OPERATION CLAMBAKE: SCIENTOLOGY COURT FILES

Part of a public library containing court papers related to lawsuits involving Scientology in some way. Collected to help lawyers and critics of Scientology in future lawsuits from or against this cult. Please report back if this has been of help, or send new contributions to the collection. Thanks. Andreas Heldal-Lund (heldal@online.no)




           CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICES ORG., INC., Plaintiff,
                                       v.
                     CITY OF CLEARWATER, et al., Defendants.
                              No. 84-719-CIV-T-17.
                          United States District Court,
                                  M.D. Florida,
                                 Tampa Division.
                                  Feb. 4, 1991.
  Church of Scientology challenged constitutionality of municipal ordinance
 requiring charitable organizations to file registration statement or make
 available to their members private disclosure statements.  On cross motions for
 summary judgment, the District Court, Kovachevich, J., held that:  (1) church
 had standing to challenge constitutionality of ordinance, and (2) ordinance was
 constitutional.
  Summary judgment for municipality.

 [1] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
 Determination that litigant has standing to sue is preliminary jurisdictional
 matter that should be decided without consideration of likelihood of litigant's
 success on underlying merits of case.

 [2] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 To satisfy minimum constitutional requirements for standing, plaintiff must
 show that he personally has suffered actual or prospective injury as result of
 putatively illegal conduct, that injury is fairly traceable to challenged
 action, and that injury is likely to be redressed by favorable court decision.

 [3] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Prudential issues which court must consider in determining whether plaintiff
 has standing to sue are whether plaintiff's complaint falls within zone of
 interests protected by statute or constitutional provision at issue, whether
 complaint raises abstract questions amounting to generalized grievances that
 are more appropriately resolved by legislative branches, and whether plaintiff
 is asserting his or her own legal rights and interest rather than legal rights
 and interest of third parties.

 [4] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Determination of whether set of beliefs is religion, entitled to First
 Amendment protection, would include consideration, among other things, of
 whether ideas or beliefs in question address issues of fundamental or ultimate
 concern, whether ideas are combined into comprehensive belief system and
 whether there are any formal, external, or surface signs that may be analogous
 to accepted religions.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [5] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Although American courts have adopted expansive definition of religion, party
 claiming First Amendment protections must demonstrate that it is a religion if
 challenged.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [6] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Church of Scientology would be considered to be a religion, for purpose of
 challenging charitable organization registration ordinance on First Amendment
 grounds.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [7] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Overbreadth doctrine is exception to rule that individuals may not litigate
 rights of third parties.

 [8] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Generally, where parties challenging facial validity of statute are those who
 seek to engage in activity that allegedly overbroad statute purports to punish,
 courts will not entertain overbreadth challenge.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [9] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 First Amendment rights and guaranties are fundamental, but they are not
 absolute or unrestricted, and are subject to reasonable limitation and
 control.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [10] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 To withstand establishment clause challenge, law must have secular legislative
 purpose, principal or primary effect of law must neither advance nor inhibit
 religion, and law must not foster excessive government entanglement with
 religion.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [11] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute;  government may not
 evaluate benefits of religious practice including truth or falsity of
 statements about benefits of religious practices under any circumstances.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [12] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 While freedom of religious belief is absolute, freedom to act pursuant to one's
 religion is not;  government had inherent police power to regulate religious
 activities in reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner, to protect safety,
 peace, order, and comfort of society.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [12] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 While freedom of religious belief is absolute, freedom to act pursuant to one's
 religion is not;  government had inherent police power to regulate religious
 activities in reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner, to protect safety,
 peace, order, and comfort of society.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [13] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Although state cannot punish religious views and beliefs, state can punish
 external manifestation of those views if resulting conduct is a clear and
 present danger to safety, morals, health or general welfare of community and is
 violative of laws enacted for their protection.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [13] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Although state cannot punish religious views and beliefs, state can punish
 external manifestation of those views if resulting conduct is a clear and
 present danger to safety, morals, health or general welfare of community and is
 violative of laws enacted for their protection.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [14] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Ordinance directed at conduct rather than belief, with secular purpose and
 effect, and justified by governmental interest in public health and safety does
 not violate First Amendment rights.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [14] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Ordinance directed at conduct rather than belief, with secular purpose and
 effect, and justified by governmental interest in public health and safety does
 not violate First Amendment rights.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [15] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Right to free exercise does not relieve individual's obligation to comply with
 valid and neutral law of general applicability on ground that law proscribes
 (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [16] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Ordinance that could constitutionally apply to wide range of conduct other than
 conduct of challenging religious group does not violate First Amendment
 rights.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [17] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Generally applicable administrative and record-keeping regulations may be
 imposed on religious organization without violating First Amendment.
 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [18] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Routine regulatory interaction that involves no inquiry into religious
 doctrine, no delegation of state power to religious body, and no detailed
 monitoring and close administrative contact between secular and religious
 bodies does not violate nonentanglement command.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [19] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 To pass constitutional challenge alleging infringement of free exercise clause,
 law must regulate conduct rather than belief, and must have secular purpose and
 effect;  if law passes these threshold tests, court balances cost to government
 of altering its activity to allow religious practice to continue unimpeded
 versus cost to religious interests imposed by government activity.  U.S.C.A.
 Const.Amend. 1.

 [20] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Regulation that does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably
 obstruct or delay collection of funds is constitutionally valid, even though
 collection is for religious purpose.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [21] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 State can protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation and insure that
 funds raised actually find their way to organization for which solicitation was
 given by requiring stranger in community to establish his identity and his
 authority to act for cause he purports to represent before permitting him to
 publicly solicit funds for any purpose.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [22] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Any regulation of public solicitation must be by least restrictive means
 necessary to further state interests, and must not allow administrative and
 enforcement officials excessive discretion as to scope or breadth of
 regulation.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [23] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Freedom of association is not stated directly in Constitution, but is implied
 in First Amendment.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [24] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it does not aim specifically at
 evils within allowable area of government control, but sweeps within its ambit
 other activities that constitute exercise of protected expressive or
 associational rights.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [24] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it does not aim specifically at
 evils within allowable area of government control, but sweeps within its ambit
 other activities that constitute exercise of protected expressive or
 associational rights.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [25] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Overbreadth doctrine will not apply unless protected acts affected by statute
 are substantial when compared with law's legitimate applications to unprotected
 acts, even when acts in question are pure speech.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [25] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Overbreadth doctrine will not apply unless protected acts affected by statute
 are substantial when compared with law's legitimate applications to unprotected
 acts, even when acts in question are pure speech.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [26] CHARITIES
 Municipal ordinance requiring charitable organizations to file registration
 statement was not unconstitutional on ground that it failed to exempt
 organizations that solicited only from their members;  ordinance also gave such
 organizations option of providing private disclosure statements to their
 members.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [26] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Municipal ordinance requiring charitable organizations to file registration
 statement was not unconstitutional on ground that it failed to exempt
 organizations that solicited only from their members;  ordinance also gave such
 organizations option of providing private disclosure statements to their
 members.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [27] CHARITIES
 Municipal ordinance requiring charitable organizations to file registration
 statement was not unconstitutionally overbroad, even if it failed to exempt
 solicitations by such organizations of their members on their own premises;
 purpose of ordinance was to protect members of organization as well as public
 against fraud.

 [28] CHARITIES
 Although regulation may not constitutionally require that charitable
 organization offer refund of solicited funds, regulation can constitutionally
 require that written affirmation also be given when voluntary offer of refund
 is made at time of solicitation.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [28] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Although regulation may not constitutionally require that charitable
 organization offer refund of solicited funds, regulation can constitutionally
 require that written affirmation also be given when voluntary offer of refund
 is made at time of solicitation.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [29] CHARITIES
 Municipal ordinance making it unlawful for charitable organization to willfully
 fail to honor written request for promised refund of solicited funds within 60
 days did not unconstitutionally interfere with intramember relations;  city had
 interest in protecting against refund fraud.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [29] CONSTITUTIONAL
 Municipal ordinance making it unlawful for charitable organization to willfully
 fail to honor written request for promised refund of solicited funds within 60
 days did not unconstitutionally interfere with intramember relations;  city had
 interest in protecting against refund fraud.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [30] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Although public officials cannot determine veracity or benefits of religious
 belief, ordinance authorizing officials to investigate allegations of fraud or
 other unlawful conduct did not unconstitutionally interfere with relationship
 between churches and their members.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [30] RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES
 Although public officials cannot determine veracity or benefits of religious
 belief, ordinance authorizing officials to investigate allegations of fraud or
 other unlawful conduct did not unconstitutionally interfere with relationship
 between churches and their members.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [31] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Full disclosure requirement of municipal ordinance regulating charitable
 organizations' solicitation of funds did not unconstitutionally interfere with
 church's internal affairs;  built in safeguards of ordinance, including private
 statement, required judicial review, and required application of legal
 standards such as basing investigation only on bona fide complaints and finding
 of probable cause prior to prosecution, were sufficient to prevent unnecessary
 disclosure.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [31] RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES
 Full disclosure requirement of municipal ordinance regulating charitable
 organizations' solicitation of funds did not unconstitutionally interfere with
 church's internal affairs;  built in safeguards of ordinance, including private
 statement, required judicial review, and required application of legal
 standards such as basing investigation only on bona fide complaints and finding
 of probable cause prior to prosecution, were sufficient to prevent unnecessary
 disclosure.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [32] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Day-to-day intrusion and excessive surveillance are necessary before
 unconstitutionally excessive regulatory entanglement occurs.  U.S.C.A.
 Const.Amend. 1.

 [33] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Record-keeping requirements of municipal ordinance regulating charitable
 organizations' solicitation of funds were not so broad and intrusive as to
 constitute excessive regulatory entanglement with church's affairs;  city would
 only become involved if there were ten bona fide complaints, which could give
 rise to an investigation.

 [33] RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES
 Record-keeping requirements of municipal ordinance regulating charitable
 organizations' solicitation of funds were not so broad and intrusive as to
 constitute excessive regulatory entanglement with church's affairs;  city would
 only become involved if there were ten bona fide complaints, which could give
 rise to an investigation.

 [34] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
 In order to withstand vagueness challenge, law must be drawn with sufficient
 clarity so that people know conduct they must take to avoid sanction of
 particular law, and must provide explicit standards for those who apply it to
 prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

 [35] CHARITIES
 Municipal ordinance requiring charitable organizations to file registration
 statement or make available to its members private disclosure statement was not
 unconstitutionally vague, though it vested investigatory and prosecutorial
 powers in city officials;  ordinance specifically delineated authority of such
 officials.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [36] CHARITIES
 Municipal ordinance regulating charitable organizations' solicitation of funds
 does not violate First Amendment merely because definition of soliciting funds
 includes sale of products upon representation, express or implied, that
 proceeds will be used for charitable purpose.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

 [36] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 Municipal ordinance regulating charitable organizations' solicitation of funds
 does not violate First Amendment merely because definition of soliciting funds
 includes sale of products upon representation, express or implied, that
 proceeds will be used for charitable purpose.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
  *1501 Paul B. Johnson, Johnson, Paniello & Hayes, Tampa, Fla. (Eric
 Lieberman, Katherine Stone, Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman,
 New York City, of counsel) Lawrence E. Heller, Lenske, Lenske & Heller,
 Woodland Hills, Cal., for plaintiff.
  Lawrence R. Velvel, Nashua, N.H., Alan S. Zimmet, Sargent, Repka and Covert,
 M.A. Galbraith, Jr., City Atty., City of Clearwater, Clearwater, Fla., for
 defendants.
                                ORDER ON MOTIONS

