The MISSOURI CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
James E. ADAMS et al., Defendants-Respondents.
No. 59377.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
Dec. 13, 1976.
A complaint for libel per se was dismissed by the Circuit Court, City of St.
Louis, William E. Buder, J., and the plaintiff, a not-for-profit religious
corporation, appealed. The Supreme Court, Finch, J., held that merely alleging
six innuendos stating plaintiff's interpretation of the meaning of articles
attached as exhibits were not sufficient to state a cause of action for libel
per se, and the petition could have been dismissed on such basis. Further,
articles written and published by defendant publisher and writers concerning
the not-for-profit religious corporation did not constitute malicious
defamation and were not, as to such organization, libelous per se.
Affirmed.
[1] LIBEL AND SLANDER
Published words in written communication which are defamatory within meaning of
statute without aid of extrinsic facts, referred to as libelous per se, are
actionable. V.A.M.R. Civil Rule 83.03; Section 559.410 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.
[2] LIBEL AND SLANDER
Whether allegedly libelous words or statements are libelous per se is question
of law which court may decide on motion to dismiss. Section 559.410 RSMo 1969,
V.A.M.S.
[3] LIBEL AND SLANDER
Petition seeking recovery for libel per se should recite in petition the
specific words or statements alleged to be libelous; plaintiff knows words
claimed to be libelous and for which recovery is sought, and should be and is
required to specify them with particularity. Section 559.410 RSMo 1969,
V.A.M.S.
[4] LIBEL AND SLANDER
As to whether words alleged to be libelous per se are in fact defamatory, they
must be read in connection with whole publication rather than in isolation, and
it is permissible under rule to attach whole publication to complaint as
exhibit, but it is not required, and attaching and incorporating entire series
of articles is not substitute for specifically setting forth in petition
particular words alleged to be libelous per se. Section 559.410 RSMo 1969,
V.A.M.S.; V.A.M.R. Civil Rule 55.12.
[4] LIBEL AND SLANDER
As to whether words alleged to be libelous per se are in fact defamatory, they
must be read in connection with whole publication rather than in isolation, and
it is permissible under rule to attach whole publication to complaint as
exhibit, but it is not required, and attaching and incorporating entire series
of articles is not substitute for specifically setting forth in petition
particular words alleged to be libelous per se. Section 559.410 RSMo 1969,
V.A.M.S.; V.A.M.R. Civil Rule 55.12.
[4] PLEADING
As to whether words alleged to be libelous per se are in fact defamatory, they
must be read in connection with whole publication rather than in isolation, and
it is permissible under rule to attach whole publication to complaint as
exhibit, but it is not required, and attaching and incorporating entire series
of articles is not substitute for specifically setting forth in petition
particular words alleged to be libelous per se. Section 559.410 RSMo 1969,
V.A.M.S.; V.A.M.R. Civil Rule 55.12.
[4] PLEADING
As to whether words alleged to be libelous per se are in fact defamatory, they
must be read in connection with whole publication rather than in isolation, and
it is permissible under rule to attach whole publication to complaint as
exhibit, but it is not required, and attaching and incorporating entire series
of articles is not substitute for specifically setting forth in petition
particular words alleged to be libelous per se. Section 559.410 RSMo 1969,
V.A.M.S.; V.A.M.R. Civil Rule 55.12.
[5] LIBEL AND SLANDER
Merely alleging six innuendos stating plaintiff's interpretation of meaning of
articles attached as exhibits was not sufficient to state cause of action for
libel per se, and petition could have been dismissed on such basis. Section
559.410 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.; V.A.M.R. Civil Rule 55.12.
[5] PLEADING
Merely alleging six innuendos stating plaintiff's interpretation of meaning of
articles attached as exhibits was not sufficient to state cause of action for
libel per se, and petition could have been dismissed on such basis. Section
559.410 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.; V.A.M.R. Civil Rule 55.12.
[6] LIBEL AND SLANDER
Where trial court could have dismissed complaint in action for libel per se on
ground of insufficiency but rather held that articles could not be read to
constitute malicious defamation, Supreme Court decided on appeal to determine
ultimate issue whether articles were libelous per se, rather than on basis of
insufficiency of petition, where it would have been unwise and wasteful to
remand for further pleadings and proceedings, but court warned that courts are
not required to search publications seeking words to fit plaintiff's claim that
article or book is libelous per se and that petitions not specifically alleging
statements claimed to be libelous are subject to dismissal. Section 559.410
RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.; V.A.M.R. Civil Rule 55.12.
[7] LIBEL AND SLANDER
Articles written and published by defendant publisher and writers concerning
not-for-profit religious corporation did not constitute malicious defamation
and were not, as to such organization, libelous per se. V.A.M.R. Civil Rules
83.03; Section 559.410 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.
*777 Thomas J. Frawley, St. Louis, for appellant.
Michael P. Casey, St. Louis, for respondents.
FINCH, Judge.
Plaintiff, a Missouri not-for-profit religious corporation, sued two writers
for and the publisher of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for libel on the basis of
a series of five articles which were published March 3 through 7, 1974. The
petition sought $500,000 actual plus $2,000,000 punitive damages. Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. That motion was sustained and plaintiff appealed to the Missouri
Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, which affirmed. We then sustained
plaintiff's application under Rule 83.03[FN1] to transfer and we now decide the
case as though here on direct appeal. We affirm.
