Part of a public library containing court papers related to lawsuits involving Scientology in some way. Collected to help lawyers and critics of Scientology in future lawsuits from or against this cult. Please report back if this has been of help, or send new contributions to the collection. Thanks. Andreas Heldal-Lund (heldal@online.no)

       NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other
       than opinions or orders designated for publication are not
       precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the
       doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

       (The decision of the Court is referenced in a "Table of Decisions
       Without Reported Opinions" appearing in the Federal Reporter.)

 Vicki J. AZNARAN, Richard N. Aznaran, Plaintiffs-counter-defendants-Appellees,
 Church of Spiritual Technology, Inc., Religious Technology Center, Inc., Author
 Services, Inc., Church of Scientology International, Inc., Defendants-counter-
                                  No. 90-55288.
                 United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
                        Argued and Submitted May 8, 1991.
                             Decided July 11, 1991.
  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of
 California, No. CV-88-1786-JMI;  James M. Ideman, District Judge, Presiding.

  Before TANG, REINHARDT and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.
                                MEMORANDUM [FN*]
  **1 Vicki and Richard Aznaran are former high-ranking members of the Church
 of Scientology ("Scientology").  They left the church under circumstances that
 they describe as involving duress.  They filed a complaint against Scientology
 alleging false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress and
 other tortious conduct.  Scientology brought a motion for summary judgment
 alleging that the Aznarans had signed releases relieving Scientology of any
 further liability when they left Scientology.  The district court denied that
 motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration on the basis that there were
 factual questions as to the validity of the releases.
  Scientology then brought the instant motion for a preliminary injunction to
 prohibit:  (1) the continuation of this lawsuit;  (2) dissemination of
 information about the workings of Scientology;  and (3) voluntary assistance of
 the Aznarans to third parties contemplating litigation against Scientology.
 Scientology argued that various provisions of the releases entitled it to this
 relief.  The district court declined to grant the preliminary injunction.
 Scientology appealed.  We affirm.
                               STANDARD OF REVIEW
  " 'Review of a ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction is "very
 limited" ' ".  Diamontiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 795 (9th
 Cir.1990) (quoting Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 762
 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir.1985)).  "A grant of a preliminary injunction will be
 reversed only where the district court abused its discretion or based its
 decision on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous factual
 findings."  Diamontiney, 918 F.2d at 795.
  We first address Scientology's contention that the district court should have
 preliminarily enjoined the litigation.  Although the parties have raised a
 number of issues regarding the first amendment's protection of the free
 exercise of religion and its prohibition against the establishment of religion,
 as well as issues relating to the enforceability of the waiver, there is a
 basic flaw in Scientology's position which makes it unnecessary for us to reach
 these issues.  A preliminary injunction is temporary relief.  If granted, it
 remains in effect only until the district court renders judgment on the merits
 of the case after trial.  Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 686 F.2d
 750, 753 (9th Cir.1982).  Here, however, Scientology seeks to enjoin the case
 from proceeding to trial.  If such relief were granted it would necessarily be
 permanent relief because it would remain in effect until the trial is
 completed--and of course the trial could never be completed because it would be
 enjoined from ever taking place.  Since Scientology has not demonstrated that
 it is entitled to permanent relief, the district court did not err by denying
 its motion to enjoin the litigation. [FN1]
  We next address Scientology's claim that it was entitled to a preliminary
 injunction enforcing the confidentiality and non-assistance provisions of the
 releases.  "At a minimum, a [party] seeking preliminary injunctive relief must
 demonstrate that it will be exposed to irreparable harm."  Caribbean Marine
 Servs. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (1988);  see also Los Angeles
 Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 634 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1980).
  **2 Scientology argues that in the absence of a preliminary injunction
 enforcing the confidentiality and non-assistance provisions of the releases,
 there is a possibility that it will suffer irreparable injury.  However, the
 releases which it prepared provide liquidated damages for violation of these
 provisions.  Thus, under the agreement it drafted, any injury that would result
 from a breach would be compensable.  Purely monetary injuries are not
 considered irreparable.  See Lydo Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Las Vegas,
 745 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir.1984);  Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90
 (1974) (" 'Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and
 energy necessarily expended ... are not enough' " to constitute irreparable
 injury) (quoting Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n,
 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.Cir.1958)).
  Nonetheless, according to Scientology, the Aznarans are judgment-proof, and as
 a result will be unable to provide monetary compensation for a breach.  Thus,
 Scientology argues, this case provides an exception to the general rule that
 injuries which are compensable in money are not irreparable.  We note initially
 that even if the Aznarans were judgment-proof, that would not necessarily
 entitle Scientology to relief in this case, at least in the absence of some
 showing that their financial status had changed since the waivers were prepared
 and signed.  Scientology was apparently aware of the Aznarans' financial
 situation when it agreed to the liquidated damages clauses in the waivers it
 drafted and now invokes.
  Moreover, the district court made a factual finding that the Aznarans are not
 judgment-proof.  Scientology contests this finding by pointing out that the
 Aznarans could not afford to hire an attorney.  However, that is not
 necessarily inconsistent with their ability to pay whatever judgment might
 ultimately be rendered against them.  The finding that the Aznarans are not
 judgment-proof is not clearly erroneous, and the determination that Scientology
 has not met its burden with respect to the irreparable harm issue was not an
 abuse of discretion.
  Finally, the Aznarans argue that we should impose sanctions against
 Scientology because this appeal is frivolous.  Fed.R.App.P. 38.  Scientology
 has presented many strong arguments.  While these arguments were unsuccessful,
 they are not frivolous.  The request for sanctions is denied.
  The judgment of the district court is

      FN* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be
     cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R.

      FN1. We do not suggest that such relief could in any event be obtained
     through the vehicle of a preliminary injunction.  The appropriate procedure
     for terminating litigation before trial is a summary judgment motion.
     Scientology brought such a motion but the district court denied it, and
     subsequently denied Scientology's motion for reconsideration of its
     decision.  Neither the original decision nor the denial of the
     reconsideration motion may be reviewed on an interlocutory appeal.

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