  KOVACHEVICH, District Judge.
  This cause is before the Court on the following:
   Dkt. 80 Motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of standing by
 Plaintiff and request for oral argument on this motion by Plaintiff, filed July
 23, 1987.
   Dkt. 81 Memorandum of law in support of motion for partial summary judgment
 by Plaintiff, filed July 23, 1987.
   Dkt. 82, 83, 84 Affidavits of Professor Lonnie D. Kliever, Frank K. Flinn,
 and Reverend James Sydejko, filed July 23, 1987.
   Dkt. 105 Motion for partial summary judgment by Plaintiff, filed January 15,
 1988.
   Dkt. 106 Motion for summary judgment by Defendants Clearwater, Goudeau, and
 Galbraith, filed January 15, 1988.
   Dkt. 108 Memorandum of law in support of Defendants' motion for summary
 judgment with exhibits, filed January 15, 1988.
   Dkt. 109 Memorandum of law in support of motion for partial summary judgment
 by Plaintiff, filed January 15, 1988.
   Dkt. 110 Affidavits/exhibits in support of Plaintiff's motion for partial
 summary judgment, filed January 15, 1988.
   Dkt. 111 Request for oral argument on the issues of motion for summary
 judgment by Defendants, filed February 16, 1988.
   *1502 Dkt. 112 Memorandum of law in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for
 summary judgment with exhibits 1-4 attached yet filed under separate cover by
 Defendants, filed February 16, 1988.
   Dkt. 113 Memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary
 judgment with Exhibit A attached by Plaintiff, filed February 16, 1988.
   Dkt. 116 Reply memorandum in support of its motion for partial summary
 judgment by Plaintiff, filed March 15, 1988.
   Dkt. 117 Reply memorandum to Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to
 Defendants' motion for summary judgment by Defendants.  (Exhibit, Deposition
 Excerpts and Case Authorities attached), filed March 16, 1988.
   Dkt. 129 Notice of filing documents in support of motion for summary judgment
 and in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment by Defendants
 (Documents filed under separate cover), filed January 20, 1989.
   Dkt. 133 Supplemental memorandum of points and authorities in support of
 motion for partial summary judgment and in opposition to motion for summary
 judgment by Plaintiff, filed July 11, 1989.
   Dkt. 137 Motion to strike memorandum of points and authorities in support of
 motion for partial summary judgment and in opposition to motion for summary
 judgment by Defendants, filed July 26, 1989.
   Dkt. 139 Memorandum in response to Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's
 supplemental memorandum and request to permit the filing and consideration of
 supplemental authorities by Plaintiff, filed August 18, 1989.
   Dkt. 143 Motion to strike letter of July 16, 1990 and memorandum in support
 by Plaintiff, filed August 9, 1990.
   Dkt. 144 Response to Plaintiff's motion to strike and Defendants' motion for
 leave to file notice of supplemental authorities and memorandum in support by
 Defendants, filed August 22, 1990.
  The cross motions for summary judgment require this Court to determine whether
 Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, Inc. has standing to sue in
 this matter and whether Clearwater Ordinance 3479-84 regulating charitable
 contributions is constitutional.
  The Court finds that Scientology has standing and that all provisions of
 Clearwater Ordinance 3479-84 are constitutional.  Therefore, the Court grants
 Scientology's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of standing, but
 denies summary judgment on all other issues.  The Court denies Defendant
 Clearwater's motion for summary judgment on the issue of standing, but grants
 summary judgment on all other issues.  The Court's reasoning is set out below.
                                   BACKGROUND
  Defendant City of Clearwater (Clearwater) is a municipality of the State of
 Florida.  In 1975, Plaintiff Church of Scientology Flag Services Organization,
 Inc. (Scientology) established a major base in Clearwater.  Scientology rests
 almost entirely upon the writing L. Ron Hubbard.  Founding Church of
 Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1153
 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 963, 90 S.Ct. 434, 24 L.Ed.2d 427 (1969).
 In the early 1950's Hubbard wrote tracts elucidating what he called Dianetics.
 Dianetics is a theory of therapeutic mind techniques, based on the idea that
 man possesses both a reactive mind and an analytic mind.  The analytic mind is
 comparable to a superior computer, incapable of error and human misjudgments
 that create social problems and individual suffering.  The reactive mind is
 made up of patterns imprinted on the nervous system in moments of pain, stress
 or unconsciousness.  These patterns are called engrams.  Engrams are triggered
 by stimuli associated with the original imprinting, and produce unconscious or
 conditioned behavior that is harmful or irrational.  The reactive mind makes
 the errors and misjudgments that create social problems and individual
 suffering.  Id.
  Supposedly, Dianetics is a practical science that can cure many of man's
 problems *1503 by erasing the old imprinted engrams.  According to Dianetics
 theory, the ordinary person, encumbered by the engrams of his reactive mind, is
 a preclear, similar to a computer that contains previously programmed
 instructions.  Just as computer program instructions can be erased, a person's
 imprinted engrams can be erased.  Dianetics' goal is to erase the programs and
 make persons clear, thus freeing the rational and analytic mind.  Id.
  The process of working toward clear is described as auditing.  An auditor asks
 the person being audited a set of structured questions and drills, called
 rundowns, leading the subject or preclear along his time track discovering and
 exposing engrams along the way.  The auditor's goal is to detect the buttons
 that indicate a conscious or subconscious response to the rundown and enable
 the subject to identify his or her own engrams.  Although the auditor works
 one-on-one with a preclear, the content of each session is not individually
 tailored.  The process of auditing allegedly improves the physical as well as
 the spiritual condition of the subject.  Id.
  The E-meter plays an important part in the process of auditing.  The E-meter
 is a skin galvanometer, similar to those used in lie detector tests.  The
 subject holds two tin soup cans in his hands.  The cans are attached to an
 electrical device.  A needle on the device registers changes in the electrical
 resistance of the subject's skin when the subject answers the auditor's
 questions often addressing personal, intimate and confidential subject
 matters.  Supposedly the auditor, using a set of complex rules and procedures,
 can identify the subject's emotional reaction to the questions by the analyzing
 the needle movement.  Then the auditor uses the analysis to diagnose the mental
 and spiritual condition of the subject.  Scientology provides doctrinal courses
 known as training for becoming an auditor.  Like auditing courses, training
 courses are provided in sequential levels.  Id.  Auditors are sometimes
 young persons with no training other than having been audited themselves for a
 short period of time.  (Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for
 Summary Judgment [Defendants' Support Memorandum], p. 2 (citing Transcript of
 hearings held by Clearwater's City Commission at vol. I, page 50 [hereinafter
 "Tr. at vol. pg."] )).  Auditors are paid directly by Scientology.  Founding
 Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C., 409 F.2d 1146.
  Scientology receives most of its income from auditing and training,
 although it also sells E-Meters, books and tapes.  Id.  Scientology charges
 a fixed donation, also known as a price or a fixed contribution, for auditing
 services.  Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 109
 S.Ct. 2136, 2141, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989) (citing Church of Scientology of
 California v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.1987),
 cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988)).  The
 charges are set out in schedules.  In 1972, auditing charges ranged from $625
 for a twelve and one half hour session to $4,250 for a one hundred hour
 intensive session.  Id.  The system of mandatory fixed charges is based on
 Scientology's doctrine of exchange that requires an even balance between what a
 person pays to the organization and what he receives in return.  Id.
 Scientology promotes auditing sessions through newspaper, magazine and radio
 advertisements and also through free lectures, free personality tests and
 leaflets.  Id.  In addition, Scientology encourages prepayment for the
 auditing services and allows a five percent discount for advance payment.
 Id.
  Scientology will refund unused portions of prepaid auditing or training fees,
 less an administrative charge if the audited person believes that he or she has
 not received religious or spiritual benefit from his participation in the
 organization's activities.  (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
 Summary Judgment [Plaintiff's 1988 Support Memorandum], p. 5, note 5;  Support
 Affidavits and Exhibits;  Supplemental Sydejko aff., pp. 2-3, pars. 5, 6).
 "There is no membership in the Church as such;  persons are accepted for
 auditing on the basis of their interest in Scientology (and presumably their
 ability to pay ...)"  Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, *1504
 D.C., 409 F.2d 1146.  Payments for auditing services are not deductible
 charitable contributions under the Internal Revenue Tax laws because
 participants receive quid pro quo for their money.  Hernandez, 109 S.Ct.
 2136.
  The Clearwater organization brings people from all over the world to receive
 Scientology training.  In 1982, Clearwater, on the basis of complaints from the
 community about Scientology's activities (Defendants' Support Memorandum, p. 3
 (citing Tr. at I 5)), held a series of legislative hearings to determine
 whether the municipality should initiate any action on the complaints.  (Id.
 at I 5).  The complaints included allegations of fraud based on the failure of
 auditing to provide promised physical, mental and other benefits, (Id. at I
 7, 8) and on Scientology's failure to give promised refunds (Id. at III 81)
                                      FACTS
  1. On October 6, 1983, Defendant City of Clearwater (Clearwater) enacted
 Ordinance No. 3091-83, to become effective January 31, 1984.  The purpose of
 the ordinance was to regulate charitable solicitations within the city.  The
 ordinance required charitable organizations that wanted to solicit funds in
 Clearwater to register with the City, maintain specified records, disclose the
 sources and uses of their contributions, refrain from engaging in fraudulent
 solicitation practices and submit to an investigation by the City Attorney if
 ten or more individuals complained about the organization's activities.
 Clearwater patterned the ordinance after a similar Houston ordinance, upheld as
 constitutional by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.  See International
 Society of Krishna Consciousness of Houston, Inc [ISKCON] v. City of Houston,
 689 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.1982) [hereinafter Houston ].
  2. On January 20, 1984, Americans United for Separation of Church and
 State (Americans United) brought an action in the Federal District Court of the
 Middle District of Florida (the Court) to enjoin Clearwater from enforcing the
 ordinance.  Americans United claimed that the ordinance was unconstitutional.
  3. On January 23, Scientology brought a separate action for injunctive relief
 on similar constitutional grounds.  Both Plaintiffs moved for temporary
 restraining orders pursuant to Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
 Procedure.
  The Court, pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2), F.R.Civ.P., consolidated the parties'
 motions for injunctive relief with the trial on the merits, and scheduled a
 hearing on the issue of a permanent injunction.  At the hearing, the parties
 requested the Court to limit the scope of the hearing to the facial validity of
 the ordinance.  Clearwater stated that it would not challenge Scientology's
 standing, except as to the claims alleging that the ordinance violated the
 freedom of religion clauses of the first amendment.  After argument on the
 facial validity of the ordinance, the Court directed counsel to file post-
 hearing Memoranda by March 16.
  4. On March 15, Clearwater enacted Emergency Ordinance No. 3479-84, as an
 amendment to Ordinance No. 3091-83.  The amended ordinance also comprehensively
 regulated charitable solicitation and effectively repealed Ordinance No. 3091-
 83.  As an emergency ordinance, No. 3479-84 would automatically expire after
 90 days if not passed as a non-emergency ordinance within that time.  In
 addition, Ordinance 3479-84 explicitly provided for its expiration in 90 days.
 Clearwater notified the Court and Plaintiffs of the amended ordinance.
  5. On March 28, the Court determined that Ordinance No. 3091-83 was
 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its application and enforcement.  The
 Court terminated the Americans United case by granting the parties' requested
 injunctive relief and dismissing the case.  The Court also terminated the
 Scientology case, granting the requested relief and dismissing all but one
 count of the complaint.  The Court retained jurisdiction for the enforcement of
 the executory provisions of its order.
  6. On April 5, Clearwater appealed the District Court's injunctive orders as
 to Clearwater Ordinance 3091-83, pursuant to *1505 28 U.S.C. s
 1292(a)(1) (1982).  Section 1292 provides that Courts of appeals have
 jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of the District Court's
 granting or refusing to grant injunctions.
  7. On April 20, Scientology, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of Emergency
 Ordinance 3479-84, moved the District Court for leave to amend the remaining
 count of its complaint.  The proposed amendment set out the same constitutional
 challenges that Scientology had raised in opposition to the original
 ordinance.  At the same time, Scientology moved the Court for a temporary
 restraining order prohibiting Clearwater from enforcing Ordinance No. 3479-84.
  8. On May 17, Clearwater enacted Ordinance 3479-84 as a permanent ordinance.
  9. On May 21, Americans United filed a new action in the District Court
 seeking injunctive relief and challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance
 No. 3479-84 on the grounds raised in its previous suit.  Simultaneously,
 Americans United moved for a temporary restraining order, which the Court
 granted.
  10. On May 24, Scientology filed a new suit, seeking essentially the same
 relief as Americans United.  Scientology's action asks for declaratory and
 injunctive relief.  Scientology contends that:
  A) The amended ordinance was enacted to single out Scientology for harassment
 and persecution in violation of the establishment and free exercise clauses of
 the first amendment and the equal protection and due process clauses of the
 fourteenth amendment;
  B) On its face and as applied to all religious groups, the amended ordinance
 violates the first, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments of the United States
 Constitution;  sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 17, and 23 of
 Article I of the Florida Constitution;  Florida Statutes s 166.041(3)(a);
 and Clearwater City Charter s 2.09.  Scientology alleges that the case arises
 under 42 U.S.C. ss 1983 and 1988, and 28 U.S.C. ss 2201 and 2202.
  11. The two Scientology cases and the American United case challenging the
 amended ordinance 3479-84 were not consolidated by the District Court.
  12. On July 13, the District Court heard argument of Americans United and
 Scientology counsel at a scheduled hearing limited to the question of the
 facial constitutionality of Ordinance 3479-84.  The Court consolidated
 Plaintiffs' applications for preliminary injunctive relief with the trial on
 the merits pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2).  The Court found that Ordinance 3479-
 84 was facially constitutional.  However, the Court encouraged an immediate
 interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, pursuant to
 28 U.S.C. s 1292(b) (1982).  The Court also issued a temporary restraining
 order enjoining Clearwater from enforcing the ordinance pending the disposition
 of any appeals that might be taken.  In its written orders, the Court converted
 its temporary restraining orders to preliminary injunctions prohibiting
 Clearwater from enforcing the portions of the Ordinance 3479-84 that dealt with
 a charitable organization's obligation to register with the city and to
 maintain certain records.
  13. On July 31, Scientology moved the District Court, in both of its cases,
 for a temporary restraining order prohibiting Clearwater from enforcing all
 provisions of the Ordinance 3479-84.  Scientology also moved the Court to
 schedule an evidentiary hearing on its pending application for a preliminary
 injunction.
  14. On August 2, the Court denied Scientology's motion for a temporary
 restraining order prohibiting Clearwater from enforcing Ordinance 3479-84 and
 denied Scientology's motion for a hearing on its application for a preliminary
 injunction.
  15. On August 3, Scientology appealed the District Court's July 23 orders
 declaring Ordinance 3479-84 constitutional and enjoining the enforcement of
 less than all of Ordinance 3479-84.  Scientology also appealed the District
 Court's August 2 order denying Scientology's motion for a temporary restraining
 order and a preliminary injunction.
  *1506 16. On November 1, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
  A) vacated the District Court's order prohibiting Clearwater from enforcing
 repealed Ordinance 3091-83 because the controversy was moot;  the Eleventh
 Circuit remanded the two cases with instructions that they be dismissed without
 prejudice;
  B) dismissed the section 1292(b) interlocutory appeals from the District
 Court's determination that amended Ordinance 3479-84 was facially
 constitutional;  the Eleventh Circuit vacated the orders that allowed the
 appeals to proceed;
  C) affirmed the District Court's refusal to grant Scientology's applications
 for preliminary injunctions because Scientology failed to establish the
 criteria necessary for preliminary injunctive relief.  The Eleventh Circuit
 also found that the District Court record did not support an adequate basis to
 justify a finding of standing.
  17. On July 23, 1987, Scientology filed a motion for partial summary judgment
 on the issue of standing, and on January 15, 1988, filed a partial summary
 judgment on standing and the merits.
  18. On January 15, 1988, Clearwater also filed a motion for summary judgment.
                          CLEARWATER ORDINANCE 3479-84
  Clearwater Ordinance 3479-84 applies to charitable organizations that solicit
 funds or property within Clearwater and to charitable organizations that offer
 within the city to make sales of property including, but not limited to books,
 tapes, publications and brochures whose proceeds will be used for charitable
 purposes.  Section 100.01.  The ordinance exempts organizations that annually