FN1. All references to rules are to V.A.M.R.
[1][2] Plaintiff seeks recovery on the basis of libel per se, not libel
per quod. In such a case, '(p)ublished words in a written communication which
are defamatory within the meaning of Section 559.410, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.,
without the aid of extrinsic facts, referred to as libelous per se, are
actionable. Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publishing Company, Mo., 368 S.W.2d 385;
Chambers v. National Battery Co., D.C., 34 F.Supp. 834; 53 C.J.S. Libel and
Slander ss 8 and 162.' Brown v. Kitterman, 443 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo.1969).
Whether the allegedly libelous words or statements are libelous per se is a
question of law which the court may decide on a motion to dismiss. Brown v.
Kitterman, supra, at 150.
[3][4] A petition seeking recovery for libel per se should recite in the
petition the specific words or statements alleged to be libelous. Lorenz v.
Towntalk Pub. co., 261 S.W.2d 952 (Mo.1953). That was not done in this
case. Instead, plaintiff attached the complete text of the five lengthy
articles as exhibits which were incorporated by reference. The reason for the
rule we state is obvious. To do otherwise requires a court to search lengthy
articles or books to discover whether they contain words which are libelous per
se. Plaintiff knows the words claimed to be libelous and for which recovery is
sought and should be and is required to specify them with particularity.[FN2]
FN2. We recognize the rule that in deciding whether words alleged to be
libelous per se are in fact defamatory, they must be read in connection
with the whole publication rather than in isolation. Thomson v. Kansas
City Star Co., 387 S.W.2d 493 (Mo.1965); Diener v. Star-Chronicle Pub.
Co., 232 Mo. 416, 135 S.W. 6 (banc 1911). Consequently, it would be
permissible under Rule 55.12 to attach the whole publication as an exhibit,
although this court has held that this is not required. Coots v. Payton,
365 Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. banc 1955). However, as we have held
herein, attaching and incorporating the entire series of articles, as here,
is not a substitute for specifically setting forth in the petition the
particular words alleged to be libelous per se.
[5] Instead of reciting the specific words claimed to be libelous per se,
plaintiff merely alleged six innuendoes stating its interpretation of the
meaning of the articles attached as exhibits. That is not sufficient to state
a cause of action for libel per se and the trial court could have dismissed the
petition on that basis. However, it did not do so. Instead, it held that the
five articles could not be read to constitute a malicious defamation under
Missouri's law and, hence, did not state a cause of action.
[6] Under these circumstances, we have concluded to decide this appeal on the
ultimate issue of whether the five articles were libelous per se under s
559.410, RSMo 1969, rather than on the basis of the insufficiency of the
petition because if we ruled the case on the latter basis we would be inclined
to remand the case to give plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended petition
wherein it could specifically set out the statements *778 claimed to be
libelous per se.[FN3] Since we have concluded that the articles are not
libelous as a matter of law, it would be unwise and wasteful to remand for
further pleadings and proceedings.
FN3. Plaintiff did not seek such opportunity in the trial court but that
is understandable because defendant did not seek dismissal on that basis
and the trial court did not base its order of dismissal on that ground.
Even so, we follow this course somewhat reluctantly because by reviewing the
entire five articles, unaided by allegations of the specific statements therein
claimed to be libelous per se, we risk encouraging other plaintiffs to file
similar petitions. We seek to avoid that result by the caveat that courts are
not required to search through publications seeking words which might fit a
plaintiff's claim that an article or a book is libelous per se and that
petitions which do not specifically allege those statements claimed to be
libelous are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.
[7] We have examined carefully the five articles written and published by
defendants. Some portions relate to plaintiff corporation but substantial
portions are devoted to the international organization of Scientology and its
founder, L. Ron Hubbard, rather than to plaintiff corporation. The articles
detail complaints and criticisms by ex-members but point out that for every
dissenter there are numerous devotees who are enthusiastic. Frequent
statements and explanations by Scientology leaders are contained in the
articles. In our judgment, the articles do not constitute a malicious
defamation of plaintiff corporation and as to it are not libelous per se.
Accordingly, we affirm the action of the trial court in dismissing plaintiff's
petition for failure to state a cause of action on which relief can be granted.
In view of the foregoing disposition of this appeal, we need not and do not
reach other questions raised and briefed in the court of appeals and in this
court as to whether plaintiff is a public or private figure under New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964),
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296
(1971), Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d
789 (1974) and Time, Inc., v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47
L.Ed.2d 258 (1976); whether plaintiff's petition sufficiently pled malice;[FN4]
and whether a not-for-profit church can maintain an action for libel on the
basis of statements as to its tenets and practices in the light of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and such cases as Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) and United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944).
FN4. Plaintiff asserts on appeal that its pleading of malice was
sufficient under Walker v. Kansas City Star Co., 406 S.W.2d 44
(Mo.1966), but defendant claimed that under the later cases of Brown v.
Kitterman, 443 S.W.2d 146 (Mo.1969) and Woolbright v. Sun
Communications, Inc., 480 S.W.2d 864 (Mo.1972), plaintiff's petition was
insufficient in that it failed to allege facts from which it could be found
that the articles were published with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless disregard of whether they were true or false.
Judgment affirmed.
All concur.