App.2d 68, 21 Cal.Rptr. 896
 (1962) (private investigator's report concerning dismissal of police chief
 denied to newspaper).  All of those cases, however, apparently involved
 materials of a highly contemporary nature.  Disclosure would have resulted in
 impairment of investigation or invasion of privacy.  We find nothing in those
 cases to indicate that investigative materials should forever remain
 confidential simply as a result of its original characterization as such.  In
 fact, one California decision cited by appellee dealing with grand jury
 transcripts, holds that material which at one time is properly secret should
 not permanently be withheld from public inspection.  Craemer v. Superior
 Court, 71 Cal.Rptr. 193, 265 Cal.App.2d 216 (1968).
  There is no specific Arizona statutory exemption from inspection for
 investigative materials.  We note that the Federal Freedom of Information Act
 exempts investigatory records from inspection only to the extent that
 production would:
   (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right
 to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted
 invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential
 source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement
 authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting
 a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information
 furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative
 techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
 enforcement personnel; . . .  5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(7).
  Under these federal standards the appellant would be permitted to inspect
 these materials.  The appellee has not suggested that the federal policy is
 unsound, and in fact has referred us to another provision of the Federal Act
 exempting "inter or intra-agency communications" from disclosure.  We agree
 that the Federal Act offers guidance, but the provision to which appellee
 refers does not support the position which it urges.  Far from exempting all
 inter and intra-agency communications per se, the Federal Act provides that
 they shall be subject to disclosure to the extent that they would be subject to
 discovery by a party in litigation with the agency.  5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(5).
 See Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35
 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973).  In oral argument, appellee conceded that the materials
 involved here would be discoverable under such a standard.
  In sum, we are mindful of the importance of protecting truly confidential
 investigatory materials but find no justification for refusing to disclose
 these documents.  We are not persuaded that our statutory policy in favor of
 disclosure should be so easily, and permanently, thwarted by the unilateral and
 potentially self-serving inclination of government officials to classify files
 as confidential.  Whether the materials retain, or ever had, any significance
 or value to the appellant is a decision properly left to the appellant.
  The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the
 trial court with instructions to make copies of the documents in question
 available to appellant.

  HAIRE, J., concurs.

  OGG, Judge, dissenting:
  I respectfully dissent.  I do not believe the legislature intended to include
 police interoffice and intra-agency communications as public records.  See
 Mathews v. Pyle, supra.  I do believe such communications **1037
 *341 qualify as "other matters" under A.R.S. s 39-121, and they may be
 inspected by the public unless they are (1) confidential, or (2) of such a
 nature that it would be against the best interest of the state to permit
 disclosure of their content.
  In order for the documents requested in this case to be considered
 confidential, the police department's need for secrecy must outweigh the
 Church's interest in disclosure.  Such a balancing test was established in the
 case of Mathews v. Pyle, where the Arizona Supreme Court stated a
 governmental agency has the authority to deny the inspection of such material
 if it thinks such disclosure would be detrimental to the best interest of the
 state.  If such decision is challenged, the issue must be determined by the
 courts.  The trial judge must hold an "in camera" inspection of the disputed
 documents and in the exercise of sound discretion determine if the inspection
 would be detrimental to the best interests of the state.
  In this case, the trial judge followed the Mathews v. Pyle guidelines and
 held an "in camera" inspection of the interoffice and intra-agency police
 communications relative to the criminal investigation made involving the
 Church.  At the conclusion of this inspection, the court entered an order
 finding they were not public records and therefore denying inspection of these
 communications by the Church.
  Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the judgment of
 the trier of fact, I find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.  The
 Church wanted these records so they could straighten out the thinking of those
 who sent or received these communications during the investigation.  The
 documents were not and are not needed for any litigation between the parties.
 Such inspection has been held to be proper where litigation is involved, but
 even there the trial court has the authority to withhold confidential
 materials, such as the names and addresses of witnesses or complainants.
 City of Tucson v. Superior Court, 25 Ariz.App. 512, 544 P.2d 1113 (1976);
 City of Phoenix v. Peterson, 11 Ariz.App. 136, 462 P.2d 829 (1969).  Mere
 fishing expeditions are not permitted.  State ex rel. DeConcini v. Superior
 Court, 20 Ariz.App. 33, 509 P.2d 1070 (1973).  From my personal inspection of
 the contested documents, it appears that while some are innocuous, others are
 investigation memoranda of officers and opinions of potential witnesses as well
 as lists of names, addresses and phone numbers.  In my opinion, there is a
 strong state interest in protecting the free flow of information, both
 interoffice and intra-agency, among police agencies.  If a private citizen
 knows his name, address and testimony may be divulged, no matter how remote in
 time, to the party under investigation by the police, this will have a chilling
 effect upon the participation by the public in police investigations.
  I find the interest of the Church in the disputed documents to be minimal.
 Much of the information requested has been disclosed.  Using the balancing test
 of Mathews v. Pyle, I cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion in
 refusing to order the disclosure of these police interoffice and intra-agency
 communications.
  I would affirm the judgment.