 collect monies from less than twenty people in Clearwater or that annually
 collect less than $10,000 there.  Section 100.02.
  Covered organizations must file a registration statement with the City Clerk.
 Section 100.03.  The statement requires the organization to provide information
 about the collection and disbursement of funds, including names, addresses, and
 phone numbers of the soliciting organization, the person in charge of
 soliciting funds in Clearwater, and the person authorized to disburse those
 funds;  a description of the soliciting organization, the methods of
 solicitation and the use to be made of the funds;  the time period of the
 solicitation;  and estimate of salaries, fees and costs to be incurred in
 soliciting;  the names of organization officials or solicitors who have been
 convicted of serious crimes in the last five years;  the names of other Florida
 cities in which the organization has solicited;  and a statement that the
 organization maintains records or documents necessary to file the registration
 statement.  The registration is a public document.
  An organization that files similar information elsewhere may submit that
 filing in lieu of the registration statement.  An organization that solicits
 only from members may provide the information to its members in a private
 statement, available only to members, in lieu of the registration statement.
 The organization must prepare the statement at least annually, must maintain
 the underlying records for three years from the date of each statement, and
 must make the records and statement reasonably available for inspection by each
 member of the charitable organization.  Section 100.02(3).
  After an organization files its registration statement, the City Clerk
 must either issue a Certificate of Registration within ten working days or tell
 the organization what required information is missing from the statement.
 Section 100.03(2).  If the Clerk does not issue a Certificate of
 Registration, the organization can continue to solicit in Clearwater without
 the statement until the Clerk's decision is upheld by a court.  Section
 100.03(3).  The City bears the burden of initiating court proceedings, which it
 must do within ten working days of the refusal of a permit.  Id.  In such
 proceedings, the organization can show that the missing information should not
 be required because furnishing it would impose a special hardship on the
 organization.  Section 100.03(4).
  The registration statement is effective for one year.  Sixty days after the
 year is *1507 over, the organization must file a statement containing
 information as to the amount of funds and property collected in Clearwater
 during the year;  the costs incurred for wages, fees, advertising, and other
 expenses;  and the utilization of the proceeds in approximate amounts.
 Section 100.03(8).
  Under the ordinance, certain acts are unlawful.  These include willful failure
 to file required statements or knowingly filing false statements, fraud or
 misrepresentation to obtain money or property;  promising any person that the
 proceeds of a solicitation of funds will be refunded upon request, and
 thereafter willfully failing to make a written refund request within 60 days;
 promising any person that he or she will receive a refund upon request without
 providing a written statement of the refund terms and conditions;  knowing
 misrepresentation that a donor will obtain a federal tax deduction, willful use
 of solicited funds to commit a crime, and willful failure to maintain required
 records.  Section 100.05.
  The City Attorney is empowered to investigate alleged violations of the
 ordinance, but only if he has received ten bona fide, sworn complaints setting
 forth facts showing a violation and harm.  Section 100.06(1).  In an
 investigation, the city attorney can subpoena persons and records, Section
 100.06(2), but he has no power to enforce his subpoenas and must go to court
 for enforcement.  If an investigation shows probable cause to believe a
 violation exists, the City Attorney can prosecute.  Section 100.06(3).
 Finally, the statute contains an explicit severability clause.  Section 10.
                          STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
  This circuit clearly holds that summary judgment should only be entered when
 the moving party has sustained its burden of showing the absence of a genuine
 issue as to any material fact when all the evidence is viewed in the light most
 favorable to the nonmoving party.  Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d
 655 (11th Cir.1983) All doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of
 material fact must be resolved against the moving party.  Hayden v. First
 National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 996-97 (5th Cir.1979), (quoting
 Gross v. Southern Railroad Co., 414 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.1969)).  Factual
 disputes preclude summary judgment.
  The Supreme Court of the United States held, in Celotex Corp. v.
 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986):
   In our view the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
 judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
 who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
 case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial.
  Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273.
  The Court also said, "Rule 56(e) therefore, requires that the moving party go
 beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers
 to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 'designate' specific facts showing
 there is a genuine issue for trial."  Celotex, supra at 324, 106 S.Ct. at
 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274.  This Court is satisfied that no factual disputes
 remain which preclude summary judgment.
  A. WHETHER SCIENTOLOGY HAS STANDING TO SUE.
  [1] Standing to sue is an aspect of Article III that limits federal judicial
 power to the resolution of cases and controversies.  "A threshold question in
 every federal case is whether the Plaintiff has made out a justiciable case or
 controversy within the meaning of Article III."  Church of Scientology Flag
 Service Organization v. City of Clearwater, 777 F.2d 598, 606 (11th Cir.1985)
 cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116, 106 S.Ct. 1973, 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986) (citing
 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204, 45 L.Ed.2d 343
 (1975)).  Determination that a litigant has standing to sue is a preliminary
 jurisdictional matter that should be decided "without consideration of the
 likelihood of the litigant's success on the underlying merits of the case."
 Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, *1508 690 n. 4 (11th
 Cir.1987).  The essence of the inquiry is ...
   whether the parties seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction have alleged
 such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
 concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
 court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
 questions.
  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 238-39, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1680, 72 L.Ed.2d
 33 (1982) (citations omitted).
  [2] Standing includes constitutional and prudential requirements.  To
 satisfy the minimum constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must show a) that
 he personally has suffered an actual or prospective injury as a result of the
 putatively illegal conduct;  b) that the injury is fairly traceable to the
 challenged action;  and c) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a
 favorable court decision.  See, e.g., Larson, 456 U.S. at 239, 102 S.Ct. at
 1680;  Valley Forge Christian College v. American United for Separation of
 Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700
 (1982);  see also Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization, 777 F.2d
 at 606.
                              Constitutional Issues
  Actual or Threatened Injury.  In some circumstances, a charitable solicitation
 registration requirement will confer standing on a litigant to contest the
 law.  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 241, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1681, 72 L.Ed.2d
 33 (1982).  Scientology claims that the Clearwater ordinance does so.
 Scientology claims that it meets the injury test because it maintains and
 operates a facility exclusively for training and auditing in the City of
 Clearwater.  (Hugh Wilhere aff., par. 4) and directs its Clearwater activities
 toward those who come to its facility to avail themselves of the facility's
 services.  Scientology solicits money in Clearwater, and does so almost
 exclusively in the course of offering participation in the services of auditing
 and training.  (Id;  Sydejko aff., par. 18).  Scientology also advertises
 and sells religious books to the general public, as well as to those involved
 with the Scientology organization in Clearwater.  (Wilhere aff. par. 4;
 Sudejko aff. par. 19).
  Scientology further alleges that it will suffer injury if Ordinance
 3479-84 is enforced because Scientology is a charitable organization as defined
 by the ordinance:  an organization "which is or holds itself out to be a
 religious" organization.  Section 100.01(1).  Scientology also engages in
 "solicitation of funds" as that term is defined in the statute since it
 requests money for the organization in the course of offering literature and
 participation in services and training.
  The ordinance requires that charitable organizations soliciting funds in
 Clearwater file registration and disclosure statements with the city.
 Organizations and individuals may at some time be subject to penalties under
 the ordinance.  Therefore, Scientology claims that it meets the injury in fact
 prong of the constitutional test.
   Traceable Connection to the Challenged Action.
  Scientology claims that it meets this prong of the constitutional requirements
 test because the reporting and registration requirements directly impact the
 organization's solicitation in Clearwater and the ordinance guidelines
 concerning refunds impact the organization's policies concerning refunds.
  Redress By a Favorable Decision.  Scientology claims that its injuries are
 likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.  Scientology is seeking a
 declaration that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face and as applied
 to religions and other charitable organizations, and in particular,
 Scientology, and is seeking a permanent injunction against enforcement of the
 ordinance.  (See Complaint, Prayer for Relief, pars. A-D).  Such a ruling would
 redress almost all of the organizations' injuries.
  In addition, Scientology seeks to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance
 provisions that require disclosure of solicitations from members, or on their
 own premises, and the provisions that set out guidelines for refund policies.
 A favorable decision on *1509 these issues would redress Scientology's
 alleged injuries in these areas.
                                Prudential Issues
  [3] In addition to the essential constitutional requirements a court must
 consider the case in light of three principles that might counsel judicial
 restraint, referred to as prudential considerations.  See Valley Forge
 Christian College, 454 U.S. at 471, 474, 102 S.Ct. at 757, 759.  While not
 jurisdictional, they are invoked to "limit the role of the courts in resolving
 public disputes."  Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. at 2206.  These
 considerations are (1) whether the plaintiff's complaint falls within the zone
 of interests protected by the statute or constitutional provision at issue;
 (2) whether the complaint raises abstract questions amounting to generalized
 grievances that are more appropriately resolved by the legislative branches;
 and (3) whether the plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and
 interests rather than the legal rights and interest of third parties;  Allen
 v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).
  Zone of Interest.  Scientology contends that it meets the first prong of the
 prudential requirements test because the Clearwater ordinance arguably
 infringes on the zones of interest protected by the first amendment's
 associational, speech and religious guarantees.  Association of Data
 Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25
 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) (emphasis added).  Scientology claims that because the
 ordinance fails to exclude, from the reporting requirement, charitable
 contributions from its members, or on its premises, the ordinance violates the
 organization's first amendment rights.
  Scientology further contends that the registration and reporting
 requirements and enforcement provisions infringe on associational and religious
 rights by permitting surveillance into Scientology's affairs and by pressuring
 Scientology to adopt certain policies and practices.  In addition, Scientology
 claims that the ordinance provisions requiring the licensing of public
 solicitation and sale of literature infringe on first amendment rights of free
 expression and free exercise of religions.
  Distinct Concrete Injury.  Scientology claims that it meets the second element
 of the prudential requirements test because the ordinance inflicts a distinct,
 concrete injury on a limited set of charitable organizations, which
 specifically includes the Scientology organization.  In addition, Scientology
 alleges that the legislative history of the ordinance shows that the ordinance
 is aimed at Scientology.  (Wilhere aff., par. 7 & 8).
  Legal Claims Raised.  Scientology claims that it meets the third element of
 the prudential requirements test because it can invoke the constitutional
 protection afforded all organizations for associational and expressive
 activities, whether they are religious or not.  See Roberts v. United States
 Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984).  Further,
 Scientology claims that it has standing to raise the legal claims because it is
 a religion, or because the overbreadth doctrine would give it standing.  In
 reality, almost all of Scientology's arguments are premised on its claim to be
 a religious organization.
           Scientology's Standing To Raise Legal Claims As a Religion
  [4] American courts have adopted an expansive definition of religion.
 Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163, 174, 180, 85 S.Ct. 850, 858, 861, 13
 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965).  Determining whether a set of beliefs is a religion under a
 modern definition of religion would include consideration, among other things,
 of whether the ideas or beliefs in question address issues of fundamental or
 ultimate concern, whether the ideas are combined into a comprehensive belief-
 system and whether there are any formal, external, or surface signs that may be
 analogous to accepted religions.  Such signs might include formal services,
 ceremonial functions, clergy, and efforts at propagation.  Malnak v. Yogi,
 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
  *1510 The affidavits submitted by Scientology indicate that Scientology
 meets some of the modern definitional elements of religion.  (See Reverend
 Sydejko aff., par. 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13;  Dr. Frank Flinn aff., par.s 9, 10,
 12, 13, 14;  Kliever aff., par.s 6, 7-12, 13, 16, 17).  Scientology is
 incorporated as a church and it has ministers with the legal authority to marry
 and to bury.  The fundamental writings of the church contain a general account
 of man and his nature comparable in scope to that of some recognized
 religions.  Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C., 409 F.2d at
 1154.  Scientology is propagated by a mother church in California and by
 numerous branch churches around the world.  The mother church instructs laity,
 trains and ordains ministers, and creates new congregations.  Branches, known
 as franchises or missions, provide Scientology services at the local level.
 Id.  The affidavits address only the religiosity of Scientology's beliefs;
 they do not address the religiosity of Scientology's activities.
  [5] Although American courts have adopted an expansive definition of
 religion, a party must demonstrate that it is a religion if challenged.  See
 Larson, 456 U.S. at 255-256, n. 30, 102 S.Ct. at 1689, n. 30 ("[N]othing in
 our opinion suggests that appellants could not attempt to compel the
 Unification Church to register under the Act as a charitable organization not
 entitled to the religious-organization exemption, and put the Church to the
 proof of its bona fides as a religious organization.");  International
 Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 438 (2d
 Cir.1981) (It must be "determin[ed] whether the Krishna beliefs, credos, and
 philosophy, as well as the particular practice of sankirtan, are sufficiently
 'religious' in nature to warrant the protection of the free exercise
 guarantee.");  Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294, 295 (9th Cir.1979) ("There is
 no prohibition ... against ruling whether or not a set of beliefs constitutes a
 religion when deciding if First Amendment protection apply.").
  Clearwater claims Scientology has not proven that it is a religion, but
 "[e]ven if Scientology is a religion, the actions at issue here are commercial,
 and sometimes criminal, in character."  (Defendants' Support Memorandum, p.
 13).  Defendants point out specific passages 1982 municipal hearing transcripts
 that illustrate illicit acts and practices allegedly carried on by
 Scientologists (Defendants' Support Memorandum, pp. 4-10):
   Burglaries of the offices of doctors, lawyers, and government officials to
 obtain documents and information for use against critics or opponents (Tr. at I
 89, 179, 232, 242;  IV 156, 162, 260, 262, 290, 291, 292, 293, 302, 303);
 electronic bugging of medical offices and government offices to obtain
 information for use against critics or opponents (Tr. at I 121, 152;  III 338-
 339;  IV 9, 20-21, 134, 156, 321, 326, 334);  "framing" opponents by
 manufacturing and planting false evidence (Tr. at I 40, 101, 102, 212;  Iv 137,
 326, 334);  use of highly confidential information, which was obtained through
 "auditing" and was supposed to remain confidential, to blackmail persons who
 leave the organization (Tr. at I 75, 98, 204-205;  II 24, 26-27, 61-62, 200;
 III 20;  Iv 10, 26, 37, 61-62, 81, 116-117, 155, 173, 183, 185, 192-193, 214,
 240-242, 270, 364-365);  beating, kidnapping, and imprisoning persons who
 wished to leave the organization (Tr. at I 84-85, 99, 122-123, 242;  II 24, 37,
 132, 135, 183-184, 214;  III 103, 271;  IV 50-51, 57-58, 245-246, 287, 417-
 418);  fraudulently inducing individuals to pay large sums of money for
 Scientology "training" by falsely claiming that Scientology can cure mental and
 physical ailments and will enable a person to achieve great success;  by
 falsely stating that L. Ron Hubbard was a war hero, had healed himself of
 terrible wounds, is a nuclear physicist, and is an eminent and accomplished
 research scientist;  and by false promises of refunds (Tr. I 73, 113-114, 124,
 264-265, 269, 282, 287-288;  II 104;  III 81, 281;  IV (, 22-23, 25, 72-73, 75-
 76, 108-110, 152-153, 285, 286);  maintaining poor living conditions for low
 level Scientologists who work at church bases (Tr. at I 59-60, II 166, 249,
 250-251;  III 10, 11, 98, 149, 157, 188, *1511 268, 269, 270;  IV 16, 53,
 98, 119-120, 228, 245-246).
  Although Clearwater alleges that Scientologists commit the acts set out
 above, it states, "For purposes of the summary judgment motions, Defendants
 shall not assert that the beliefs of Scientology are not religious in
 character."  (Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
 Summary Judgment [hereinafter Defendants' Opposition Memorandum], p. 3).
 Clearwater further states, "[S]cientology may have religious beliefs ..."
 (Id. at 5).
  Scientology's beliefs developed from Hubbard's writings:
   L. Ron Hubbard, writing in a science fiction magazine in the 1940's, first
 advanced the extravagant false claims that various physical and mental
 illnesses could be cured by auditing.  He played a major part in developing
 Scientology.  Thereafter, commencing in the early 1950's numerous Scientology
 books and pamphlets were written explaining how various illnesses can be and
 had been cured through auditing.  These materials were widely distributed ...
   Hubbard and his fellow Scientologists developed the notion of using a E-meter
 to aid auditing.  Substantial fees were charged for the meter and for auditing
 sessions using the meter.  Auditing was guaranteed to be successful ...
 Unfortunately, the Government did not move to stop the practice of Scientology
 and a related "science" known as Dianetics when these activities first appeared
 and were gaining public acceptance....  The government did not sue to condemn
 the E-meter until the early 1960's, by which time a religious cult known as the
 Founding Church of Scientology had appeared.  This religion, formally organized
 in 1955, existed side-by-side with the secular practice of Scientology.  Its
 adherents embrace many of Hubbard's teachings and widely disseminate his
 writings.  The church purports to believe that many illnesses may be cured
 through E-meter auditing by its trained ministers through an appeal to the
 spirit or soul of a man.  As a matter of formal doctrine, the Church professes
 to have abandoned any contention that there is a scientific basis for claiming
 cures resulting from E-meter use.
  United States v. Article or Device, 333 F.Supp. 357 (D.D.C.1971).
  [6] Based on the Article or Device court's analysis and the affidavits
 cited above, this Court finds that Scientology fulfills the elements of the
 modern definition of religion;  for purposes of considering the motions for
 summary judgment, the Court will consider Scientology to be a religion.
    Scientology's Claim To Raise Legal Claims Under the Overbreadth Doctrine
  [7] The overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the rule that individuals
 may not litigate the rights of third parties.  See Barrows v. Jackson, 346
 U.S. 249, 255, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 1034, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953).  "[A]n individual
 whose own speech or expressive conduct may validly be prohibited or sanctioned
 is permitted to challenge a statute on its face because it also threatens
 others not before the court--those who desire to engage in legally protected
 expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or
 undertake to have the law declared partially invalid."  Brockett v. Spokane
 Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2801, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985).
  [8] Generally, where the parties challenging the facial validity of a
 statute are those who seek to engage in the activity that the overbroad statute
 purports to punish, courts will not entertain an overbreadth challenge.
 City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104
 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984).  In some cases, the overbreadth doctrine may
 be employed only if the contested regulation violates the rights of those not
 before the Court.  Id.  Resorting to the overbreadth doctrine in this case
 is not necessary since this Court has found that Scientology meets the
 definition of a religion for purposes of the summary judgment motions.
 Consequently, the Court *1512 finds that Scientology has standing and grants
 Scientology's motion for summary judgement on this issue.
                           FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEES
  [9] "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
 prohibiting the free exercise thereof;  or abridging the freedom of speech, or
 of the press;  or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
 petition the government for a redress of grievances."  U.S. Const.Amend. I.
 First amendment rights and guaranties are fundamental, but they are not
 absolute or unrestricted, and they are subject to reasonable limitation and
 control.
                               Freedom of Religion
  The guarantee of freedom of religion was adopted to curtail Congress' power to
 interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express
 the dictates of his conscience.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct.
 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (silent prayer law unconstitutional).  Both the
 anti-establishment clause and the free exercise clause are applied to the
 states through incorporation into the fourteenth amendment due process
 guarantee of liberty.  Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct.
 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (anti-establishment);  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (free exercise).  The two clauses
 often appear to conflict, and reconciling these potentially conflicting
 constitutional demands is a continuing problem.  The basic role of the
 government has been to maintain a position of neutrality.  While the Court has
 not directly defined religion, it has indicated that non-theistic beliefs can
 qualify for constitutional protection.  Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850.
  The Establishment Clause.  States may not make laws respecting the
 establishment of religion.  Courts interpret this clause broadly to prohibit
 laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
 another.  Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504.
  [10] In most cases, a law must satisfy each part of a three-part test to
 withstand an Establishment Clause challenge:  (1) the law must have a secular
 legislative purpose;  (2) the principal or primary effect of the law must
 neither advance nor inhibit religion;  and (3) the law must not foster "an
 excessive government entanglement with religion."  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971).
  Improper administrative entanglement may arise when religious and public
 employees must work closely together to carry out a legislative plan.  See
 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 3238, 87 L.Ed.2d 290
 (1985) (citing Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 674, 90 S.Ct. 1409,
 1414, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970)).  Administrative entanglement claims commonly
 arise in suits to strike down government benefits to religion;  e.g., when
 government aid is followed by government investigators who must make on-site
 inspection to ensure that aid moneys are expended only for secular purposes.
 See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412, 105 S.Ct. at 3237.  Day-to-day intrusion into
 the operation of a religious institution is entanglement.  Impermissible
 entanglement occurs if a law allows the state to investigate the financial
 affairs of religious organization when the goal of the investigation is to
 determine whether regulation is necessary.  Surinach v. Pesquera de
 Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir.1979).
  Regulatory entanglement claims arise when parties seek to show that
 enforcement of a law would create excessive entanglement.  Tony and Susan
 Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85
 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).  Potentially, regulatory entanglement claims permit
 religious bodies to use the establishment clause, like the free exercise
 clause, as a shield from government intrusion.  See e.g., McClure v.
 Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S. 896, 93 S.Ct.
 132, 34 L.Ed.2d 153 (1972) (religious organization exempt from some sex
 discrimination suits under Title VII);  Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 481
 N.E.2d 1160 (1985) (Christian Science Monitor, *1513 as religious
 organization, immune from some employment discrimination suits).
  The Court has specifically criticized the three-part Lemon test and often
 departs from the test in making decisions.  See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
 783, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983) (Court upheld prayers opening
 legislative session, emphasizing the prayer's historical acceptance making it
 a "part of the fabric of our society.").  The Court has criticized the
 entanglement prong of the test because the supervision necessary to ensure that
 there is no entanglement becomes entanglement.  See, e.g., Aguilar, 473 U.S.
 at 429, 105 S.Ct. at 3246 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);  Wallace, 472 U.S. at
 109-110, 105 S.Ct. at 2517-2518 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);  Lynch v.
 Donnelly 465 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1367, 79 L.Ed.2d 604
 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 666-668, 91 S.Ct. at
 2137-2139 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).  However, the three-part
 Lemon test remains the basic standard of judicial review in Establishment
 Clause cases.
  [11] Free Exercise of Religion.  States may not make laws that inhibit the
 free exercise of religion.  "The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions
 is absolute."  Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d
 563 (1961).  (See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943)) (law requiring Jehovah's Witness
 to salute the flag struck down because government cannot prescribe what is
 orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion).  The
 government may not evaluate the benefits of religious practice including the
 truth or falsity of statements about the benefits of religious practices under
 any circumstances.  United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88
 L.Ed. 1148 (1944);  Founding Church of Scientology of Washington D.C., 409
 F.2d 1146.
  [12][13] While freedom to believe is absolute, freedom to act pursuant to
 one's religion cannot be.  "Conduct remains subject to regulations for the
 protection of society."  Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-304, 60 S.Ct. at 903-
 904.  The government has the inherent police power to regulate religious
 activities in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner, to protect the safety,
 peace, order, and comfort of society.  Id.  Although the state cannot punish
 religious views and beliefs, the state can punish the external manifestation of
 those views if the resulting conduct is a clear and present danger to the
 safety, morals, health or general welfare of the community and is violative of
 laws enacted for their protection.  Portland v. Thornton, 174 Or. 508, 149
 P.2d 972 cert. denied 323 U.S. 770, 65 S.Ct. 123, 89 L.Ed. 616 (1944).
  [14][15][16] An ordinance directed at conduct rather than belief,
 with a secular purpose and effect, and justified by governmental interest in
 public health and safety does not violate first amendment rights.  Church of
 the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F.Supp. 1467
 (S.D.Fla.1989).  The right to free exercise does not relieve an individual's
 obligation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability on
 the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
 prescribes (or proscribes)."  Employment Division, Department of Human
 Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876
 (1990), citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n. 3, 102 S.Ct. 1051,
 1058 n. 3, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944).  An ordinance that could constitutionally
 apply to a wide range of conduct other than the conduct of the challenging
 religious group does not violate first amendment rights.  Lukumi, 723
 F.Supp. 1467 (municipal ordinances regulating ritual sacrifice of animals not
 unconstitutional).
  When community problems exist, a city ordinance triggered by the conduct of a
 particular group is constitutionally valid if the purpose of the ordinance is
 to address the community problem.  Id.  The first amendment does not require
 strict religious neutrality.  See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 82-83, 105 S.Ct. at
 2503-2504 (O'Connor, J., concurring);  McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
 *1514 639, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 1334, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
 concurring) (noting that "government [may] take religion into account when
 necessary to further secular purposes").  Courts may uphold laws explicitly
 mentioning religious conduct so long as the laws serve a secular purpose.  See
 e.g., Jones v. Butz, 374 F.Supp. 1284, 1292-93 (S.D.N.Y.1974).
  Although laws cannot establish religion or prohibit its free exercise, laws
 can control criminal acts connected with religion.  Criminal acts are not "any
 less odious" because they are sanctioned by a particular sect as religion.
 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345, 10 S.Ct. 299, 301, 33 L.Ed. 637
 (1890).  "However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate
 to the criminal laws of the country ..."  Id. at 342-343, 10 S.Ct. at 300-
 01.  Otherwise, "the professed doctrines of religious belief [would be]
 superior to the law of the land," and the result would be "to permit every
 citizen to become a law unto himself.  Government could exist only in name
 under such circumstances."  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167, 25
 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (quoted in Davis, 133 U.S. at 344, 10 S.Ct. at 301).
  That the government can regulate religiously based activities in the exercise
 of its power to promote the health, safety and general welfare, Wisconsin,
 406 U.S. at 220, 92 S.Ct. at 1535;  see also Bob Jones University v. United
 States, 461 U.S. 574, 603, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2034, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), is
 illustrated by the numerous statutes courts have upheld precluding or impairing
 religious actions that violate civil or criminal laws.  Thus, polygamy can be
 banned.  Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145;  Davis, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299.
 Child labor can be barred.  Prince, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438.  Parents can
 be punished for failing to provide children with medical attention.
 Hermanson v. State, 570 So.2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).  The use of poisonous
 snakes in religious services can be forbidden.  Harden v. State, 188 Tenn.
 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).  The use of marijuana, LSD and peyote can be
 punished.  Employment Division, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d
 876.  Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir.1967), rev'd on other
 grounds, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969);  State v.
 Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917, 87
 S.Ct. 876, 17 L.Ed.2d 789 (1967).  Violation of zoning laws can be
 prohibited.  Grosz v. City of Miami, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir.1983), cert.
 denied, 469 U.S. 827, 105 S.Ct. 108, 83 L.Ed.2d 52 (1984).
  [17][18] Even neutral laws of general application that significantly
 burden religious liberty may be constitutional.  Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102
 S.Ct. 1051 (mandatory and continuous participation in the social security
 system vital to integrity of the system);  Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation,
 471 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953.  However, the government must avoid
 administrative entanglement with religious institutions.  Walz v. Tax
 Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d
 697 (1970);  Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105.  Generally applicable
 administrative and recordkeeping regulations may be imposed on religious
 organizations without violating the first amendment.  Routine regulatory
 interaction that involves no inquiry into religious doctrine, no delegation of
 state power to a religious body, and no detailed monitoring and close
 administrative contact between secular and religious bodies does not violate
 the non-entanglement command.  Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
 Equalization of California, 493 U.S. 378, 110 S.Ct. 688, 107 L.Ed.2d 796
 (1990) (citing Hernandez, 109 S.Ct. 2136).
  Until recently, government actions that burdened religious free exercise had
 to be justified by showing that the government had a compelling purpose and no
 less burdensome means of achieving the purpose of the regulation.  Sherbert
 v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963).  See
 also Wisconsin, 406 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. at 1533 (purpose must be of
 highest order).  But cf. Employment Division, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595,
 108 L.Ed.2d 876.  However, after Employment Division, Department of Human
 Resources of Oregon v. Smith, *1515 the compelling government interest test
 is no longer required when the government action involves a religion-neutral
 criminal law.  The Employment Division court stated:
   [g]enerally applicable, religion-neutral criminal laws that have the effect
 of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified, under the
 free exercise of religion clause ... by a compelling governmental interest
 because (1) if the general laws were to be subjected to a "religious practice"
 exemption, both the importance of the law at issue and the centrality of the
 practice at issue would reasonably have to be considered, (2) it is
 inappropriate for judges to determine the "centrality" of a belief to an
 individual's religion, (3) thus, if the "compelling interest" test were to be
 applied at all, it would have to be applied across the board, to all actions
 thought to be religiously commanded, (4) such a rule would open the prospect of
 constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost
 every conceivable kind, a result that is not required by the First amendment's
 protection of religious liberty, and (5) the nation cannot afford the luxury of
 deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every
 regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order;
 although it may be that leaving accommodation of religious practices to the
 judicial process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
 practices that are not widely engaged in, such an unavoidable consequence of
 democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is
 a law unto itself or in which judges weight the social importance of all laws
 against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
  [19] To pass a constitutional challenge against infringement of the
 free exercise clause, a law must regulate conduct rather than belief, and the
 law must have a secular purpose and effect.  If the law passes these threshold
 tests, the court balances the cost to the government of altering its activity
 to allow the religious practice to continue unimpeded versus the cost to the
 religious interest imposed by the government activity.  Grosz, 721 F.2d at
 734.
                      Solicitation and the First Amendment
  [20] Public solicitation is protected under the first amendment because
 solicitation is a form of communication.  Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens
 for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 100 S.Ct. 826, 833, 63 L.Ed.2d 73
 (1980);  Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900;  Fernandes v. Limmer, 663
 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.1981).  However, solicitation is subject to reasonable
 regulation.  The state has an important interest in regulating solicitation
 activities to avoid disturbances of the peace and to insure public safety.
 Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900.  A regulation that does not involve
 any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection
 of funds is constitutionally valid, even though the collection is for a
 religious purpose.  Id.
  [21] A state or municipality also has an interest in prohibiting fraud in
 solicitation.  "Public awareness of abuses in the administration of charitable
 fund raising practices has increased over the past twenty years."  Houston,
 689 F.2d at 541.  The state can protect its citizens from fraudulent
 solicitation and insure that funds raised actually find their way to the
 organization for which the solicitation was given by requiring a stranger in
 the community to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause
 he purports to represent before permitting him to publicly solicit funds for
 any purpose.  Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306.  Disclosure is a less intrusive
 means for protecting citizens than prohibiting solicitation entirely.
 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826.
  However, a solicitation regulation must bear a "reasonable relationship to the
 achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its justification."
 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2666, 33 L.Ed.2d 626
 (1972).  For example, the state can require solicitors to disclose that they
 are professional solicitors at the time of solicitation, and can require a
 subsequent *1516 written affirmation of the disclosure.  Indiana
 Voluntary Firemen's Association, Inc. v. Pearson, 700 F.Supp. 421
 (S.D.Ind.1988).  However, the state cannot compel disclosure about the
 solicitors' contract with the charitable organization or other details that
 solicitors would not voluntarily disclose.  Id.  Neither can the state
 regulate the percentage of contributions a charitable organization expends for
 services of professional solicitors.  Shannon v. Telco Communications, Inc.,
 824 F.2d 150 (1st Cir.1987);  Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson
 Company, 467 U.S. 947, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984);  Schaumburg,
 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826;  Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of
 North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988).
 The regulatory authority may not attempt to regulate the content of the
 representations made to induce contributions on the basis that the
 representations falsely state spiritual, emotional or other benefits that may
 accrue to the contributor in this world or the next.  United States v.
 Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944).
  [22] Any regulation of public solicitation must be by the least
 restrictive means necessary to further the state interests.  Fernandes, 663
 F.2d 619.  A regulation must not allow administrative and enforcement officials
 excessive discretion as to the scope or breath of the regulation.  Hynes v.
 Mayor and Council of the Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 48
 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976);  Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826.
  An ordinance imposing a flat license tax for the privilege of canvassing or
 soliciting within a municipality is unconstitutional when the tax is applied to
 the dissemination of religious beliefs through the sale of religious books and
 pamphlets by solicitation from house to house.  Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1954).
                          Summary Judgment Contentions
  Scientology alleges that:  a) it meets the constitutional and prudential
 requirements necessary to establish standing;  b) the Clearwater ordinance is
 unconstitutionally overbroad and violates Plaintiff's first amendment rights
 because the ordinance regulates fundraising by churches from their own members
 and on their own premises;  attempts to regulate matters of internal
 ecclesiastical rule, custom, discipline and procedure;  and regulates and
 requires broad financial disclosure of church fundraising for general church
 purposes;  c) the Clearwater ordinance unconstitutionally vests excessive and
 vaguely defined discretion on city enforcement officials;  d) the Clearwater
 ordinance unconstitutionally seeks to regulate and license the sale of books
 and literature in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments.
 [Throughout its motion, Scientology relies on the Houston ordinance to
 support its arguments].
  Clearwater refutes Scientology's claims, argues that Clearwater Ordinance
 3479-84 is constitutional on its face and that, because there are no genuine
 issues of material fact needing to be resolved, Clearwater is entitled to
 summary judgment in its favor.
  B. WHETHER THE CLEARWATER ORDINANCE IS OVERBROAD AND THUS INTERFERES WITH
 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION.
                             Freedom of Association
  [23] Freedom of association is not stated directly in the constitution but
 is implied in the first amendment.  See Tashjian v. Republication Party of
 Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 214, 107 S.Ct. 544, 548, 93 L.Ed.2d 514
 (1986) (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78
 S.Ct. 1163, 1170, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958)) (freedom of association protected by
 first and fourteenth amendments includes partisan political organization).
  The Supreme Court identified two types of associations in Roberts, 468 U.S.
 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244.  The first type is the intimate human relationship
 exemplified by relationships involving the creation and sustenance of a family,
 including marriage, childbirth, raising and educating children, and
 cohabitation with one's relatives.  Id. at 619, 104 S.Ct. at 3250 (citations
 omitted).  Intimate relationships, which demand the *1517 fullest
 protection, are characterized by small numbers, a high degree of selectivity,
 and seclusion from others.  Id. at 620, 104 S.Ct. at 3250.  "As a general
 matter, only relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect
 the consideration that have led to an understanding of freedom of association
 as a intrinsic element of personal liberty."  Id.
  The second type of identified association, apposite to an intimate
 association, is an express association, exemplified by large business
 associations.  Id.  A large business association lacking the qualities of
 the intimate association "seems remote from the concerns giving rise to ...
 constitutional protection."  Id.  "Between the poles lies a broad range of
 human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional
 protection from particular incursions by the State."  Id.  Some general
 principles of group protection have emerged.
  Generally, laws that directly punish group membership or association are
 invalid See Noto v. United, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98, 81 S.Ct. 1517, 1520-21, 6
 L.Ed.2d 836 (1961);  Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 86 S.Ct. 1238, 16
 L.Ed.2d 321 (1966) as are laws that regulate internal activities such as whom
 to include as members and which non-members to invite to take part in the group
 processes.  See March Fong Eu, Secretary of State of California v. San
 Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 109 S.Ct. 1013,
 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (statute restricting organization and composition of
 official governing bodies of political parties and terms of office of state
 central committee invalid).
  Laws that withhold a privilege or benefit from the members of a group or
 association and laws that compel disclosure of a group's membership or an
 individual's associations, where anonymity is likely to be important to the
 continued viability of associational ties, are also invalid.  See Gibson v.
 Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 83 S.Ct. 889, 9
 L.Ed.2d 929 (1963);  Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3
 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959);  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-
 65, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172-73, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958).
  Laws that interfere in hierarchial religious associations' decisions regarding
 control of church real property, appointments to church positions and
 discipline are generally invalid.  See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
 Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2381, 49 L.Ed.2d 151
 (1976) (attempt to control defrocking procedures in a religious organization
 invalid;  courts must accept such decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
 tribunal as final and binding) (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
 679, 727, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872));  Paul v. Watchtower Bible Tract Society of
 New York, 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.1987) (religious practice of shunning is
 affirmative defense to suit for defamation and intentional infliction of
 emotional distress by church member against Jehovah's Witness organization).
 However, charitable and religious groups are subject to law and courts have
 sustained the power of enforcement officials to investigate infractions by
 obtaining documents and information pursuant to subpoenas and production
 orders.  See e.g., United States v. Coates, 692 F.2d 629 (9th Cir.1982);
 United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456
 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 2257, 72 L.Ed.2d 861 (1982);  United States v. The
 Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.1979);  In re Rabbinical Seminary
 Netzach Israel Ramailis, 450 F.Supp. 1078 (E.D.N.Y.1978);  see Church of
 Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 463-464, aff'd 823
 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.1987).
                                   Overbreadth
  [24] Overbreadth is concerned with the precision of a law.  A statute
 is void on its face if it "does not aim specifically at evils within the
 allowable area of [government] control, but ... sweeps within its ambit other
 activities that constitute an exercise" of protected expressive or
 associational rights.  Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736,
 741, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (statute prohibiting all picketing void *1518 on
 its face since it bans peaceful picketing protected by first amendment).
  The question of how overbroad a statute must be before it is subject to facial
 invalidation is difficult.  The Supreme Court has "never held that a statute
 should be held invalid on its face merely because it is possible to conceive of
 a single impermissible application."  City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,
 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
 U.S. 601, 630, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2925, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
 dissenting)).
  Testing the constitutionality of a statute on its face is to some degree
 "fundamentally at odds with the function of the federal courts" to resolve
 concrete cases and controversies.  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52, 91
 S.Ct. 746, 754, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).  Application of the overbreadth doctrine
 to facially invalidate a statute is "manifestly, strong medicine," and the
 Court is reluctant to resort to the doctrine.  Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 630,
 93 S.Ct. at 2925.
  [25] The overbreadth doctrine will not apply unless the protected acts
 affected by the statute are substantial when compared with the law's legitimate
 applications to unprotected acts, even when the acts in question are pure
 speech.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770-71, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361-
 62, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982).  " '[S]ubstantial overbreadth' is essentially a
 case-by-case analysis under which the court scrutinizes the statute's apparent
 overbreadth, judges it 'in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
 sweep,' Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917, and ascertains
 whether, in relation to that 'legitimate sweep,' the statute's overbreadth is
 'substantial' or 'marginal.' "  Indiana Voluntary Firemen's Association, 700
 F.Supp. 421.  The overbreadth doctrine does not apply at all to commercial
 speech.  Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10-11 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 887, 894-895,
 n. 9, 59 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979).  Closely related to the overbreadth doctrine is
 the less restrictive means test which requires that the means used to pursue a
 legitimate and substantial governmental purpose must be the least restrictive
 means possible.  Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5
 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960).
  A. Whether the Clearwater Ordinance Affects Organization-Member Relationships
  Ordinance 3479-84 requires organizations to file a registration statement or
 make available to its members a private disclosure statement.  Scientology
 claims that the Clearwater ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it
 does not exempt solicitations by charitable organizations of their own members
 on their own premises.  Scientology claims that while Clearwater may be able to
 require disclosure of contributions from the public, Clearwater cannot require
 disclosure of contributions from members, or on the organization's premises
 without violating the overbreadth doctrine because freedom of association is
 protected by the first amendment and freedom of association prevents
 interference with the internal affairs of an organization.
  Clearwater contends that the City can require Scientology and other
 organizations to disclose information because the City has a compelling
 government interest in preventing fraud, criminal and antisocial action and
 disclosure to members and the public will expose and thus prevent fraud.
 Clearwater argues that regulation of charitable disclosures is the least
 intrusive means of accomplishing the City's purpose of preventing fraud.
  Clearwater argues that while the Supreme Court has ruled that disclosure laws
 and penal laws are both less intrusive alternatives than prohibition of
 solicitation, disclosure laws are even less intrusive than criminal ones.
 Clearwater points out that government can obtain and at trial make public the
 very same types of information required to be provided under a disclosure law
 when investigating and prosecuting crimes such as fraud under a criminal
 statute.  But the penalty imposed at the conclusion of a criminal prosecution
 is jail or a fine.  The only penalty imposed for accurate *1519 revelation
 of information pursuant to a disclosure law is that a potential contributor,
 upon learning of the information, may decide not to contribute.  Clearwater
 contends that the penalty of noncontribution is less intrusive than the penalty
 of jail or a fine.  As the Fifth Circuit states, "It is difficult to see what
 less intrusive alternative there could be to a disclosure law."  Houston,
 689 F.2d at 550.
  Clearwater claims that hierarchial religious organizations would become a law
 unto themselves if they were immune from laws such as Clearwater's charitable
 solicitation ordinance.  Clearwater further contends that the private statement
 provision of the Clearwater ordinance provides for the exemption of
 organizations that solicit only from members or on their own premises, and that
 if an organization requires a hierarchial tenet of secrecy, then members can
 simply ignore the private statement.  Section 100.02(3) of Ordinance 3479-84
 reads as follows:
  Section 100.02 Exemptions.
   (3) If a charitable organization does not want to disclose publicly the
 information required by the statements described in Section 100.03 regarding
 the solicitation of funds from members of the charitable organization, it may
 exclude this information from the statements required by Section 100.03 if:
   (a) it indicates on the statement required by Section 100.03 that
 information about solicitation of funds from members of the charitable
 organization has been excluded, and
   (b) it prepares a private statement at least annually that contains all of
 the information required by the statements described in Section 100.03 for
 the solicitation of funds from members of the charitable organization that is
 not reported in the statements required by Section 100.03, which is signed
 under oath by the individual described in subparagraph 1(c) of Section
 100.03, and
   (c) it maintains the records and documents that are necessary to complete
 this private statement for a period of three years from the date of each
 statement, and together with the private statement, makes them reasonably
 available for inspection by every member of the charitable organization.
  The Court examined the history of Clearwater Ordinance 3479-84 to
 determine the origin of the private statement provision.  The Court found that
 Ordinance No. 3091-83, the predecessor of Ordinance 3479-84, exempted
 solicitation from members and on organization premises.  The applicable
 provision of the original ordinance read:
   Section 100.02 Exemptions.
   (1) Notwithstanding the foregoing, a charitable organization shall be exempt
 from the provision of this chapter (a) if it does not receive contributions
 from more than 20 persons;  or (b) all of its functions, including fund raising
 activities, are carried on by persons who are unpaid for their services;  or if
 no part of the organizations assets or income inure to the benefit of or is
 paid to any officer or member;  or if the solicitation is in the form of a
 donation or collection that occurred within the membership of the charitable
 organization;  or if the charitable organization does not raise or receive
 contributions from the public ...
   Section 100.01 Definitions.
   (5) The term "member" shall mean any person regularly attending or
 participating in a charitable organization.
  When this Court, in its order of March 28, 1984, found that Ordinance 3091-83
 was unconstitutional, the Court addressed the membership exemption:
   Clearwater Ordinance 3091-83 exempts those churches which limit their
 solicitations to those who regularly attend or participate in religious
 services (Section 100.01(5)).  Churches which obtain contributions from
 members who participate in church services on a non-regular or episodic basis,
 as well as churches which do not offer, encourage, or require regular
 attendance or regular participation of their members are not exempt.  Thus a
 stable church membership requiring regular attendance need not be affected by
 this ordinance;  however, a church whose membership is *1520 growing and
 actively engaged in proselytizing and fund raising falls under the regulatory
 scheme of this ordinance.
   How can a church whose congregation or group of members is growing, ever, at
 any given time, indicate to civil authority the number of "members" it has in
 regular attendance or as participants in the organization?
   If a drunk were to stagger into a church and "be saved" and then indicate an
 intention to dedicate his life to its purposes through regular attendance at
 that church, would he be a "member"?
   There is absolutely no showing of any compelling state interest being
 furthered by the parameters of the limited membership exemption of this
 ordinance.  This ordinance not only implies a religious preference, its mere
 presence could foster a stagnation of religious practice in Clearwater by
 impacting on growing congregations and forestalling larger, more organized
 churches from continuing to seek new members as well.
  Clearwater amended its ordinance to include organizations that solicited from
 members and only on their premises, but provided a private statement provision
 to allow organizations that solicited only from members or only their premises
 to opt out of the disclosure requirement.
  The comparable membership exemption provision in the Houston ordinance
 cited by Scientology throughout its memorandum was also found unconstitutional
 by the trial court judge, but for another reason.  Houston, 689 F.2d at
 553.  The Houston judge ruled that the phrase "exempting organization or
 associations" if they solicit from their own "members" was constitutionally
 infirm because the terms were not defined.  The judge pointed out that the
 "concept of membership in a religion eludes objective definition."
  After the trial judge ruled the Houston exemption clause unconstitutional
 because it was vague, Houston did not amend its ordinance as Clearwater did.
 Instead, Houston appealed the trial court's decision and the appellate judge
 reversed, pointing out that the term "organization and member" are commonly
 understood and that the phrase was not vague.  Therefore, the Houston ordinance
 contains an exemption provision for organizations that solicit from members
 only while the Clearwater ordinance contains an optional private statement
 provision that accomplishes the same purpose.  Neither ordinance contains a
 provision exempting religious organizations.
  In its brief to the Eleventh Circuit, Clearwater claims that Scientology
 actively participated in the early drafting of the ordinance and "when an
 earlier draft of the ordinance exempted solicitations by a religious
 organization from its own members, they [Scientology] said this discriminated
 against groups which solicited from the public.  When the membership exemption
 was removed to accommodate their view, they said now the ordinance intruded on
 religion because it regulated the relationships between a religious
 organization and its members, and the only permissible regulation was of
 relations between a religious organization and the public."  Brief for
 Appellees at 24, Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization v. City of
 Clearwater, 777 F.2d 598, 606 (11th Cir.1985) (Nos. 84-3574, et al.).
  [26] Even though the availability of the private statement option appears to
 refute Scientology's argument that the Clearwater ordinance is unconstitutional
 because it fails to exempt organizations that solicit only from their members,
 the Court will address Scientology's other contentions, and will assume,
 arguendo, that the private statement option is not available.
  Scientology cites no case law that directly supports its position that failure
 to exempt solicitations by charitable organizations of their own members on
 their own premises invalidates the ordinance.  Scientology claims that
 Houston, 689 F.2d at 553, supports its view and claims that the Houston
 Court upheld the Houston ordinance because it exempted both solicitation by
 organizations of their members and solicitation on the organizations's own
 premises.  Id. at 556.  The Court disagrees with Scientology's reading of
 Houston:  the Houston Court upheld the Houston ordinance *1521 over
 ISKCON's objection that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it exempted
 members on their premises, thereby favoring institutionalized religions (which
 had members and premises on which to solicit) over uninstitutionalized
 religions.  Houston did not imply that a statute requiring registration by
 organizations that solicited only from members would be unconstitutional.
 Scientology's reliance on the Houston ordinance does not support its argument
 on this issue.
  Scientology also cites National Foundation v. City of Fort Worth,
 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.1969) as support for its position.  Again, the Court finds
 that Scientology's reliance is misplaced.  The Fort Worth Court upheld an
 ordinance that exempted organizations soliciting only from members as
 constitutional;  Fort Worth did not imply that an ordinance that did not
 exempt such organizations would be unconstitutional.
  Scientology's reliance on Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 is not clear.
 Under Watson, courts will not interfere in ecclesiastical disputes.  The
 present situation does not involve an ecclesiastical dispute.  Therefore, the
 Court finds that neither National foundation nor Watson support
 Scientology's claim for invalidation of the ordinance.
  The circumstances under which the Houston and the Clearwater ordinance were
 enacted differ greatly.  The purpose of the Houston ordinance was to protect
 the public.  Judge Wisdom stated, "During this time [the past twenty years] as
 is reflected in the case law, some Krishna followers and others soliciting
 funds for charitable purposes, particularly in airports, parks, and public
 gatherings, have pursued their overzealous solicitation to the point of causing
 undue annoyance of the public.  Many local governmental authorities have
 reacted by adopting regulations requiring the licensing of solicitors for
 charitable or religious purposes."  That the Houston ordinance "exempt[ed] from
 disclosure requirements the internal communications between members of an
 organization or association" is not surprising.  Houston, 689 F.2d at 553.
 "Such communications are not related to the governmental purposes of the
 ordinance," protecting the public.  Id.
  This Court cited Houston for that proposition in Church of Scientology
 v. City of Clearwater, Civ. No. 84-96 (Slip Opinion 3/28/84, p. 6).  The Court
 pointed out that regulations such as those in the Houston ordinance should be
 limited to solicitation of the public in public places because activity on the
 organization's premises could not disturb the public and because there would
 not be a danger of misrepresentation by the organization when it solicited from
 its own members.
  Many charitable solicitation cases involve ordinances designed to protect the
 public, and not members of the organization, against fraudulent solicitation.
 See, e.g., Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826.  In Schaumburg the
 Court said, The Village's interests "in protecting the public from fraud, crime
 and undue annoyance" are "indeed substantial ... Efforts to promote disclosure
 of the finances of charitable organizations also may assist in preventing fraud
 by informing the public."  Id. at 636-8, 100 S.Ct. at 836.  That such
 ordinances exempt charitable organizations' solicitation from members or on
 their premises is logical.
  [27] However, when the purpose of an ordinance is to protect the members of
 the organization as well as the public against fraud, exempting solicitation
 from members and on the organization's premises would thwart the purpose of the
 statute.  The purpose of the Clearwater ordinance is to prevent fraud against
 the members as well as the public.  Therefore, the ordinance logically includes
 disclosure from organizations soliciting only from members, although the
 Clearwater ordinance provides an option by private statement to exclude such
 organizations.  Scientology claims that an ordinance that requires disclosure
 but fails to exempt organization that solicit only from members is
 unconstitutional on its face, even when the ordinance provides an alternative
 private statement that allows the organization to opt out of the disclosure
 requirements, because the ordinance impacts its freedom of association *1522
 by interfering with intra-member relations.
  This Court has evaluated Scientology's claim that the ordinance
 violates associational freedom and finds that Scientology's claim is without
 merit.  First, the ordinance does not directly punish group membership or
 association, See Noto v. United, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98, 81 S.Ct. 1517, 1520-
 21, 6 L.Ed.2d 836 (1961);  Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 86 S.Ct. 1238,
 16 L.Ed.2d 321 (1966), nor does the ordinance regulate internal activities such
 as whom to include as members and which nonmembers to invite to take part in
 the group processes.  See March Fong Eu, Secretary of State of California v.
 San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 109 S.Ct.
 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989).
  Nor does the ordinance withhold a privilege or benefit from the members of a
 group or association or compel disclosure of a group's membership or an
 individual's associations.  See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
 Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 83 S.Ct. 889, 9 L.Ed.2d 929 (1963);  Greene v.
 McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959);  NAACP v.
 Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-65, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172-73, 2
 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958).
  Since there is no ecclesiastical dispute in this situation, the ordinance
 cannot interfere in a hierarchial religious decision regarding such things as
 control of church property, appointments to church positions and discipline.
 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 710, 96 S.Ct. at 2381
 (citing Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727);  Paul, 819 F.2d 875.
  The Court also examined the applicability of the overbreadth doctrine to the
 present situation.  The overbreadth doctrine will not apply unless the
 protected acts affected by the statute are substantial when compared with the
 law's legitimate applications to unprotected acts, even when the acts in
 question are pure speech.  See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 770-71, 102 S.Ct. at
 3361-62.
  The Court finds that the ordinance is not overbroad when analyzed in light of
 first amendment freedom of association caselaw.  Consequently, the Court finds
 that Scientology's overbreadth claim is without merit and denies Scientology's
 motion for summary judgement on this issue.
                                Refund Provisions
  Scientology also alleges that the refund provisions found in section
 100.05(1)(f) and (g) of Ordinance 3479-84 interfere with intra-member
 relations.  Sections 100.05(1)(f) and (g) read as follows:
   Section 100.05 Prohibited Acts.
   No charitable organization subject to the provisions of this chapter, or no
 agent, employee or officer of any such organization, shall engage in any of the
 following prohibited acts:
   (f) promising any person that the proceeds of a solicitation of funds will be
 refunded upon request, and thereafter willfully failing within 60 days to make
 a refund that has been requested in writing;
   (g) promising any person that refunds of the proceeds of any solicitation of
 funds will be made upon request without providing such person, at the time such
 representation is made, with a written statement of the terms and conditions
 upon which refunds are made;  provided, however, that any statement made in
 good faith at the time is not prohibited by this section.
  Scientology contends that the provisions unconstitutionally interfere with
 their exchange doctrine relating to payment for auditing and training
 sessions.  However, Scientology's concern is moot since payments for auditing
 and training are no longer tax deductible charitable contributions under
 Internal Revenue Code s 170.  Hernandez, 109 S.Ct. 2136.  The
 Hernandez court found that payments for auditing are part of
   a quintessential quid pro quo exchange;  in exchange for their money,
 those being audited receive an identifiable service, namely auditing and
 training sessions.  Id.  "Scientology establishes fixed price schedules for
 auditing and training sessions in each branch church;  it calibrates particular
 prices to auditing or training *1523 sessions of particular lengths and
 levels of sophistication;  it returns a refund if auditing and training
 services go unperformed [less an administrative discount];  it distributes
 account cards on which persons who have paid money to Scientology can monitor
 prepaid services they have not yet used;  and it categorically bars provision
 of auditing or training sessions for free."  Id. at 2145.  Scientology
 promotes auditing through newspaper, magazine, and radio advertisements, free
 lectures, free personality tests and leaflets.  Id. at 2141.  Scientology
 encourages prepayment and awards prepayment with a 5% discount.  Id.  A
 Scientology direction states:  "Price cuts are forbidden under any guise ... 1.
 PROCESSING MAY NEVER BE GIVEN AWAY BY AN ORG. processing is too expensive to
 deliver ... 9. ONLY FULLY CONTRACTED STAFF IS AWARDED FREE SERVICE, AND THIS IS
 DONE BY INVOICE AND LEGAL NOTE WHICH BECOMES DUE AND PAYABLE IF THE CONTRACT IS
 BROKEN."  Id. at 2145 n. 9 (citing Graham v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. at
 577-578, n. 5).
  Because payments for auditing and training are no longer tax deductible
 charitable contributions, these payments are no longer covered by the
 Clearwater ordinance.  Therefore, Scientology's arguments about this issue are
 not applicable.
  [28] The Court recognizes that Scientology and other organizations may offer
 refunds unrelated to an organizational doctrine such as the doctrine of
 exchange.  No regulation could require that an organization offer a refund.
 However, when a voluntary offer of a refund is made at the time of
 solicitation, a regulation can constitutionally require that a written
 affirmation also be given.  See Indiana Voluntary Firemen's Association, 700
 F.Supp. at 442, 447 (citing Riley v. National Federation of The Blind of
 North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988))
 (ordinance requiring written affirmation of disclosure statements made at the
 time of solicitation upheld, even when the disclosure was a compelled statement
 regarding the solicitor's professional status).  By analogy, Section
 100.05(1)(g) of Clearwater Ordinance 3479-84 is constitutional.  Section
 100.05(1)(g) requires written affirmation only if a promise of a refund is
 voluntarily made.
  [29] Likewise, Section 100.05(1)(f), making it unlawful to willfully fail
 to honor a written request for a promised refund within sixty days is
 constitutional.  A municipality has an interest in protecting against refund
 fraud similar to the interest a city has in insuring that funds raised actually
 find their way to the organization for which the solicitation was given.
 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306, 60 S.Ct. at 904.  Regulating to protect against
 the latter is constitutional.  Analogously, regulating to protect against the
 former should also be constitutional.
  Sections 100.05(1)(f) and (g) do not mandate excessive
 entanglement.  They do not require surveillance or inspection.  Clearwater
 would have no involvement with these provisions unless ten bona fide sworn
 complaints were filed with the City Attorney regarding the organization's
 policy and an investigation ensued.  The ordinance does not require regulatory
 interaction that inquires into religious doctrine, nor delegation of state
 power to a religious body, nor detailed monitoring and close administrative
 contact between secular and religious bodies.  Hernandez, 109 S.Ct. at 2147
 (citations omitted).  See Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. 290, 105
 S.Ct. 1953.  A situation similar to on-site continuing inspection of day-to-day
 operations is necessary before entanglement occurs.  Swaggart, 110 S.Ct.
 688.
  This Court finds that Scientology's arguments regarding the invalidity of
 Sections 100.05(1)(f) and (g), the "refund provisions" are not persuasive
 and denies summary judgement to Scientology on this issue.
             Prohibiting the Use of a Scheme or Artifice To Defraud
  Scientology also alleges that the City Attorney's power to investigate and
 prosecute under Section 100.05(1)(c) of Ordinance 3479-84 is an
 unconstitutional infringement of the relationship between churches and
 *1524 their members.  Section 100.05(1)(c) prohibits the "use of any
 scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain property by means of any false
 statement or representation"  Scientology further claims that civil authorities
 cannot "delve into the details of religious practice for the purpose of judging
 its veracity or belief."
  Clearwater contends that charitable and religious groups are subject to law,
 and that enforcement officials have the power to investigate infractions by
 obtaining documents and information pursuant to subpoenas and production
 orders.  Clearwater further alleges that law enforcement officials have both
 the power and the responsibility of investigating fraud complaints.
  [30] While this Court agrees with Scientology's claim that officials cannot
 determine the veracity or benefits of a religious belief, the Court does not
 agree with Scientology's claim that officials cannot investigate allegations of
 fraud or other unlawful conduct because the investigation would
 unconstitutionally interfere with the relationship between churches and their
 members.  The United States Supreme Court, in Employment Division held that
 religious organizations are not exempt from civil and criminal laws and pointed
 out that "the nation cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid,
 as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not
 protect an interest of the highest order."  Courts have sustained the power of
 officials to investigate whether religious organization have violated the law,
 See Coates, 692 F.2d 629;  Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096;  United States v.
 Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1157, 102 S.Ct.
 1031, 71 L.Ed.2d 315 (1982).  The Court finds Scientology's arguments
 unconvincing and denies summary judgment to Scientology on this issue.
                           Full Disclosure Requirement
  [31] Scientology alleges the full disclosure requirement allows
 Clearwater to dictate a particular form of organizational government because
 hierarchically organized groups do not permit all members to know such matters
 as the salaries of officials or the aggregate assets of the organization, and
 the members would acquire such knowledge under the disclosure requirement.
 Scientology also contends that by allowing the City Attorney to investigate on
 the basis of ten bona fide sworn complaints, the ordinance allows dissident
 members or factions of the church the power of the state to compel church
 leaders to govern their churches in accordance with civil authority's
 standards.  Scientology asserts that because the City Attorney can subpoena the
 private records and statements, Scientology is forced to maintain records, even
 if it chooses to provide a private statement.  Ultimately these records could
 become public under the investigatory powers of the City Attorney.
  Clearwater contends that organizations requiring secrecy because of hierarchal
 organization can use the private statement option;  the ordinance does not
 require that members read the private statement or the supporting records.  In
 addition, Clearwater points out that organizations are protected against
 disclosure because they can claim hardship rather than disclose the information
 on their registration statements.  If a Certificate is denied, organizations
 can continue to solicit.  Clearwater must initiate a court proceeding within 10
 days to determine whether or not the Certificate was validly denied.
 Clearwater emphasizes that Section 100.03(4) states:
   In such judicial proceedings, a charitable organization may also raise the
 question to the court that furnishing a specific item or items of information
 or explanations under this chapter constitutes a special or unique hardship to
 the charitable organization, and the court shall have jurisdiction in such
 review process, upon concluding that disclosure constitutes a unique or special
 hardship, to dispense with the furnishing of that information or explanation,
 so that a Certificate of Registration can be issued.
  The Court, not the City Clerk or other official determines whether the
 disclosure constitutes a unique or special hardship.  Therefore, no City
 official has discretion as *1525 to the hardship standard.  As
 Scientology points out, if the city official determines whether the hardship
 standard applies, the hardship standard is vague.  (Plaintiff's 1988 Support
 Memorandum, p. 45) (citing Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 104 S.Ct. 2839).
 Clearwater contends that because the judicial review process built into
 Ordinance 3479-84 mandates that a Court determine whether information is
 required or not, organizations are protected from unconstitutional disclosure
 of harmful information.  See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct.
 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965);  Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975).
  Further, Clearwater points out that the City Attorney, as a member of the
 legal profession, is competent to distinguish between bona fide and frivolous
 complaints and is ethically required to uphold the standards of the legal
 profession.  Clearwater contends that because ten complainants must prove harm
 before the City Attorney instigates an investigation, dissident members could
 not impact the organization.  However, Clearwater also points out that if ten
 people have valid complaints, whether they are dissidents or not, they deserve
 the protection of the legal system.
  Clearwater further argues that an ordinance can constitutionally
 require organizations to maintain records.  See Tony and Susan Alamo, 471
 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953 (religious organizations not exempt from secular
 governmental activity such as fire inspections, building and zoning
 regulations, or the recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
 Act).  See also Swaggart, 110 S.Ct. 688.  However, Clearwater points out
 that records may never become public even if ten bona fide sworn complaints are
 filed, the complainants prove harm, and the city attorney instigates an
 investigation.  The City Attorney's subpoena power under the ordinance,
 Section 100.06, can only be enforced through the courts, and would be
 subject to self-incrimination limitations.  Granting Subpoena Power to
 Community Relations Board, 075-11 Annual Report of the Att'y Gen., 16, 17
 (1975).
  Clearwater also contends that Scientology has not changed the structure of the
 organization despite disclosure resulting from various lawsuits and that
 Scientology remains a flourishing organization with a large income and
 extensive assets despite disclosure.  See Church of Scientology of
 California v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310 (initial 1975 tax case, decided in
 1984 involved year long audit, three or four full-time agents;  review of
 approximately two million items including financial records, policy issues,
 membership fees and descriptions, contracts for services and employment,
 organizational charts, newsletters and disseminations pieces, and similar
 records illustrating organizational activities and financial practices, a
 fifty-one day trial spread out over a year covering Scientology's corporate and
 management structure, financial activities, banking practices, dissemination
 practices, techniques, beliefs and relationship to an alleged trust).  Id at
 26, 50.
  The Court finds that Scientology's arguments are not convincing.  The
 Clearwater ordinance has built in safeguards to prevent unnecessary
 disclosure:  the private statement, required judicial review, and the required
 application of legal standards such as basing an investigation only on bona
 fide complaints and finding probable cause prior to prosecution, Therefore, the
 Court denies summary judgment to Scientology on this issue.
 WHETHER THE RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS OF THE CLEARWATER ORDINANCE VIOLATE THE
                              ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE.
  States may not make laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
 one religion over another.  Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504.  In most
 cases, a law must satisfy each part of a three-part test to withstand an
 Establishment Clause challenge:  (1) the law must have a secular legislative
 purpose;  (2) the principal or primary effect of the law must neither advance
 nor inhibit religion;  and (3) the law must not foster "an excessive government
 *1526 entanglement with religion."  Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105.
  [32] Regulatory entanglement claims arise when parties seek to show that
 enforcement of a law would create excessive entanglement.  Tony and Susan
 Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953.  Day-to-day intrusion and
 excessive surveillance are necessary before excessive regulatory entanglement
 occurs.  On-site inspections of appellant's evangelistic crusades, lengthy on-
 site audits, examination of appellant's books and records, and threats of
 criminal prosecution, administrative and judicial proceedings are not excessive
 entanglement.  Swaggart, 110 S.Ct. 688.
  Scientology claims that the recordkeeping requirements of Ordinance
 3479-84 are broad and intrusive and would result in excessive regulatory
 entanglement with Scientology's affairs.  Scientology further claims that
 Clearwater has the burden of showing that implementation of the ordinance will
 not infringe on and entangle it in Scientology's affairs.  Acorn v. City of
 Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 817 (8th Cir.1973) and Braintree Baptist Temple v.
 Holbrook Public Schools, 616 F.Supp. 81, 90 (D.C.Mass.1984).
  Scientology further claims that the under the ordinance, Clearwater would have
 to "engage in 'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing ... surveillance' "
 of the organization.  It further claims that mere information gathering has the
 potential for substantially infringing the exercise of first amendment rights
 and cites NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d
 533 (1979) for this proposition.
  Scientology also contends that courts in Sylte v. The Metropolitan
 Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 493 F.Supp. 313 (M.D.Tenn.1980)
 and Taylor v. City of Knoxville, 566 F.Supp. 925 (E.D.Tenn.1983) struck down
 ordinances containing recordkeeping and disclosure provisions virtually
 identical to those in the Clearwater Ordinance because they resulted in
 impermissible entanglement with church affairs.  According to Scientology, just
 the requirement of disclosure amounts to entanglement.  (Plaintiff's 1988
 Support Memorandum, p. 38).
  Clearwater contends that the informational requirements of the Clearwater
 ordinance do not place an undue burden on any charitable or religious
 organization.  As evidence, Clearwater cites examples of organizations that
 complied with the previous ordinance (Defendants' Support Memorandum, pp. 28-30
 and Exhibits), the opinion of John O'Connor, legal counsel for March of Dimes
 (Id. at 30 and exhibits), sample charitable organization disclosure reports,
 and certified copies of organizations' registration statements filed in other
 jurisdictions.  (Id. at 30-35 and Exhibits).  Clearwater also cites to
 National Attorneys General, State Regulation of Charitable Trusts and
 Solicitations (1977), the Internal Revenue Code, and statistics regarding other
 municipalities that have adopted charitable regulation ordinances to support
 its contention.  (Defendants' Support Memorandum, pp. 36-40 and Exhibits 18 and
 25).
  Further, according to Clearwater, there is no ongoing surveillance that
 produces excessive entanglement because the city only becomes involved if there
 are ten bona fide complaints and an investigation ensues.  The City has no day-
 to-day or on-site involvement with the charitable organization.  See Tony &
 Susan Alamo Foundation, 471 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953;  Swaggart, 110 S.Ct.
 688.
  [33] The Court analyzed the cases cited by Scientology to support its
 contention that the Clearwater ordinance would create entanglement if
 enforced.  The Court does not find the cases persuasive.  First, while
 Scientology claims that NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 99
 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979) held that mere information-gathering sought
 by government officials is impermissible in the religious context, this Court
 reads the case to stand for the proposition that the National Labor Relations
 Act did not confer jurisdiction for the NLRB to certify unions as bargaining
 agents for lay teachers in church-operated schools.  The NLRB Court pointed
 out the chilling effect that the requirement *1527 of bargaining would
 impose on the exercise of the bishops' control over the religious mission of
 the schools.
  The Court also considered Sylte v. Metropolitan Government of
 Nashville and Davidson County, 493 F.Supp. 313 and distinguishes the case on
 the facts.  The Sylte Court struck down the Nashville ordinance because a
 Nashville solicitation Board could investigate the affairs of any person
 soliciting.  The Board had the power to "have access to and inspect books,
 records, papers, and facilities of applicants or of anyone making solicitation
 in the area of Metropolitan Government."  The Board could also delegate their
 power to any person approved by the Board.  In its investigation, the Board
 could hold hearings and at the hearing inquire into the need to further the
 religious beliefs, and ask for information "as the Board might reasonably
 require to determine whether the solicitation is in the interest and not
 inimical to the public welfare."  The ordinance set out no standards by which
 the Board was to make determinations.  The Board could investigate "where
 questions arose," and no provision was made for a judicial hearing.  The Board
 had "unfettered power to obstruct the collection of funds for religious
 purposes."  Id. at 319.  Sylte is not relative to the present case
 because the Clearwater ordinance provides for a judicial hearing prior to
 denial of a Certificate of Registration;  there is no board with unlimited
 discretion to investigate anyone soliciting "when questions arise";  and the
 City Attorney's investigatory power cannot be delegated.  Therefore Sylte
 does not support Scientology's contention that excessive entanglement would
 follow the enforcement of the Clearwater ordinance.
  The facts in Taylor v. City of Knoxville, 566 F.Supp. 925 also distinguish
 that case from the present controversy.  The Taylor Court addressed issues
 similar to those addressed in Sylte.  In Taylor, a Board had authority:
   to investigate the affairs of any person soliciting for religious purposes
 under a certificate ... and to make public their findings in order that the
 public may be fully informed as to the affairs of any said person.  Said person
 shall make available to the Board ... or any person designated by the Board ...
 all books, records, or other information ...
  Unlike the Clearwater ordinance, the Taylor ordinance set up no pre-
 investigation prerequisites such as ten bona fide complaints, and the ordinance
 provided no procedural safeguards such as requiring judicial process for
 enforcement of subpoenas.  Taylor does not support Scientology's contention
 that excessive entanglement would follow the enforcement of the Clearwater
 ordinance.
  This Court studied Scientology's interpretation of deposition testimony
 offered in support of its contention that the Clearwater ordinance creates
 excessive entanglement.  (Plaintiff's 1988 Support Memorandum, p. 38).  The
 Court does not find Scientology's interpretation persuasive.  For example,
 Scientology claims that, "according to the City Clerk [Mrs. Williams], she
 might refuse to grant a solicitation certificate altogether unless, in her
 view, the intended use of the funds furthers a legitimate charitable purpose of
 the church."  (William's Deposition 74-76).  The Court disagrees with
 Scientology's interpretation of Mrs. Williams' statements and their effect on
 the certification granting process.
  Scientology appears to assert that because the Clearwater ordinance
 requires disclosure, entanglement will occur.  The Court does not find this
 argument persuasive.  Entanglement requires specific actions such as on-going
 surveillance and day-to-day on site inspection.  Therefore, the Court denies
 summary judgment to Scientology on this issue.
  C. WHETHER THE CLEARWATER ORDINANCE IS VAGUE AND CONFERS EXCESSIVE DISCRETION
 ON OFFICIALS FOR ENFORCEMENT
  [34] Vagueness is concerned with the clarity of a law.  A law must be drawn
 with sufficient clarity so that people know the conduct they must take to avoid
 the sanction of the particular law.  "[A]ny law is unconstitutionally vague if
 'people of *1528 common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
 and differ as to its application.' "  Connally v. General Construction Co.,
 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).  Under procedural
 due process, a statute is not constitutionally fair if it fails to give enough
 information so that people can avoid unlawful conduct.  "The applicable
 standard, however, is not one of wholly consistent academic definitions of
 abstract terms.  It is, rather, the practical criterion of fair notice to those
 to whom the statute is directed.  The particular context is all important."
 American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412, 70 S.Ct.
 674, 691, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950).
  In addition, a law must provide explicit standards for those who apply it to
 prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  Grayned v. City of
 Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222
 (1972).  "A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
 policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
 with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."
 Id.  However, "[T]he very nature of due process negates any concept of
 inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."
 Liberman v. Schesventer, 447 F.Supp. 1355 (M.D.Fla.1978) (citing
 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6
 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)).  Judicial review before action is taken meets the
 requirements of procedural due process.  Freedman, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct.
 734;  Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239,
 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975).
  [35] Scientology alleges that Ordinance 3479-84 is unconstitutionally vague
 and that it vests excessively broad and undefined discretion in its enforcing
 officials.  Scientology provides no facts or argument to support its assertion
 that the ordinance fails to provide persons a reasonable opportunity to know
 what is prohibited.
  To support its argument of broad and undefined discretion, Scientology once
 again uses the Houston ordinance as a yardstick for measuring the
 constitutionality of the Clearwater ordinance.  Scientology claims that the
 Houston ordinance does not confer excessive discretion on city officials, but
 claims that Sections 100.03(2) and (3) and 100.05(1)(b) of the Clearwater
 ordinance do.  Scientology claims that the Clearwater "issuing official has
 broad authority to engage in selective and discriminatory enforcement and to
 interfere with protected activities in several significant respects."
 Scientology claims that the Clearwater provisions give the Clearwater City
 Clerk and City Attorney authority to "determine the sufficiency of registration
 statements, and in the case of the City Attorney, the truth or falsity of
 information contained there."  The Clearwater provisions read as follows:
   Section 100.03. Registration with City Clerk.
   (2) After a review of the registration statement to determine its compliance
 with this section, and within ten (10) working days of the receipt of the
 registration statement, the City Clerk shall either issue a Certificate of
 Registration, as provided in this section, or notify the person registering
 that the registration statement does not comply with the requirements of this
 section and specifically point out what information or explanation has not been
 furnished that is required before a Certificate of Registration will be issued.
   (3) If for any reason the City Clerk refuses to issue a Certificate of
 Registration to any charitable organization that has filed a registration
 statement and the charitable organization disagrees with this decision, the
 City of Clearwater shall bear the burden of initiating, within ten working days
 of the denial, a judicial proceeding in the form of a declaratory judgment
 action pursuant to Chapter 86, Florida Statutes, to review the City Clerk's
 refusal to grant a registration certificate.  In such proceeding, the
 charitable organization seeking the Certificate of Registration shall be
 considered a party in interest.  Unless or until the circuit court rules that
 the City Clerk has properly refused to issue a Certificate of
 *1529 Registration, the charitable organization may solicit funds without
 compliance with the registration provisions of this chapter.
   100.05. Prohibited Acts.
   No charitable organization subject to the provisions of this chapter, or no
 agent, employee, or officer of any such organization, shall engage in any of
 the following prohibited acts:
   1. (b) wilful failure to file any statement required by this chapter or
 knowingly making false statements or providing false information in these
 statements.
  The comparable provision in the Houston Ordinance, which Scientology claims
 does not confer excessive discretion is Section 37-45.
                             Houston City Ordinance
   Section 37-45. Issuance of Certificate of Registration.
   After a review of the registration statement to determine its compliance with
 Section 37-43 above, and within ten (10) working days of the receipt of the
 registration statement, the City Tax Assessor and Collector shall either issue
 a Certificate of Registration, as provided in Section 37-47, or notify the
 person registering that the registration statement does not comply with the
 requirements of Section 37-43 above and specifically point out what information
 or explanation has not been furnished that is required before a Certificate of
 Registration can be issued.
  The Court compared the provisions and found no significant differences between
 the discretion the city officials have to approve a Certificate of Registration
 under either ordinance.  The Clearwater ordinance appears to offer more
 protection to an individual applying for a Certificate of Registration because
 under Section 100.03(3) only a court can deny a Certificate of Registration.
  In addition, Scientology alleges that the Houston ordinance was upheld partly
 because of the removal, by amendment, of the investigatory and prosecutorial
 powers of the city officials.  Scientology states:  "It was the removal, by
 amendment, of the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Houston
 Ordinance ..." that was critical to the Court's holding the ordinance
 constitutional.  (Plaintiff's 1988 Supporting Memorandum, p. 40).  Scientology
 claims that the removal of the following language removed investigatory and
 prosecutorial power:  [The city tax assessor and collector shall] "examine the
 application and to make such investigation as he may deem necessary to
 ascertain the truth and the facts and information set out therein."
 Houston, 689 F.2d at 543.
  This Court does not find any prosecutorial powers inherent in this
 statement, or that the Houston ordinance contained any prosecutorial powers at
 any time.  Prosecutorial or enforcement powers were not part of the Houston
 ordinance because Houston has a separate enforcement provision for city
 ordinances.  (Statement of City Attorney's Office, Houston).
  However, some solicitation ordinances do contain enforcement provisions.  For
 example, the Court in Indiana Voluntary Firemen's Association, 700 F.Supp.
 at 425 upheld the following enforcement provisions in a solicitation regulation
 ordinance:
   First, the attorney general may bring an action to enjoin a violation of the
 statute--and to receive such injunctive relief, the state 'is not required to
 establish irreparable harm but only a violation of a statue or that the
 requested order promotes the public interest.'  Ind.Code s 23-7-8(c).
 Second, for each violation of the Statute, the state may be awarded civil
 penalties of up to five hundred dollars ($500).  Id.  Third, and most
 significantly, any person who 'knowingly or intentionally' fails to make the
 disclosures prescribed in section 23-7-8-6 thereby commits a Class A
 infraction, subjecting that person to a possible adverse judgment of up to ten
 thousand dollars ($10,000) plus costs.  Ind.Code s 23-7-8-8(d).
  Scientology also contends that Section 100.06 of the Clearwater ordinance
 gives the City Attorney extraordinarily broad *1530 powers to investigate
 and prosecute violations of the ordinance, including use of subpoenas to compel
 the production of persons or documents, and the institution of legal
 proceedings.  Section 100.06 reads:
   Section 100.06. Power of the City Attorney to Investigate and Prosecute
 Prohibited Acts of Charitable Organizations.
   1. The City Attorney shall investigate alleged violations of this chapter
 only after ten individuals file separate bona fide complaints in writing, sworn
 to or affirmed, with the City Attorney, setting forth facts demonstrating that
 one or more of the prohibited acts set forth in Section 100.05 have been
 engaged in by the charitable organization and that the complaining party has
 been injured by each act or acts.
   2. The City Attorney, when conducting an investigation pursuant to
 subparagraph 1 shall have the power to subpoena any person, require the
 production of the records or documents described in Section 100.04 and the
 private statement and records or documents described in Section 100.01(3),
 and administer oaths.
   3. If the investigation conducted under subparagraph 1 demonstrates that
 probable cause exists to believe that a violation or violations under
 Section 100.05 exist, then the City Attorney shall institute an action to
 prosecute such violation or violations.
  Clearwater argues that Scientology's objection to the investigatory power of
 the City Attorney is frivolous because the City's law enforcement officer
 always determines whether to investigate suspected violations of law and how
 extensive an investigation should be.  Clearwater claims that the ordinance
 actually diminishes the City Attorney's power to investigate since the City
 Attorney cannot investigate alleged violations of the ordinance unless ten
 individuals file separate bona fide complaints setting forth facts showing that
 unlawful acts have been committed.  The ten complaints must be sworn to or
 affirmed.  A prosecution can be brought only after an investigation subsequent
 to the complaints demonstrates probable cause to believe there were
 violations.  Subpoenas issued by the City Attorney during an investigation are
 not self-executing.  The City Attorney must go to court to enforce them.
 Therefore, an organization can refuse to obey the subpoena unless ordered to
 comply by a neutral and detached court, and in court the organization can put
 forth any and all of its statutory and constitutional arguments to attempt to
 dissuade the tribunal from enforcing the subpoena.
  Clearwater points out that in defining action that constitutes a
 violation of the ordinance, the ordinance explicitly states, in almost all
 instances that the violative act must be willful or knowing.  In the other
 instances violations are acts that are inherently willful or knowing (such as
 using a scheme or artifice to defraud by means of false representations).
 Section 100.05(1)(c).
  Clearwater points out that the Supreme Court has held that government " 'has
 broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute."  Wayte v. United States, 470
 U.S. 598, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530-31, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985).  See also Newman
 v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.Cir.1967).  " '[S]o long as the
 prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
 defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute ... generally
 rests entirely in his discretion.' "  Wayte, 105 S.Ct. at 1531 (quoting
 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d
 604 (1978)).
  Clearwater further alleges that charitable and religious organizations cannot
 validly claim that their first amendment rights of speech or religions are a
 bar to laws requiring them to keep information and to disclose it to the public
 and to government investigators acting pursuant to subpoena.  Clearwater
 contends that if the first amendment did bar such information and disclosure
 requirements, charities and religions would be above the law and would be able
 to commit violations with impunity from detection, punishment and deterrence.
 Government, as the Supreme Court has said, would, "exist only in name."
 Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145.
  *1531 The Court finds Clearwater's arguments persuasive.  Therefore, the
 Court denies summary judgment to Scientology on this issue.
  D. WHETHER THE CLEARWATER ORDINANCE VIOLATES FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEES
 BECAUSE THE DEFINITION OF SOLICITING FUNDS INCLUDES THE SALE OF PRODUCTS UPON
 THE REPRESENTATION, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, THAT THE PROCEEDS WILL BE USED FOR A
 CHARITABLE PURPOSE.
  [36] Clearwater Ordinance 3479-84 Section 100.01(2) reads:
   (2) The term "solicit funds" or "solicitation of funds" shall mean any
 request, within the City of Clearwater for the donation of money, property, or
 anything of value, or the pledge of a future donation of money, property, or
 anything of value;  or the selling or offering for sale of any property, real
 or person, tangible or intangible, whether of value or not, including, but not
 limited to, goods, books, pamphlets, tickets, publications or subscriptions to
 publications, or brochures, upon the representation, express or implied, that
 the proceeds of such sale will be used for a charitable purpose as such term is
 herein defined.  Expressly excluded from the meaning of "solicit funds" or
 "solicitation of funds" is any offer of membership in any charitable
 organization.  A solicitation of funds is complete when the solicitation is
 communicated to any individual then located within the corporate limits of the
 city.
  Scientology alleges that under this provision, "a charitable organization,
 such as a church, a social club, or a university book store may not sell a
 pamphlet, a book, a ticket to a theatrical production, or a magazine without
 obtaining a license in the form of a Certificate of Registration."
 (Plaintiff's 1988 Support Memorandum, p. 47).  Scientology also alleges that
 M.A. Galbraith, Clearwater City Attorney, in a deposition, indicated that "the
 requirement that a charitable organization register and obtain a certificate
 before selling a book or magazine applies whether or not the organization makes
 representations as to the use of the proceeds of the sale."  (Id.)
  Clearwater points out that the plain language of the provision refutes
 Scientology's statements.  Further, Clearwater contends that Scientology
 misrepresents the Galbraith deposition testimony (Galbraith dep., pp. 88-92) as
 to the sale of literature.
  Clearwater also contends that the provision does not censor content of the
 literature and is not a prior restraint.  Clearwater also reiterates the
 protection built in to the ordinance itself:  the ordinance provides an
 exemption from the financial reporting requirement if the charitable
 organization collected $10,000 or less from no more than twenty people during
 the preceding twelve months;  the ordinance provides judicial review of any
 denial of a Certificate of Registrations;  and the ordinance provides that
 organizations can continue soliciting until a court denies a Certificate of
 Registration.
  The Court examined the Galbraith deposition and finds that the deposition
 testimony does not support Scientology's claim.  (Galbraith dep., pp. 88-92).
 The Court also compared the definition of "soliciting funds" in the Clearwater
 ordinance with a similar provision in the Houston ordinance.  Houston ordinance
 Section 37-41 reads:
   (a) The term "solicit funds" or "solicitation of funds" shall mean any
 request for the donation of money, property, or any thing of value, or the
 pledge of a future donation of money, property, or anything of value;  or the
 selling or offering for sale of any property, real or person, tangible or
 intangible whether of value or not, including, but not limited to, goods,
 books, pamphlets, tickets, publications, or brochures, upon the representation,
 express or implied, that the proceeds of such sale will be used for a
 charitable purpose as such term is herein defined.  Expressly excluded from the
 meaning of "solicit funds" or "solicitation of funds" is any offer of
 membership in any organization.  A solicitation of funds is complete when the
 solicitation *1532 is communicated to any individual located within the
 corporate limits of the city.
  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Houston ordinance, including
 this provision was constitutional.  This Court does not find that the
 Clearwater provision differs significantly from the Houston provision.
 Throughout all its Memoranda, Scientology has relied on the Houston ordinance.
 The Court relies on the Houston ordinance in this instance.  The Court finds
 Scientology's arguments unconvincing and denies summary judgment to Scientology
 on this issue.  Accordingly, it is
  ORDERED that Plaintiff CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE ORG. INC.'s motion
 for partial summary judgment against Defendants, CITY OF CLEARWATER, et al. on
 the issue of standing is granted;  it is further
  ORDERED that Plaintiff CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE ORG. INC.'s motion
 for partial summary judgment against Defendants, CITY OF CLEARWATER, et al. on
 all issues other than standing is denied.  It is further
  ORDERED that Defendants, CITY OF CLEARWATER, et al.'s motion for partial
 summary judgment against Plaintiff CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE ORG. INC.
 on the issue of standing is denied;
  ORDERED that Defendants, CITY OF CLEARWATER, et al.'s motion for
 partial summary judgment against Plaintiff CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE
 ORG. INC. on all issues other than standing is granted;
  ORDERED that all other pending motions before the Court in this case, as
 listed above, are denied as moot.
  DONE AND ORDERED.
                                    PROLOGUE
  In 1984, when this Court ruled that Ordinance 3479-84 was facially
 constitutional, the Court was accepting a burden that would save the parties
 time and effort by allowing the parties to appeal the Court's ruling
 immediately.  The Court recognized that it was dealing with the concerns of a
 municipality as expressed through its legislative body, and that the concerns
 required swift, expeditious attention.  This Court's role is merely to
 interpret the laws made by the elected representatives of the people, who, in
 making the laws, provide contemporary expression of the public's will and
 public policy.  An immediate appeal in this case provided the vehicle for an
 expeditious clarification and resolution of the issues raised by an expression
 of the people's will as manifested in a city ordinance.
  The Court also deferred to the fundamental precept that a statute, when
 possible, should be upheld as constitutional.  The Texas cases of
 International Society of Krishna Consciousness of Houston, Inc. v. City of
 Houston, Texas, 689 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.1982) and Poe v. City of Humble,
 Texas, 554 F.Supp. 233 (1983) also influenced the Court's ruling that the
 Clearwater ordinance was constitutional.  The Houston ordinance was initially
 passed in 1969.  The ordinance expressed the will of the people regarding
 financial disclosure in charitable solicitation situations.  It was tested by
 the Plaintiff in 1979 and the Fifth Circuit upheld the ordinance and the will
 of the people.  The ordinance was again upheld when Poe, a member of a
 religious society, brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a
 religious solicitation ordinance in Humble, Texas.  The Federal District Judge
 upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance citing Houston.  Likewise,
 this Court upheld the will of the people in upholding the constitutionality of
 the Clearwater ordinance.
  Since 1984, several important decisions have supported the Clearwater
 citizens' viewpoint.  See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
 of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990);
 Riley v. National Federation of The Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S.
 781, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988);  Hernandez v. Commissioner of
 Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2141, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989);
 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F.Supp. 1467
 (S.D.Fla.1989).
  *1533 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor also support, in their
 dissent from the Court's majority opinion in Riley, 487 U.S. 781, 108 S.Ct.
 2667, the Clearwater viewpoint that not all solicitation is protected first
 amendment conduct.  The Chief Justice said, about charitable contribution first
 amendment protection:
   The Court's opinion in Village of Schaumburg relied on the seminal
 cases of Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 [58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949]
 (1938), Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 [60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155]
 (1939), and Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 [63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313]
 (1943), as establishing the right of charitable solicitors under the First
 Amendment to be free from burdensome governmental regulation.  It is
 interesting to compare the activities of the three "solicitors" in those cases
 with the activities of professional fundraisers in cases like the present one.
 In Lovell, for example, appellant was convicted for distributing a religious
 pamphlet and a magazine called the "Golden Age" without a permit.  303 U.S.
 at 450 [58 S.Ct. at 668].  In Schneider, the evidence showed that one of the
 petitioners was a "Jehovah's Witness" who canvassed house-to-house seeking to
 leave behind some literature and to obtain contributions to defray the cost of
 printing additional literature for others.  308 U.S. at 158 [60 S.Ct. at
 149].  In Martin, the appellant was also a Jehovah's Witness, who went door-
 to-door distributing to residents of homes leaflets advertising a religious
 meeting.  319 U.S. at 142 [63 S.Ct. at 863].
   These activities are a far cry indeed from the activities of professional
 solicitors such as those involved in Munson and the present case.  In
 Munson, the plaintiff, an Indiana corporation, was "a professional for-
 profit fundraiser in the business of promoting fundraising events and giving
 advise to customers on how those events should be conducted.  Its Maryland
 customers include[d] various chapters of the Fraternal Order of Police."
 467 U.S. at 950 [104 S.Ct. at 2843].  The professional fundraisers in the
 present case presumably operate in the same manner.  Yet the Court obdurately
 refuses to allow the various States which have legislated in this area to
 distinguish between the sort of incidental fundraising involved in Lovell,
 Schneider, and Martin on the one hand, and the entirely commercial
 activities of people whose job is, simply put, figuring out how to raise money
 for charities.
   The Court has recognized that the commercial aspects of newsgathering and
 publishing are different from the editorial function, and has upheld regulation
 of the former against claims based on the First Amendment....

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